

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 9 1 7										PAGE 13 1 OF 0 2																															
TITLE (4) Misapplication of Fuses in 250 V.D.C. System																																																			
EVENT DATE (8)						LER NUMBER (6)						REPORT DATE (7)						OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																																	
MONTH		DAY		YEAR		YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER		M. NTH		DAY		YEAR		FACILITY NAMES																																	
0 5		3		0 8		4 8		4		0 4		8		0 0		0 6		2 5		8 4		DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0																													
0 5		3		0 8		4 8		4		0 4		8		0 0		0 6		2 5		8 4		0 5 0 0 0																													
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																																																	
2		20.402(b)										20.406(c)										80.73(a)(2)(iv)										73.71(b)																			
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 0 5										20.406(a)(1)(i)										80.38(e)(1)										80.73(a)(2)(v)										73.71(c)									
												20.406(a)(1)(ii)										80.38(e)(2)										80.73(a)(2)(vii)										OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text NRC Form 366A)									
												20.406(a)(1)(iii)										80.73(a)(2)(i)										80.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)																			
												20.406(a)(1)(iv)										X 80.73(a)(2)(ii)										80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)																			
												20.406(a)(1)(v)										80.73(a)(2)(iii)										80.73(a)(2)(ix)																			
LICENEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																																																			
NAME C.M. Powers, Reactor Engineering Supervisor																TELEPHONE NUMBER 5 0 1 9 3 1 7 1 - 1 2 5 0 1 7																																			
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) Ext. 2996																																																			
CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NRC				CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NRC																															
B		E J		I F U B		5 6 9		Y																																											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH		DAY		YEAR																													
YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)																X NO																																			

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Fuses used in the class IE 250 V.D.C. system were discovered to be inappropriately applied. A portion of these fuses which were required to return the 250 volt system to within its design basis were immediately replaced and the balance of the fuses scheduled for replacement during the next major maintenance outage.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 4 -	0 4 8 -	0 0	0 2	OF	0 2	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

- a) Power Level - 5%
b) Plant Mode - 2

Event

Inappropriate application of 250 volt type TR and FRN fuses discovered in Class 1 250 V.D.C. System.

Immediate Corrective Action

Initiate immediate changeout of non-1E load fuses off the 250 V.D.C. class 1 bus.

Notification was given to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B).

Further Corrective Action

Balance of 250 V.D.C. system fuses scheduled to be replaced during next major maintenance outage.

Safety Significance

The fuse manufacturer (Bussman) indicated that inductive loads (such as motors and motor operators) require fuses rated at a higher voltage. Bussman pointed out that the worst case fault for the existing fuses was arcing over the cartridge case and failure to clear the fault. Thus a fault in a non-1E load could potentially result in the loss of the entire 250 V.D.C. system and control of some outboard containment isolation valves supplied from this bus. This in conjunction with a postulated single failure could result in loss of containment integrity. Protection of the 250 volt bus from faults in non-1E loads has maintained an adequate level of assurance that the bus will perform its intended function if challenged, thereby returning the 250 volt bus to within its design basis. With the implementation of the immediate corrective actions, the safety significance of this condition has been eliminated.

Washington Public Power Supply System

P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397
June 25, 1984

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555


Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 84-048

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 84-048 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of Technical Specification Section 6.9.1.7 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This is the follow-up report to the verbal notification given at 1645 hours on May 30, 1984.

Very truly yours,



J. D. Martin (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

JDM:mm

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No. 84-048

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, Administrator
Region V, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1450 Maria Lane
Walnut Creek, California 94596
Mr. A. D. Toth, NRC Resident Inspector (901A)
Ms. Dottie Sherman
American Nuclear Insurers
The Exchange Suite 245
270 Farmington Ave.
Farmington, CT 06032

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