

James A. FitzPatrick
Nuclear Power Plant
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Corbin A. McNeill, Jr.
Resident Manager

May 31, 1984
JAFP 84-0552

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Attention: Richard W. Starostecki, Director
Division of Project and Resident Program

SUBJECT: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-333
Inspection No. 84-04

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2 Appendix C, we are submitting our response to Appendix A notice of Violation transmitted by your letter dated May 9, 1984, as received by the undersigned on May 11, 1984. This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. L. Doerflein of your office on March 1 through 31, 1984, at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.

RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION

A. The Power Authority agrees with this finding:

The fundamental cause of the violation was failure of the operator to follow the procedure for conducting plant start-ups and heat-ups. In addition, there was a loss of supervisory control on the part of the Shift Supervisor and the Assistant Shift Supervisor due to a break down in communication.

The immediate corrective action was to reduce the heat-up rate to within procedural limits by inserting control rods. This action resulted in full compliance with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.A.1 and surveillance test F-ST-26J.

The long term corrective actions are:

1. All Shift Supervisors and Assistant Shift Supervisors will be instructed on control room management techniques. This instruction will be administered by the Operations Superintendent during the weekly department meetings.
2. All operating shifts will be counseled on the importance of following approved written procedures.

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3. Alarm points have been incorporated in the plant process computer to alarm a fifteen minute intervals when the heat-up rate administrative limit of operating procedure for start-up/shutdown (F-OP-65) and Technical Specification Limit of 3.6.A.1 is approached.
4. The event has been incorporated in the licensed operator requalification program.


B. The Power Authority agrees with this finding:

The fundamental cause of this violation was failure of the management staff (Shift Supervisor, Reactor Analyst Supervisor, Operations Superintendent) to recognize and assess the proper post work testing requirements to insure the requirements of Technical Specifications 3.3.C.1 were satisfied.

The immediate corrective action on March 28, 1984 was to perform scram time testing in accordance with Reactor Analyst Procedure (RAP) 7.3.10 and Work Activity Control Procedure (WACP) 10.1.1. This action resulted in the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant being in full compliance with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.C.

The permanent corrective action was to revise the cold start-up check-off operating procedure to include a check-off for scheduling scram time testing after outages in which CRD replacement has occurred. This check-off insures that proper post work testing is scheduled to be performed after control rod drive maintenance and conducted when plant conditions permit as per the requirements of Technical Specification 4.3.C.1 which require the testing to be performed at a reactor pressure of greater than 950 psig and prior to exceeding 40 percent power.

Very truly yours,



Corbin A. McNeill, Jr.
Resident Manager

CAM:DJL:dmh

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