

NRC FORM 288
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01	F	L	C	R	P	3	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4	8						
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33						
LICENSEE CODE										LICENSE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE										CAT		

CONT

01	L	6	0	5	0	-	0	3	0	2	7	0	8	0	6	8	0	8	0	6	0	1	8	4	9							
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33						
REPORT SOURCE										DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE										REPORT DATE		

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

02 At 0700, while performing SP-340, ECCS Pump Operability, DHV-110, "A" decay
03 heat pump discharge throttle valve, would not control flow in automatic. This
04 created an event contrary to T.S. 3.5.2. DHV-110 did respond in manual
05 control; decay heat loop "B" provided redundancy. There was no effect upon
06 the general public health or safety. This was the sixth occurrence for
07 DHV-110 and the thirteenth event reported under this Specification.

09	S	F	11	E	12	E	13	I	N	S	T	R	U	14	C	15	Z	16	17	8	0	18	0	5	8	19	0	3	20	X	21	1	22	0	0	0	0	23	Y	24	N	25	A	26	C	6	8	0	27				
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60
SYSTEM CODE			CAUSE CODE			CAUSE SUBCODE			COMPONENT CODE						COMP. SUBCODE			VALVE SUBCODE			LER/RO REPORT NUMBER			EVENT YEAR			SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.			OCCURRENCE CODE			REPORT TYPE			REVISION NO.																	
ACTION TAKEN			FUTURE ACTION			EFFECT ON PLANT			SHUTDOWN METHOD			HOURS			ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED			NPRD-4 FORM SUB.			PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER			COMPONENT MANUFACTURER																													

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

10 The cause is attributed to air in the controller sensing line. Operability
11 was restored by venting the sensing line. The sensing lines for DHV-110 and
12 DHV-111 will be vented monthly until permanent corrective action is implement-
13 ed. An engineering evaluation has determined the following additional correc-
14 tive actions to be implemented: (1) replace existing flow switches with elec-
tronic controls; (2) change out helical gears in valve actuator.

15	G	28	0	0	0	29	N/A	30	B	31	Operator Observation	32	16	Z	33	Z	34	N/A	35	17	0	0	0	37	Z	38	N/A	39	18	0	0	0	40	N/A	41	19	Z	42	N/A	43	20	N	44	N/A	45	21	N/A	22	N/A	23	N/A	24	N/A	25	N/A	26	N/A	27	N/A	28	N/A	29	N/A	30	N/A	31	N/A	32	N/A	33	N/A	34	N/A	35	N/A	36	N/A	37	N/A	38	N/A	39	N/A	40	N/A	41	N/A	42	N/A	43	N/A	44	N/A	45	N/A	46	N/A	47	N/A	48	N/A	49	N/A	50	N/A	51	N/A	52	N/A	53	N/A	54	N/A	55	N/A	56	N/A	57	N/A	58	N/A	59	N/A	60	N/A
FACILITY STATUS			S. POWER			OTHER STATUS			METHOD OF DISCOVERY			DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION			ACTIVITY CONTENT			AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY			LOCATION OF RELEASE			PERSONNEL EXPOSURES			PERSONNEL INJURIES			LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY			PUBLICITY																																																																																												
RELEASED OF RELEASE			TYPE			DESCRIPTION			TYPE			DESCRIPTION			TYPE			DESCRIPTION			TYPE			DESCRIPTION			TYPE			DESCRIPTION			TYPE			DESCRIPTION																																																																																									

NAME OF PREPARER R. H. ThompsonPHONE: (904) 795-3802

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

REPORT NO. : 50-302/80-058/03X-1

FACILITY : Crystal River Unit 3

REPORT DATE : June 1, 1984

OCCURRENCE DATE: August 6, 1980

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Failure of DHV-110 to control flow in automatic mode contrary to Technical Specification 3.5.2.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 3, HOT STANDBY (0%)

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0700 during performance of SP-340, ECCS Pump Operability, it was discovered that DHV-110, "A" decay heat pump discharge throttle valve, would not control flow in automatic. DHV-110 did respond in manual control; maintenance actions were initiated.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE:

The cause is attributed to air in the sensing line of the controller.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

There was no effect upon the general public health or safety. Redundancy was maintained by the "B" decay heat loop.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The sensing lines were vented and a functional check was completed. An engineering evaluation of the control system for DHV-110 and DHV-111 determined the following additional corrective action to be implemented:

1. Replace existing flow switches with electronic controls.
2. Change out helical gears in the valve actuators.

FAILURE DATA:

This was the sixth occurrence reported for DHV-110 and the thirteenth event reported under this Specification.