

WOLF CREEK

NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

John A. Bailey
Vice President
Operations

January 17, 1992

NO 92-0019


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-482: Licensee Event Report 91-017-01

Gentlemen:

The attached revision to Licensee Event Report (LER) 91-017-00 is being submitted to provide the results of an investigation of the potential inoperability of the Fuel Building and Auxiliary Building Emergency Exhaust Systems. This investigation showed that both Emergency Exhaust systems remained operable during the event. Therefore this event is no longer reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) or 50.73(c)(2)(vii) and Revision 1 is being submitted as a supplemental report.

Very truly yours,



John A. Bailey
Vice President
Operations

JAB/aem

Attachment

cc: A. T. Howell (NRC), w/a
R. D. Martin (NRC), w/a
G. A. Pick (NRC), w/a
W. D. Reckley (NRC), w/a

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) **Wolf Creek Generating Station** DOCKET NUMBER (2) **050004821** OF **05** PAGE (3)

TITLE (4) **Resolution of Potential Inoperability of Fuel Building and Auxiliary Building Emergency Exhaust Systems**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	DOCKET NUMBER (9)		
09	20	91	91	017	01	01	15	92	05	00	00

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9)	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
3	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.96(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
POWER LEVEL (10) 10	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.96(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	Supplemental Report
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Merlin G. Williams - Manager Plant Support	AREA CODE 316 364-8831

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On September 21, 1991, at 0748 CDT, Security personnel notified Control Room operators that a Fuel Building/Auxiliary Building pressure boundary door was found propped open without a continuous watch having been established. Subsequent evaluation concluded that with this door open, the Fuel Building and Auxiliary Building Emergency Exhaust Systems (EES) may not have been able to maintain a negative pressure greater than or equal to .25 inch Water Gauge independently as required by Technical Specification 3.7.7 and 3.9.13 for Fuel Building and Auxiliary Building EES operability. Subsequent testing has shown that with this door open, the Fuel Building and Auxiliary Building EES were able to maintain a negative pressure greater than or equal to .25 inch Water Gauge independently as required by Technical Specifications.

The root cause of this event is failure to follow procedures by the craftsmen who propped the door open to move scaffolding through the door. To prevent recurrence of this event, the Manager Modifications has discussed this event and its ramifications with his craftsmen's supervision.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Wolf Creek Generating Station	0 5 0 0 0 4 8 2 9 1	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	0 2 0 5
		0	1	7	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

INTRODUCTION

On September 21, 1991, at approximately 0748 CDT, Security personnel notified Control Room operators that a Fuel Building[ND]/Auxiliary Building [NF] pressure boundary door [ND/NF-DR] was found propped open without a continuous watch having been established. Subsequent evaluation concluded that with this door open, the Fuel Building and Auxiliary Building Emergency Exhaust Systems (EES) may not have been able to maintain a negative pressure greater than or equal to .25 inch Water Gauge independently as required by Technical Specification (T/S) 3.7.7 and 3.9.13 for Fuel Building and Auxiliary Building EES operability. Therefore, Revision 0 of this Licensee Event Report was submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii). Subsequent testing has shown that with this door open, the Fuel Building and Auxiliary Building EES were able to maintain a negative pressure greater than or equal to .25 inch Water Gauge independently as required by T/S.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS

On September 20, 1991, at 1842 CDT, Security personnel took Door 15071 [ND/NF-DR] off-line to facilitate the movement of scaffolding through Door 15071 into Door 1507A by Modifications craftsmen. Door 15071 is located between the Fuel Building and Auxiliary Building. Door 15071 is a fire door and also serves as part of the EES pressure boundary. A Security Officer, who was posted at nearby Door 1507A, was informed to provide alarm assessment and monitor access for the door during the transfer of equipment through Door 15071. The craftsmen entered the area and were informed by the Security Officer that someone would need to hold the door open and be responsible for closing the door when they were finished since it was a pressure boundary door. Subsequently, the craftsmen propped Door 15071 open with a spool of rope and commenced the transfer of equipment through the door.

On September 21, 1991, at approximately 0330 CDT, the craftsmen, whose shift was to be ending soon, stopped the transfer of equipment. The Security Officer then returned to monitoring only Door 1507A as originally posted. Following the Security Shift turnover at approximately 0700 CDT, the on-coming Security Officer posted at Door 1507A recognized that Door 15071 required a continuous watch while propped open. On September 21, 1991, at 0748 CDT, Security personnel notified Control Room operators that Door 15071 was found propped open without a continuous watch having been established and the door was immediately secured.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (3)			PAGE (3)
Wolf Creek Generating Station	0500048291	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	03 of 05

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 302A's) (17)

The Auxiliary Building EES ensures that any radioactive materials leaking from the Emergency Core Cooling System (JE) equipment within the Auxiliary Building following a loss of coolant accident are filtered prior to reaching the environment. Technical Specification 3.7.7 requires two operable independent Auxiliary Building EES while in Mode 1, Power Operation, through Mode 4, Hot Shutdown. With one Auxiliary Building EES inoperable, T/S 3.7.7 requires restoration of the inoperable system to operable status within 7 days or to be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours. Technical Specification 3.7.7 does not provide an action in the event both Auxiliary Building EES are inoperable. Consequently, entry into T/S 3.0.3 is required if both Auxiliary Building EES are inoperable. In part, operability of the Auxiliary Building EES must be demonstrated by verifying that the system maintains the Auxiliary Building at a negative pressure of greater than or equal to .25 inch Water Gauge relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation.

Additionally, Technical Specification 3.9.13 for the Fuel Building EES requires two operable independent Fuel Building EES whenever irradiated fuel is in the spent fuel pool. The Fuel Building EES ensures that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. With one Fuel Building EES inoperable, T/S 3.9.13 allows fuel movement within the fuel storage areas or crane operation with loads over the fuel storage areas to proceed provided the operable Fuel Building EES is in operation and discharging through at least one train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. With two Fuel Building EES inoperable, T/S 3.9.13 requires suspending all operations involving movement of fuel within the fuel storage areas or crane operation with loads over the fuel storage area until at least one Fuel Building EES is restored to operable status. In part, operability of the Fuel Building EES must be demonstrated by verifying a negative pressure of greater than or equal to .25 inch Water Gauge relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation.

Subsequent evaluation concluded that with Door 15071 propped open, the Auxiliary Building and Fuel Building EES may not have been able to maintain negative pressures greater than or equal to .25 inch Water Gauge independently as required by T/S 3.7.7 and 3.9.13 for Fuel Building and Auxiliary Building EES operability. Although this evaluation concluded that both EES were inoperable, the action statement for T/S 3.9.13 for both Fuel Building EES being operable was met during the time Door 15071 was propped open. Because T/S 3.7.7 does not provide an action for both Auxiliary Building EES being inoperable, T/S 3.0.3 should have been entered. Additionally, this evaluation

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Wolf Creek Generating Station	01500048291	-	017	-	0104 OF 05

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

determined that a pressure test would have to be performed with Door 15071 open to conclusively prove or disprove Fuel Building and Auxiliary Building EES operability in this configuration. It was determined that it was not feasible to perform this pressure test at the time.

Subsequently, on November 29, 1991, a pressure test was conducted to monitor the Auxiliary Building negative pressure with Door 15071 open. Operation of the Auxiliary Building EES Train "A" results in the limiting negative pressure. Therefore, the test was performed with Auxiliary Building EES Train "A" in operation. The Auxiliary Building maintained a negative pressure greater than .25 inch Water Gauge with Door 15071 open. Therefore, the operability of the Auxiliary Building EES was not affected by Door 15071 being propped open.

On December 10, 1991, a pressure test was conducted to monitor the Fuel Building negative pressure with Door 15071 open. Operation of the Fuel Building EES Train "B" results in the limiting negative pressure. Therefore, the test was performed with Fuel Building EES Train "B" in operation. The Fuel Building maintained a negative pressure greater than .25 inch Water Gauge with Door 15071 open. Therefore, the operability of the Fuel Building EES was not affected by Door 15071 being propped open.

ROOT CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

The root cause of this event is failure to follow procedures by the craftsmen who propped open Door 15071 to move scaffolding through the door. Procedure ADM 13-103, "Fire Protection: Impairment Control" instructs personnel on station policy that inanimate objects are not to be used to prop open a door since the station has committed to maintaining doors capable of closing and latching automatically at all times. The procedure also states that use of inanimate objects is allowed to prop open a door only when the door is controlled by a permit in accordance with the procedure. Additionally, this procedure states that prior to issuing a permit for any door listed in an Operations Special Order concerning pressure doors, the Shift Supervisor shall be consulted for heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems operability requirements. The craftsmen who propped open Door 15071 did not comply with procedure ADM 13-103 requirements.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (3)	PAGE (4)			
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YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER				
Wolf Creek Generating Station	0 5 0 0 0 4 8 2 9 1	- 0 1 7 - 0 1	0 5 OF 0 5			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 336A's) (17)

Because the investigation into this event has been unsuccessful at identifying the craftsmen involved, to prevent recurrence of this event, the Manager Modifications has discussed this event and its ramifications with his craftsmen's supervision. Additionally, to enhance the administrative controls for maintaining pressure boundary doors closed, Security has issued a Special Order to Security personnel requiring notification to the Shift Supervisor when taking any normally on-line pressure boundary door off-line. The Security Special Order also instructs Security personnel to notify the Shift Supervisor any time a door is found propped open without the proper permit. Additional long-term programmatic enhancements are being evaluated and will be implemented by March 31, 1992.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

At the time of this event, the unit was in Mode 3, Hot Standby, cooling down for refueling. There was no damage to plant equipment or release of radioactivity as a result of this event. At no time did conditions develop that may have posed a threat to the health and safety of the public.

Licensee Event Report (LER) 90-005-00 discusses an event in which inadequate procedures resulted in improper control of pressure boundary doors which adversely effected the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System operability. In response to LER 90-005-00, procedure ADM 13-103 was revised to provide administrative controls for propping open pressure boundary doors. Because the craftsmen failed to follow this procedure, this procedure revision had no effect in preventing this event's occurrence.