

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | |

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

1	0	1	1	A	R	A	N	0	2	12	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	13	4	1	1	1	1	1	14	1	1	15
7				LICENSEE CODE								14	15	LICENSE NUMBER								25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58

REPORT SOURCE 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES IF
 On 10/9/81, while in Mode 3, the steam driven Emergency Feedwater Pump, 2P7A, tripped on overspeed while the
 monthly surveillance test was being performed. On 10/11/81, the EFW Pump, 2P7A, tripped on overspeed
 following a manual start during a unit trip recovery. On 10/12/81, the EFW Pump, 2P7A, tripped on overspeed
 after receiving an auto start signal following a turbine/reactor trip. The electric driven EFW Pump, 2P7B,
 was available at all times. Reportable per Technical Specification (T.S.) 6.9.1.9.b.

07	1			
08	1			
78	9			

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUB CODE	COMPONENT CODE				COMP SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0	9	1	2	T	U	R	B	I	N
7	8	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18

LER/RO	EVENT YEAR			SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.			OCCURRENCE CODE			REPORT TYPE			REVISION NO.		
17	REPORT	8	1	---	0	3	8	1	1	0	3	1	X	---	1
	NUMBER	21	22	23	24	25	26	27		28	29	30	31	32	

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
1 X 18	1 Z 19	1 Z 20	1 Z 21	1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 22	1 Y 23	1 Y 24	1 A 25	1 T 1 4 1 7 26
33	34	35	36	37 40	41	42	43	44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

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1 0 The 10/9/81, occurrence was believed to be caused by an oil leak in the turbine hydraulic system. The oil

1 1 leak was repaired, and the EFW Pump, 2P7A was tested, found to be operable, and returned to service. The

1 2 10/11/81, occurrence was attributed to condensation in the steam lines which resulted from insulation not

1 3 being reinstalled and a steam trap not being unisolated after a maintenance activity. The insulation was

1 4 replaced and the trap was unisolated. Also, the trap bypasses were opened to ensure that condensation (cont'd)

						80
FACILITY STATUS		% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
<u>I</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>128</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>Operator Observation</u>	
9	8	10	12	13	44	45
ACTIVITY		CONTENT			46	80

ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE	
1	6	1	2	1	135	1	136
8	9	10	11	44	45	80	

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										44	45	80
NUMBER				TYPE		DESCRIPTION						
1	7	1	0	0	0	37	2	38	NA			
8	9	10	11	12	13							139
PERSONNEL INJURIES												80

PERSONNEL INJURIES										80
NUMBER					DESCRIPTION					
1	8	1	0	0	0	40	NA			
	8		9		11	12				41
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY										80

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		80
TYPE	DESCRIPTION	
1. 9	Z 142 NA	143

[illegible]

NAME OF PREPARER: Patrick Rogers

PHONE: (501) 964-3100

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

• LER No. 50-368/81-038/03X-1

Occurrence Date: 10/09/81

Cause Description and Corrective Actions (Continued)

would not accumulate in the lines. The EFW Pump, 2P7A, was tested, found operable and returned to service. The 10/12/81, occurrence was caused by the steam supply control valve not being properly reset after maintenance. The valve limits were reset properly and the EFW Pump, 2P7A, was tested, and returned to operable status. The design of the governor for the turbine driver was determined to have a high sensitivity to minor system deficiencies which should not by themselves cause the driver to overspeed. Consequently, a design change to reduce sensitivity to overspeed was installed. The new design changed the startup method so that steam is admitted to the turbine through a new bypass line for 15 seconds prior to opening the steam inlet valves (2CV-0340-2). This allows the turbine speed to increase to the idle speed which pressurizes the hydraulic portion of the governor system. This facilitates the governor to respond quickly enough to prevent an overspeed trip when 2CV-0340-2 opens after the 15 second time delay. This design change was completed and the system was released to operations on 11/17/82.



ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

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July 16, 1984

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
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2
Docket No. 50-368
License No. NPF-6
Licensee Event Report
No. 81-038/03X-1

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Arkansas Nuclear one - Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b, attached is the subject report concerning steam driven Emergency Feedwater Pump (EFW) 2P7A. This is an update to a previous submittal dated October 30, 1981. Change bars have been added to indicate the updated material.

Very truly yours,


John R. Marshall
Manager, Licensing

JRM:RJS:ac

Attachment

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Mr. Norman M. Haller, Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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