

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2				
TITLE (4) Loss of Automatic Control for 1501-3A & 3B																								
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)														
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES N/A						DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0									
0	6	2	8	8	4	8	4	0	0	7	0	0	0	7	2	5	8	4	0 5 0 0 0					
OPERATING MODE (9) N		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																						
POWER LEVEL (10) 01013		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)										
		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(e)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)										
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(e)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)										
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)				50.73 (a)(2)(vi)										
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)														
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)														
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																								
NAME Lawrence Coyle										TELEPHONE NUMBER 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 0														
AREA CODE (X-483)																								
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																								
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS														
B				N																				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)														
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO														

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During the unit Hot Standby, while performing maintenance on A02-2301-65, fuse 2330-702 was removed, which caused the loss of automatic control for the LPCI/CCSW heat exchanger delta p (remote control of valves 2-1501-3A and 3B). Safety significance was minimal since the unit was in Hot Standby and valves 2-1501-3A and 3B could be operated from the local control station. This is the first occurrence of this type.

The unit was brought to cold shutdown, fuse 2330-702 was replaced, and automatic control was returned to the valves. Upon investigation of the event, it was found that both LPCI system I and system II delta p controllers were supplied through the same fused circuit on the 120V AC instrument Bus, indicating that the CCSW/LPCI system did not meet single failure criterion. Unit 3 wiring was found identical to Unit 2. Modifications for both units were immediately initiated to provide an alternate feed for system II from 120V AC Essential Service Bus. A special procedure was written to verify the power source to selected loads on both the Essential Service Bus and the Instrument Bus.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104  
EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	8 4	— 0 0 7	— 0 0 0	2	OF 0 2	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

During the unit startup, fuse 2330-702 was removed to facilitate maintenance on valve A02-2301-65. The removal of the fuse inadvertently caused the loss of automatic control for the LPCI/CCSW heat exchanger delta p (remote control of valves 2-1501-3A and 3B), rendering both CCSW subsystems inoperable. (Tech Spec 3.5.B.4). Safety significance was minimal since the unit was in hot standby and valves 2-1501-3A and 3B could have been operated from the local control station. This is the first occurrence of this type at Dresden.

Because of the event the unit was returned to the cold shutdown status. Fuse 2330-702 was replaced, which restored automatic remote control for both valves. Upon investigation it was discovered that the LPCI/CCSW system did not meet single failure criterion. Dresden electrical print 12E2495 indicated that the LPCI system I controller was powered from the 120V AC Instrument Bus and the LPCI system II controller was powered from the 120V AC Essential Service (ESS) Bus. However, wiring diagram 12E2699 and a physical verification of the wiring revealed that both LPCI system I and II delta p controllers were supplied through the same fused circuit on the Instrument Bus. The Unit 3 wiring was checked and found identical to Unit 2.

A committee was immediately organized comprised of station personnel, Station Nuclear Engineering Department personnel and Sargent and Lundy personnel to investigate the event and recommend corrective actions. Modifications M12-2-84-73 and M12-3-84-73 were issued and completed for Unit 2 and 3, respectively, to provide the 3B controller of LPCI system II with a feed from the ESS Bus and to initiate the necessary blueprint Drawing Change Requests associated with the modifications. Also, special procedures SP 84-6-48 and 84-7-52 were written and completed for Unit 2 and 3, respectively, to verify the power source to selected loads on both the Essential Service Bus and the Instrument Bus. The circuits listed below were tested on Unit 2 and no discrepancies were found among the schematic drawings, wiring diagrams or existing plant wiring:

1. Circuit #2 Instrument Bus
2. Circuit #11 Instrument Bus
3. Circuit #12 Instrument Bus
4. Circuit #14 Essential Service Bus
5. Circuit #16 Essential Service Bus

Dresden Station believes that this event represents an isolated incident and therefore does not present a generic safety concern.



**Commonwealth Edison**

Dresden Nuclear Power Station

R.R. #1

Morris, Illinois 60450

Telephone 815/942-2920

July 25, 1984

DJS Ltr #84-728

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #84-007-0, Docket #050237 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(vi).

D.J. Scott  
Station Superintendent  
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

DJS/kjl

Enclosure

cc: J.G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III  
File/NRC  
File/Numerical

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