

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit #1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2		
TITLE (4) Reactor Scram When Putting Mode Switch to Shutdown																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 6	0 3	8 4	8 4	0 1 1	0 0	0 7	0 3	8 4					0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
N		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				80.36(e)(1)				80.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)		
0 0 0		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				80.36(e)(2)				80.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 308A)		
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				80.73(a)(2)(i)				80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)						
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				80.73(a)(2)(ii)				80.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)						
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				80.73(a)(2)(iii)				80.73(a)(2)(ix)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME Robert Randall, Supervisor Technical Services										TELEPHONE NUMBER						
										AREA CODE 3 1 5 3 4 9 - 2 4 4 5						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

## ABSTRACT

On June 3, 1984, during a refueling outage, a reactor scram occurred when the reactor mode switch was changed from the "refuel" position to the "shutdown" position. Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel 12 was in a manual trip condition at the time due to Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor cable modification. The manual scram signal which is designed to occur when the mode switch is moved to "shutdown" was jumpered on each channel of the Reactor Protection System. An improper connection on the RPS Channel 11 jumper allowed RPS Channel 11 to trip and initiate a reactor scram signal when the reactor mode switch was changed from the "refuel" position to the "shutdown" position. Since RPS Channel 12 was already in a tripped state, a full reactor scram resulted. The RPS Channel 11 jumper was removed and checked for continuity and found to be satisfactory. The scram signal was reset shortly after the incident occurred. The jumper was reconnected to RPS Channel 11 on June 4, 1984. The reactor mode switch was then changed from the "refuel" position to the "shutdown" position without the initiation of a reactor scram.

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Nine Mile Point Unit #1	0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0	8 4	— 0 1 1	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

TEXT

On June 3, 1984, during a refueling outage, the reactor mode switch was changed from the "refuel" position to the "shutdown" position. The reactor was in cold shutdown and subcritical, the control rods were all fully inserted. Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel 12 was in a manually tripped state due to Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor cable modifications being performed at the time. The manual scram signal which is designed to occur when the mode switch is moved to "shutdown" was jumpered on each channel of the RPS at the time. An improper connection on the RPS Channel 11 jumper allowed RPS Channel 11 to trip when the reactor mode switch was changed from the "refuel" position to the "shutdown" position. Since both channels of the RPS were tripped at the same time, a full reactor scram resulted.

ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

There are no potential safety consequences arising out of this event because: 1) The reactor was in cold shutdown and subcritical; 2) the mode switch was initially in the "refuel" position at the time of the event; 3) the control rods were all fully inserted at the time of the event; and 4) this manual scram signal cannot be jumpered while in the "run" or "startup" mode, as stated in the Technical Specifications, because this signal which occurs when the mode switch is moved to "shutdown" is designed to be an additional safety feature of the plant. A manual scram can be initiated by moving the mode switch to "shutdown" in any event where a scram was not initiated by automatic means or by the manual scram pushbuttons. Therefore, all of the conditions which caused this event to occur would not be present during normal operation.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The RPS Channel 11 jumper was removed and checked for continuity, and found to be satisfactory. The scram signal was reset shortly after the scram occurrence. The jumper was reconnected to RPS Channel 11 on June 4, 1984. The reactor mode switch was then changed from the "refuel" position to the "shutdown" position without the initiation of a manual reactor scram.

## NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA  MOHAWK300 ERIE BOULEVARD, WEST  
SYRACUSE, N. Y. 13202

July 2, 1984

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-220  
LER 84-11


Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following  
Licensee Event Report:

LER 84-11      Which is being submitted in accordance with  
10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), "Any event or condition  
that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of  
any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including  
the Reactor Protection System (RPS)."

A 10 CFR 50.72 report was made at 2230 hrs on June 3, 1984. This  
report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, dated  
September 1983.

Very truly yours,



Thomas E. Lempges  
Vice President  
Nuclear Generation

TEL/lo  
attachments  
cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley  
Regional Administrator

IE22  
1/1