

NRC Form 388  
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3:50-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Update Report

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 6	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Discovery of Unsealed Fire Barriers

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
0	3	1	4	8	4	0	1	4	0	1	0
0	3	1	4	8	4	0	1	4	N/A	0	5
0	3	1	4	8	4	0	1	4		0	5

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
4		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)						
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.38(a)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(a)						
0 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(a)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 356A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAME		AREA CODE	
Ronald W. Byrd/Licensing Engineer		6 0 1 4 3 7 7 2 1 4 9	

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)		NO				
X						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Field Engineering identified ten breached penetrations which function as fire barriers and/or secondary containment boundary seals. Fire watches were established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.7 upon discovery. The seals were restored by March 23, 1984.

The cause of this situation was personnel error. The error was contrary to approved procedures. An inspection of 688 Unit 1 penetrations was conducted to determine if other unidentified breached barriers existed. As a result of this inspection an additional eight breached penetration seals were found. Also, the Quality Control Group identified 3 breached penetrations while inspecting other penetration sealing work.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 6 8 4	-	0 1 4	-	0 1	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On March 14, 1984, Field Engineering identified seven penetrations which were not intact. On March 18, three additional breached penetrations were identified. The penetrations function as fire barriers and/or secondary containment boundary seals. Some of the barriers were intact on one side of the wall. Others were completely open through the wall.

One penetration, open under an approved work order was listed incorrectly on the closing document (i.e., AE-72E was listed as AS-72D). Two penetrations were opened to route conduit for a design change but were not identified by the work instructions. The cause for other discrepancies could not be determined. The time period in which the penetrations were opened or damaged could not be determined in most cases. However, a successful secondary containment drawdown by the Standby Gas Treatment System was performed on September 23, 1983, just prior to the startup on September 25. The reactor remained critical until November 8, 1983.

The errors were contrary to approved procedures. The penetrations were apparently breached without the proper authorizations and without establishing fire watches as required by Technical Specification 3.7.7. The penetrations were restored on March 23, 1984. A successful secondary containment drawdown by the Standby Gas Treatment System was completed on March 27, 1984.

The "Implementation of Modifications and New Design Requirements" procedure has been revised to include guidance in performing walkdown inspections prior to design change package closeout. This guidance now includes verification that cable/raceway fire protection is installed or restored.

688 safety related electrical type silicone foam filled penetrations in Unit 1 were selected as the base for a penetration walkdown inspection to determine if other breached barriers existed. Silicone foam filled penetrations were chosen because they are most easily damaged and/or violated while performing work. Also, since these type penetrations are relatively easy to open, they are more likely to be opened without proper authorization. The 688 penetrations represent 33% of the total number with this type seal. Of these, eight breached penetrations were identified by the walkdown inspection. Three others were identified by the Quality Control Group while inspecting other penetration work.

The silicone foam penetration seals used for the data base and inspection group consisted of not only fire seals but approximately half of the walkdown group were fire and pressure, fire and air, or pressure seals which form either secondary containment or control room envelope boundaries and were in the most common worked areas. Due to the very low number of breached penetrations identified by the walkdown inspection, MP&L believes there is a sufficient confidence level in the operability of the fire barriers to warrant no additional actions.



# MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

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P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

October 5, 1984

NUCLEAR LICENSING & SAFETY DEPARTMENT

Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station  
Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-416  
License No. NPF-13  
File: 0260/L-835.0  
Update Report - Discovery of  
Unsealed Fire Barriers  
LER 84-014-1  
AECM-84/0457

Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 84-014-1 which is a final report.

Yours truly,

*L. F. Dale*  
L. F. Dale  
Director

EBS/SHH:rg  
Attachment

cc: Mr. J. B. Richard (w/a)  
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