UPDATE REPORT - LAST REPORT DATED 9/19/80

NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: ① (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	LICENSEE CODE: F L C R P 3 ②	LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 ③	LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 ④	CAT ⑤

CON'T

0 1	REPORT SOURCE: L ⑥	DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 - 0 3 0 2 ⑦	EVENT DATE: 0 8 2 7 8 0 ⑧	REPORT DATE: 0 6 0 1 8 4 ⑨

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

0 2 While performing SP-320, Operability of Boron Injection Sources and Pumps,
0 3 DHV-111, "B" decay heat pump discharge throttle valve, would not control flow
0 4 in automatic. This created an event contrary to Technical Specification
0 5 3.5.2. DHV-111 did respond in manual control; decay heat loop "A" provided
0 6 redundancy. There was no effect upon the general public health or safety.
0 7 This is the second event of this type and the tenth report under this Speci-
0 8 fication.

0 9	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	C F ⑪	E ⑫	E ⑬	I N S T R U ⑭	C ⑮	Z ⑯

⑰ LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 0	—	0 3 6	/	0 3	X	—	1

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS ㉒	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
E ⑱	X ⑲	Z ⑳	Z ㉑	0 0 0 0	Y ㉓	N ㉔	A ㉕	C 6 8 0 ㉖

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ㉗

1 0 The cause is attributed to water in the sensing line. Operability was re-
1 1 stored by blowing down the sensing line and performing a functional check. An
1 2 engineering evaluation has determined the following additional corrective ac-
tions to be implemented: (1) replace existing flow switches with electronic
1 3 controls; (2) change out helical gears in valve actuators.
1 4

1 5	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS ㉚	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION ㉜
	E ㉘	0 8 0 ㉙	N/A	B ㉛	Operator Observation

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY ㉟	LOCATION OF RELEASE ㊱
	Z ㉝	Z ㉞	N/A	N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION ㊴
	0 0 0 ㊲	Z ㊳	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION ㊶
	0 0 0 ㊵	N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY ㊸

1 9	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
	Z ㊷	N/A

8406050374 840601
PDR ADOCK 05000302
S PDR

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION ㊺	NRC USE ONLY
	N ㊹		

NAME OF PREPARER R. H. Thompson PHONE: (904) 795-3802

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

REPORT NO. : 50-302/80-036/03X-1

FACILITY : Crystal River Unit 3

REPORT DATE : June 1, 1984

OCCURRENCE DATE: August 27, 1980

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Failure to have two independent ECCS subsystems operable, contrary to Technical Specification 3.5.2.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1, POWER OPERATION (80%)

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0300, during performance of SP-320, Operability of Boron Injection Sources and Pumps, it was discovered that DHV-111, "B" decay heat pump discharge throttle valve, would not control flow in automatic. DHV-111 did respond in manual control; maintenance actions were initiated.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE:

The cause is attributed to water in the sensing lines.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

There was no effect upon the general public health and safety. Redundancy was maintained by the "A" decay heat loop.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The sensing lines were blown down and a functional check was completed. (The lines will be blown down after surveillance checks for three months to determine the extent of a condensation problem.) An engineering evaluation of the control system for DHV-111 and DHV-110 has determined the following additional corrective actions to be implemented:

1. Replace existing flow switches with electronic controls.

2. Change out helical gears in valve actuators.

FAILURE DATA:

This is the second occurrence reported for DHV-111 and the tenth report made under this Specification.