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**Florida
Power**
CORPORATION

June 13, 1984
3F0684-09

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator, Region II
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30323

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3
Docket No. 50-302
Operating Licensing No. DPR-72
Special Report No. 84-02

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Special Report No. 84-02 which is submitted in accordance with
Technical Specification 6.9.2.a.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

G. R. Westafer
Manager, Nuclear Operations
Licensing and Fuel Management

AEF/feb

Enclosure

cc: Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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SPECIAL REPORT 84-02

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On March 12, 1984, the Instrument and Control (I&C) Technicians were performing a surveillance test on the Engineered Safeguards System. After having completed the testing on Channels 1, 2, and 3 'A' train equipment, they began with the Reactor Building Isolation and Cooling portion of the 'B' train. Channel 2 had been tested satisfactorily and the test switch was positioned to test Channel 3. Approximately ten to fifteen seconds later, the High Pressure Injection relay in Channel 2 'B' train actuated several times and then cleared. With Channel 3 in test and Channel 2 actuated, the two out of three logic requirement was met and the 'B' train of Engineered Safeguards High Pressure Injection was initiated.

PLANT PERFORMANCE

1. Pre-Event

The plant was at ninety-eight percent (98%) Reactor Power (877 MWe). Both Emergency Diesel Generators were in standby. The 'B' Makeup and Purification Pump was running, supplying normal makeup to the Reactor Coolant System. The Reactor Containment Fans 'A' and 'C' were running in slow. Decay Heat Removal Pumps 'A' and 'B' were off. All other Engineered Safeguards associated systems were in a normal lineup with the normal duty unit in service and the emergency units in standby. These systems are:

- a. Emergency Diesel Generators
- b. Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling
- c. Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling
- d. Nuclear Services Seawater

2. Initiating Event

The initiating event was the spurious actuation of a relay in Channel 2 of High Pressure Injection train 'B' of the Engineered Safeguards System while Channel 3 of the same system was in test. This satisfied the two out of three logic requirement and initiated High Pressure Injection.

All appropriate equipment started automatically and borated water was injected into the Reactor Coolant System. No anomalies in equipment were noted.

3. Post Event

The operators ascertained that the actuation was falsely initiated and began recovery. The equipment which was unnecessarily started was replaced with normal duty equipment. Injection of borated water was secured. The power reduction caused by boron injection was approximately eight percent. No abnormalities in equipment operation were noted.

4. Operator Actions and Procedural Adequacy

The I&C Technicians were following the surveillance procedure and there were no deviations from it. Their actions were appropriate both before and after the initiation. The procedure has been used as it is written for the last five months without a prior occurrence of this event.

The actions of the control room operators were expeditious and appropriate following the initiation. All procedures were adequate for recovery operations.

ACCUMULATED ACTUATION CYCLES

<u>Transient</u>	<u>MUV-42</u>	<u>MUV-43</u>	<u>MUV-36</u>	<u>MUV-37</u>
ES Actuation (Expected)	2	2	2	2
ES Actuation (Inadvertent)	4	4	4	4
ES Actuation (Test)	15	15	15	15