

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
UPDATE REPORT-PREVIOUS REPORT
DATE 08/26/82CONTROL BLOCK:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

0	2	While the unit was operating steady-state at 2392 MWT, the RWCU system																																																																													
0	3	primary containment outboard isolation valve failed to close after																																																																													
0	4	receiving an isolation signal from the "RWCU System Leak Alarm". This																																																																													
0	5	event is contrary to Tech. Specs. 3.7.A.2.b. and c. The inboard valve was																																																																													
0	6	closed as per the LCO required by Tech. Specs. 3.7.D.2. The health and																																																																													
0	7	safety of the public were not affected. This is a non-repetitive event.																																																																													
0	8																																																																														

0	9	C	G	E	B	V	A	L	V	O	P	Z	Z	8	2	0	7	3	0	3	X	1	E	Z	Z	Z	0	0	0	0	Y	N	A	L	2	0	0																																				
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1	0	This event was caused by material failure. On 02-06-83 with the unit in																																																																													
1	1	cold shutdown, maintenance personnel determined that the primary																																																																													
1	2	containment valve's operator was at fault. The valve operator was																																																																													
1	3	repaired and returned to service per the "PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION																																																																													
1	4	VALVE OPERABILITY" procedure on 02-08-83 (refer to attached narrative).																																																																													

1	5	H	0	0	0	NA	Q	Special Inspection																																																																								
1	6	Z	2	NA																																																																												
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1	8	0	0	0	NA																																																																											
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2	0	N	NA																																																																													

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PDR ADOCK 05000321
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NAME OF PREPARER

S. B. Tipps

PHONE

(912)367-7851

NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR LER 50-321/1982-073, REV.1
UPDATE REPORT-PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 08/26/82

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-321

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b, because it showed that the unit did not meet the requirements of Tech. Specs. sections 3.7.A.2.b and c., and 3.7.D.1.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

The unit was in steady state operation at 2392 MWt (approximately 98% power) when this event occurred.

Detailed description of the event(s):

On 08-08-82, the reactor water cleanup outboard isolation valve (1G31-F004) failed to close when it received an isolation signal from the "Clean Up System Leak" alarm. This event is contrary to the requirements of Tech. Specs. sections 3.7.A.2.b and c. and Tech. Specs. section 3.7.D.1.

Consequences of the event(s):

This event did not affect plant operation. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

Inboard primary containment isolation valve 1G31-F001, was operable during this event.

Justification for continued operation:

The inboard primary containment isolation valve (1G31-F001) closed when it received the isolation signal. It (1G31-F001) was then isolated in its closed position, and plant operation continued as permitted by Tech. Specs. section 3.7.D.2.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This event is non-repetitive.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

This event had no impact upon any other system in Unit 1 or Unit 2.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

Maintenance personnel determined that the valve operator would not close the valve (1G31-F004) because its clutch was disengaged. The clutch would not engage when the valve operator's motor was run. After further investigation, it was determined that the valve operator's tripper levers (which engage the clutch) were not functioning because the tripper adjustment arm was out of adjustment.

Immediate Corrective Action:

The reactor water cleanup system's outboard isolation valve (1G31-F004) operator's tripper adjustment arm was adjusted to allow the tripper levers to operate and engage the operator's clutch when the valve operator's motor was run.

The valve was then satisfactorily functionally tested per the "PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE OPERABILITY" procedure (HNP-1-3962) and returned to service on 02-08-83.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

No supplemental corrective action is required.


Scheduled (future) corrective action:

N/A

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

N/A

Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 439
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444



Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant


June 1, 1984
GM-84-405

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1982-073, Rev. 1.
This report is required by Hatch Unit One Technical Specifications
section 6.9.1.9.b.


H. C. Nix
General Manager

^{TKS}
HCN/SBT/vlt

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