

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)  
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 8 8

PAGE (3)

1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)  
Unplanned ESF Actuations.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)														
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)													
0	5	0	1	8	4	8	4	0	0	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	5	3	1	8	4	SSSES - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																							
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)						20.406(e)						50.73(a)(2)(iv)						73.71(b)					
		20.406(a)(1)(i)						50.36(e)(1)						50.73(a)(2)(v)						73.71(c)					
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)						50.36(e)(2)						50.73(a)(2)(vii)						OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)					
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(i)						50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)											
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)						50.73(a)(2)(ii)						50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)											
		20.406(a)(1)(v)						50.73(a)(2)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(ix)											

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)  
NAME  
R.W. Stanley - Compliance Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

7 1 7 5 4 2 - 1 3 1 6 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	
A	JIM	*	*	N						

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)  
☐ YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

With the Unit in a shutdown condition with non-irradiated fuel, unplanned Unit 2 Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuations occurred while installing test equipment in the Division II Primary Containment Isolation System Circuitry. The isolation occurred when the test equipment leads were inadvertently grounded during installation of a recorder. The grounding blew a circuit fuse. The condition was quickly identified by involved personnel. The fuse was replaced, and systems restored. The ESF systems isolated, or were initiated, as designed during the isolation. The grounding of the lead was accidental. There are no corrective actions planned regarding this event. This is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) since the event involved the unplanned actuation of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 9/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 8 8 8 4 - 0 0 4 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

Unit 1 was at 100% Power. Unit 2 was shutdown at 0% Power, Condition 4, with non-irradiated fuel loaded in the vessel. The Unit 2 Division II primary containment isolation signal did not have a detrimental effect on the operation of either unit since all systems responded per design.

At 0755, on 5/1/84, Unit 2 received a Division II primary containment isolation signal. The primary containment isolation signals are designed to automatically isolate the Primary and Secondary Containment to prevent the release of radioactive material.

All the correct Division II isolations were received. These included Zone II fans (Unit 2 Reactor Building) and Zone III fans (Refueling Floor Common Area) tripping, Standby Gas Treatment system initiation, Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System (CREOASS) initiation, and isolation of the Shutdown Cooling system.

The isolation was caused by a blown fuse during the setup of test equipment required for Time Response Testing in the Relay Room. The fuse blew due to one lead of the Visicorder connected to the positive side of the isolation circuit, and the other lead accidentally touched the grounded floor. Quick action from the I&C Tech. allowed him to analyze the situation and notify the Control Room of the cause of the trip. With concurrence from the Control Room the fuse was replaced which allowed the Operation department to reset, and begin recovery from the Division II Isolation, at approximately 0815. Recovery was completed at approximately 0840. Supervisory personnel reviewed the incident with station I&C technicians.



Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

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May 31, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 84-004  
ER 100450 FILE 841-23  
PLA-2225

Docket No. 50-388  
License No. NPF-22

Attached is Licensee Event Report 84-004. This event was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) in that an unplanned Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation occurred. During the event, the reactor was in a shutdown condition. The actuation was caused by a blown fuse. This resulted in all the expected actuations.

H.W. Keiser  
Superintendent of Plant-Susquehanna

RWS/pjg

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