



NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION / 300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202 / TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

June 29, 1984
(NMP2L 0097)

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
Division of Project and Resident Programs
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is a final report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the problem concerning Anchor-Darling valves (55(e)-84-03). This problem was reported via telecon to Mr. W. Lazerus of your staff on January 27, 1984. An interim report was submitted to the NRC via our letter dated February 27, 1984.

Very truly yours,

T. E. Lempges
Vice President
Nuclear Generation

TEL/TL:ja
Enclosure

xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

R. A. Gramm, Resident Inspector

Project File

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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-410

Final Report for a Problem
Concerning Anchor-Darling Valves
(55(e)-84-03)

Description of the Problem

The problem pertains to the Anchor-Darling globe valves used in the high-pressure core spray system. The problem is attributed to the loosening of the antirotational set screws due to vibration in the valves. General Electric has informed Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation that it has reported this problem to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10CFR21. The problem also was addressed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in I.E. Information Notice No. 83-70. Three valves with Mark Nos. 2CSH*MOV110, 111 and 112 are affected.

Analysis of Safty Implications

General Electric has stated that these valves may fail to operate as a result of this condition. These valves are provided for flow testing of the high pressure core spray system. The loosening of the antirotational set screws and subsequent failure of valves 2CSH*MOV110 and 112 to close after a testing operation would provide an open flow path from the discharge of the high pressure core spray system pump to the condensate storage tank. In addition, with valves 2CSH*MOV110, 111 and 112 open, the effectiveness of the high pressure core spray system to respond following a loss of coolant accident would be reduced since high pressure core spray system injection water would preferentially flow to the lower pressure condensate storage tank and/or suppression pool rather than the reactor vessel. Therefore, if this problem remained uncorrected, it could have adversely affected the safety of operation of the plant. As a result, the criteria for reportability under 10CFR50.55(e) have been met.

Corrective Action

The corrective action will be to stake the antirotational screws. This action is expected to be complete by December 31, 1984.

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