

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	M	I	P	A	L	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4		5							
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35							
LICENSEE CODE														LICENSE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE										CAT	

0	1	R	E	P	O	R	T	S	O	U	R	C	E	6	0	5	0	0	0	2	5	5	7	1	0	0	3	8	3	8	0	5	2	9	8	4	9						
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43							
REPORT SOURCE														DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE										REPORT DATE									

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

On two occasions, fire inspection tours of the Engineered Safeguards Rooms were not completed within the required hourly period. In a separate occurrence, a fire inspection tour of cable penetration room was not completed within the required hourly period. The fire tours were being conducted as compensatory measures for the loss of fire barrier generation integrity per TS 3.22.5.1. Reportable per TS 6.9.2.b(2). No threat to public health/safety resulted. The plant is shutdown for refueling.

0	9	Z	Z	11	A	12	Z	13	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	14	Z	15	Z	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50															
SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE										COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.		ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER																					
Z		Z		11		A										Z		Z		15		Z		18		X		1		Y		Y		Z		Z		0		Y		N		Z		Z																					
17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

The first occurrence was caused by the failure to adequately communicate the significance of timely completion of fire tours. The second occurrence was caused by personnel error. Procedures have been revised to emphasize timely fire tour completion. Additionally, start and completion times of tours will be communicated via radio for improved monitoring.

1	5	H	28	0	0	0	29	NA	30	A	31	Routine Review	32	NA	33	NA	34	NA	35	NA	36	NA	37	NA	38	NA	39	NA	40	NA	41	NA	42	NA	43	NA	44	NA	45	NA	46	NA	47	NA	48	NA	49	NA	50
FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION		ACTIVITY		CONTENT		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE		PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		PERSONNEL INJURIES		LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		PUBICITY		ISSUED		DESCRIPTION		NRC USE ONLY																			
H		0		NA		A		Routine Review		NA		NA		NA		NA		NA		NA		NA		NA		NA		NA		NA																			

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JGKeppler, Administrator
Palisades Plant
ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-068 (REV 1)
May 29, 1984

A review of fire inspection tour activities revealed that required hourly fire inspection tours of the Engineered Safeguards Rooms were late on two occasions. The fire tour due at 0445 on October 3, 1983 was conducted 8 minutes late. The fire tour of the same area due again at 0553 on October 3, 1983 was conducted 4 minutes late. The inspection tours of the Engineered Safeguards Rooms were being conducted on an hourly basis as compensatory measures for the loss of fire barrier penetration integrity per T.S. 3.22.5.1.

The fire tours are normally conducted by security personnel, however, due to high levels of surface contamination in the area from construction activities, the use of respirators was required. Radiation Protection Technicians were temporarily assigned the responsibility of completing the hourly fire tours for this area since they were already qualified for respirator use.

In transferring this responsibility to the technicians, the significance of completing the fire tours at intervals of 60 minutes or less was not adequately communicated, resulting in two inspections being several minutes late. A revision to the Fire Protection Implementing Procedures has been completed which emphasizes the responsibility of timely fire tour completion. The occurrence was determined to be reportable on October 11, 1983.

In separate occurrence on October 25, 1983, the hourly fire inspection tour of a Cable Penetration Room was not completed within the required time period. Personnel error has been determined as the primary cause. Security personnel were assigned the responsibility for completing this tour, per T.S. 3.22.5.1, however, investigation indicates that no security officer was assigned to perform this particular tour. Upon discovery, a tour was immediately conducted, resulting in the hourly requirement being exceeded by 6 minutes. The incident occurred at shift change.

To prevent recurrence, a practice will be initiated whereby the start and completion times of all fire tours will be communicated via radio to the security dispatcher. The dispatcher will log the times and thus be cognizant of the actual performance of the fire tours.



Consumers
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Company

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May 29, 1984

James G Keppler, Administrator
Region III
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 -
PALISADES PLANT - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-068 REVISION 1
(FAILURE TO COMPLETE HOURLY FIRE TOURS)

Attached please find License Event Report 83-68 Revision 1 (Failure to Complete Hourly Fire Tours) which is reportable to NRC per Technical Specification 6.9.2.b(2). The revision to LER 83-068 changes the identified cause in the "Cause Code Block" (block 12) from "X" to "A" (Personnel Error).

Brian D Johnson
Staff Licensing Engineer

CC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades

Attachment

OC0584-0018A-NL02

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