

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station-Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 8				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2		
TITLE (4) Inadvertent ESF Actuation (RWCU valve)																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0	5	1	5	8	4	8	4	0	0	5	0	0	0	0		
0	5	1	5	8	4	8	4	0	0	6	1	2	8	4		
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
2		20.402(b)				20.406(e)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)				
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.38(e)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)				
0 0 4		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(e)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)				
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME L.A. Kuczynski - Nuclear Plant Specialist III										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7 1 7 5 4 2 1 - 3 7 1 5 9						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC						
A	CIE	*	*	N												
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During the performance of the monthly functional test of the Reactor Water Cleanup System Area Ventilation Differential Temperature Channels, an error by the Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) personnel performing the test caused the inadvertent closure of a valve that is part of the Primary Containment Isolation System (an Engineered Safety Feature). The valve was restored to its normal position within ten minutes. The I&C personnel received formal instruction stressing verbatim compliance with procedures.

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PDR ADOCK 05000388  
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\* Not Applicable

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (5)

PAGE (3)

Susquehanna Steam Electric  
Station-Unit 2

0 5 0 0 0 3 8 8 8 4 - 0 0 5 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

The six Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Area Ventilation differential temperature channels undergo a channel functional surveillance test on a monthly basis. Temperature channels A, C and E (Division I) provide high area differential temperature isolation signals to the RWCU containment inboard isolation valve; channels B, D and F provide signals to the RWCU containment outboard isolation valve. Both the RWCU valves specified above are considered part of the Primary Containment Isolation System, which is an Engineered Safety Feature.

On May 15, 1984, with the unit at less than 1% power, Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) technicians commenced the monthly functional test of the differential temperature channels. In preparation for testing the Division II channels, the I&C technicians mistakenly bypassed the Division I channels. (This was a cognitive error. The test procedure is written correctly.) Thus, when the Division II channels were activated per the test procedure, the RWCU containment outboard isolation valve closed on the simulated high temperature signal. (An inadvertent ESF activation.)

Both RWCU pumps had been in operation, with the system lined up to reject excess reactor coolant to the main condenser. (This is a normal configuration during heatup of the reactor pressure vessel.) The pumps tripped when the valve closed. Operations personnel reacted promptly to assess the situation and restored the RWCU system to operation within ten minutes.

The I&C personnel involved (non-licensed, utility) received formal instruction by their supervisor stressing the importance of verbatim compliance with procedures. If this event had occurred at 100% power, its consequences would still have remained minimal. The error was correctly identified and mitigated by the personnel involved with no safety impact to the plant. Due to the short duration of the event, none of the sampling required by Surveillance Requirement 4.4.4.c was or needed to be performed.



Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

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
June 12, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 84-005-00  
ER 100450 FILE 841-23  
PLA-2235

Docket No. 50-388  
License No. NPF-22

Attached is Licensee Event Report 84-005-00. This event was determined reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) in that during a surveillance test, the unit experienced an unanticipated Engineered Safety Feature actuation limited to the closure of a valve that is part of the Primary Containment Isolation System.



H.W. Keiser  
Superintendent of Plant-Susquehanna

LAK/pjg

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