

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)  
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000397

PAGE (3)

1 OF 02

TITLE (4)  
Significant Design Deficiency

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)								
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)						
0	5	2	5	8	4	8	4	0	4	7	0	5	0	0	0		
												0	5	0	0	0	

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)															
4		20.402(b)				20.406(a)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)			
POWER LEVEL (10)		0.0				20.406(a)(1)(i)				X 50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(a)			
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(a)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)			
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)				50.72(b)(2)(ii)			
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME  
L.D. Kassakatis, Plant Compliance Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

510 931 771-2501

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) Ext. 2201

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
B	J	M		N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

X NO

ABSTRACT (16) (Limit to 1400 words, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Biological Shield Wall - Penetration Fire Protection Seals not installed.

Immediate corrective action was to establish a Fire Watch Patrol in accordance with Technical Specification Action Item (3.7.7.a).

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 4	—	0 4 7	—	0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 356A's) (17)

Plant Conditions

- a) Power Level - 0%  
b) Plant Mode - 4

Event

During a cross-discipline review of radiation shielding for penetrations through the biological shield wall, it was determined that the previous design did not consider radiant heat from adjacent fire zones to possibly ignite the urethane foam separating the biological shield wall and primary containment vessel. The resultant fire could incapacitate the electrical penetrations required for safe shutdown. The WNP-2 FSAR committed that the biological shield wall penetrations must be sealed to maintain the three hour margin required by 10CFR50, Appendix R.

Immediate Corrective Action

Upon notification of the event the Shift Manager assigned a person as a Fire Watch Patrol to view one side of the wall in all areas where unsealed penetrations exist, at least once every hour, in accordance with Technical Specification Action Item 3.7.7.a. This person's duties were to determine that no fire exists that could ignite the foam between containment pressure vessel and the biological shield wall. Verbal notification was given to NRC at 1530 hours on May 25, 1984.

Final Corrective Action

All but one of the penetrations determined to need seals (122) were sealed with a minimum of four inches of approved sealing media which will provide not less than 3 (three) hours of fire protection to the containment pressure vessel. Engineering direction to seal the remaining one penetration is in development and when complete will result in 100% sealing. Hourly fire watch patrols will be maintained until 100% closure is achieved. All other rated fire walls within the Plant have been reviewed for this condition and it has been determined no further sealing is required.

Safety Significance

Biological shield wall, as committed in the FSAR (per 10CFR50, Appendix R) is a 3-hour fire barrier. In the event of a fire in the Reactor Building, had it gone undetected for a significant period of time, it was deemed possible that high temperatures from the fire could have resulted in radiant heat transmission through the unsealed penetrations and igniting the urethane foam insulation. Burning of this foam could result in heat damage to electrical penetrations associated with dedicated safe shutdown equipment and potentially preclude achieving safe shutdown.

However, this did not happen and actions taken since the determination that fire seals were required have eliminated the condition. The assessment was made that the event posed no danger to Plant personnel or the public.

## Washington Public Power Supply System

P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397  
June 15, 1984

Document Control Desk  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555


Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 84-047

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 84-047 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of Technical Specification Section 6.9.1.7 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This is the follow-up report to the verbal notification given at 1530 hours on May 25, 1984.

Very truly yours,

  
J. D. Martin (M/D 927M)  
WNP-2 Plant Manager

JDM:mm

Enclosure:  
Licensee Event Report No. 84-047

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, Administrator  
Region V, Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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Walnut Creek, California 94596  
Mr. A. D. Toth, NRC Resident Inspector (901A)  
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