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GPC Exh. II-134
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50-424/425-OLA-3 EXHIBIT NO. GPC II-134
In the matter of Georgia Power Co. et al., Vogtle Units 1 & 2
☐ Staff ☒ Applicant ☐ Intervenor ☐ Other
☒ Identified ☒ Received ☐ Rejected Reporter KHLW
Date 7/19/95 Witness Mosbaugh

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Georgia power has made an additional Material false statement in written correspondence to the NRC in Licensee Event Report 90-006 submitted 4-19-90. It is similar to the Material false statement made on 4-09-90 and involves the claims of successful starts without problems on Vogtle's Diesel generators that failed during the Site-Area Emergency of 3-20-90.

On page 5 under item D it states "Numerous sensor calibrations (including jacket water temperatures), special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple engine starts and runs were performed under various conditions. After the 3-20-90 event, the control systems of both engines have been subjected to a comprehensive test program. Subsequent to this test program, DG1A and DG1B have been started at least 18 times each and no failures or problems have occurred during any of these starts. In addition, an undervoltage start test without air roll was conducted on 4-6-90 and DG1A started and loaded properly."

The above statement regarding the number of successful starts without "failures or problems" subsequent to the control systems comprehensive test program is materially false by omission or commission. The 1B diesel control logic testing was completed on 3-27-90 just prior to performing the first undervoltage test at 22:04 CST on 3-27-90 and prior to declaring the diesel operable at 15:27 CST on 3-28-90. Completion of this testing, is the earliest point in time that a claim of completing a comprehensive control systems test program could be made. Subsequent to that date and time until 4-19-90, DG1B has been started only 11 times.

The 1A diesel control logic testing was completed on 3-31-90 just prior to performing the first undervoltage test at 22:53 CST on 3-31-90 and prior to declaring the diesel operable at 11:54 CST on 4-01-90. Completion of this testing is the earliest point in time that a claim of completing a comprehensive control systems test program could be made. Subsequent to that date and time until 4-19-90, DG1A has also been started only 11 times.

This material false statement is similar to the one made by Georgia power on 4-9-90 in correspondence ELV-01516 and again falsely overstates the extent of reliable starting experience with DG1B and DG1A. Concern was raised by plant staff on 4-18-90 with the SONOPCO Licensing Engineer, the SONOPCO Licensing Manager, the SONOPCO General Manager Plant Support, the Vogtle General Manager, the SONOPCO Vice President Vogtle, and the SONOPCO Senior Vice President Nuclear as to the accuracy of the Diesel start information and the fact that there had been "failure and problems"

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prior to submittal of the LER. SONOPCO was pressed for time and issued the LER without adequate verification and in the face of concerns for the accuracy of the information raised by the site. The issue of the accuracy of correspondence ELV-01516 including specific failure information was raised by site personnel on the phone call with the above personnel at the same time.

On 4-30-90 the Vogtle General Manager was provided a memo with start data on the DG1B, derived from control logs, shift supervisor logs and source diesel operating logs, that clearly showed that previous statements made to the NRC were false. He took no immediate action and ask for the information to be validated by operations and engineering. The information was validated on 5-1-90 and found correct. It was presented again to the General Manager on 5-2-90 and in this presentation it was stated that statements on both diesels 1A and 1B were incorrect in the LER and that the letter ELV-01516 was wrong as well. Still he took no action to promptly inform the NRC of the false statement and suggested that a revision to the LER be prepared. He also suggested that the letter ELV-01516 be corrected by including a correction in the letter being prepared for submittal to the NRC on 5-15-90. The General Manager did not follow up on the progress of these revision actions or set any time table for completion as he normally would on important issues. A revision was made to the LER and approved by the PRB on 5-8-90. On 5-10-90 the PRB reviewed the 5-15-90 letter (actually submitted on May 14) to the NRC. It had nothing that addressed or corrected the material false statement as previously suggested by the General Manager. SONOPCO and the General Manager were heavily involved in writing, editing and specifying the contents of the May 15 letter. The PRB made a comment on the fact that the letter did not address the material false statement and assigned the General Manager an action item to resolve that. After the General manager saw the action item his secretary came to the PRB secretary's office and said "Doesn't NSAC have anything better to do than assign the General Manager action items". Later on 5-24-90 the general Manager signed the action item off as complete and attached a note instructing the Technical Support Manager to use the LER cover letter to correct the other incorrect document. SONOPCO most always drafts the cover letters, not the Technical Manager.

On 5-11-90 the PRB met again with the General Manager to approve the "final" version of the May 15 letter to be sent to the Senior Vice President SONOPCO for signature. Again no correction had been made and the previous material false statement was not addressed. The "final" version was approved. The individual that had raised the issue of the material false statements had been removed from the PRB by a

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memo from the General Manager (NOTS-00382) dated 5-10-90 and effective 5-11-90.

By May 15 the revised LER was with SONOPCO. No action occurred to submit the LER to the NRC until about the first week in June when again site personnel began asking SONOPCO about what was taking so long to submit the correction. SONOPCO licensing personnel told site personnel that the Senior Vice President Nuclear planned to sign the revision on June 8 (the day of the IIT presentation to the Commission on the Vogtle Site-Area emergency).

On June 8, 11 and 12 an extraordinary number of meetings and telephone calls occurred over the Diesel start information. Quality assurance was directed by the Senior Vice President to audit all of the Diesel start logs. When this was completed, no errors were found in the information that had been presented to the General Manager over a month before on 4-30-90. With this done the Senior Vice President ask for a "complete revision" and updating of the LER. This was done and a revised LER was PRB approved by 6-22-90. Only 3 of 6 pages needed any rewrite on the "complete revision". A complete revision had originally not been planed until 6 months after the event.

The "complete" revision LER switches the counting and reporting of Diesel generator starts and failures to "valid" starts and failures per Reg Guide 1.108. By doing so correlation between the previous LER can not be made without detailed and specific data on each start. While the original LER was being drafted it was suggested that we might want to use "valid starts and failures" but that method was discounted because it was recognized that we had very few valid tests. If the original LER were stated in terms of valid starts we could only say "Subsequent to this test program the DG 1A and DG 1B have had 6 valid starts without problems or failures".

On 6-28-90 and 6-29-90 a total of 6 cover letters to be sent in with the LER revision were originated and proposed by SONOPCO. Each is different and attempts to explain the Material False statement in a different manner:

DRAFT

07:51	6-28-90	This draft says that all tests were counted but only valid failures were considered in reaching a conclusion there were no problems or failures.
06:55	6-28-90	This draft says that all tests were counted regardless of whether they were valid or not.
07:55	6-29-90	This draft says that the COA response letter used the words "Subsequent to

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the event" and that the LER inadvertently used the words "Subsequent to the test program" but should have been consistent with the COA response letter and the verbal presentation in Atlanta.

11:42 6-29-90 This draft says the LER statement didn't consider failures and problems associated with troubleshooting and restarting the Diesel and should have been "Subsequent to the event" which is consistent with the COA response and the verbal presentation.

12:06 6-29-90 This draft says that "If the comprehensive test program completed with the first Surveillance 14980-1 then there were 10 successful starts on DG1A and 12 on DG1B as of 4-19-90.

13:11 6-29-90 This draft says that "If the comprehensive test program completed with the first Surveillance 14980-1 then there were 10 successful starts on DG1A and 12 on DG1B. It also says that test program starts were included in the original count and that was due to poor record keeping practices and no definition of the end of the test program.

These explanations are all untrue and are being concocted after the fact without regard to how and why the errors were actually made. In short these are lies and an attempt to coverup the careless personnel errors made by the operations superintendent and General Manager which originated in the verbal presentation, were repeated in the COA response letter and were carelessly restated in the LER.

A look at the Diesel generators starting and failure history after the LER was written on 4-18-90 provides a technical as well as a objective view of the reliability of the diesels which is at the heart of the Material False Statement.

Diesel Generator 1B

DATE	TIME	RESULT
04-19-90	03:14	Diesel was inadvertently started

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		due to personnel error in performing Surveillance 14619-1
04-19-90	09:55	Successful start
04-29-90	09:09	Successful start
05-23-90	12:26	Diesel Tripped after start
05-23-90	13:10	Diesel tripped after start
05-23-90	14:12	Successful start manual trip
05-23-90	14:45	Successful start manual trip
05-23-90	21:18	Diesel tripped after start on low turbo lube oil pressure
05-23-90	21:38	Diesel tripped after start on low turbo lube oil pressure
05-23-90	21:57	Diesel tripped after start on low turbo lube oil pressure
05-23-90	22:55	Diesel tripped after start on H1 Jacket water temperature
05-23-90	23:37	Diesel tripped after start on H1 Jacket water temperature
05-24-90	12:29	Successful start
05-24-90	12:42	Successful start
05-24-90	12:53	Successful start
05-24-90	13:10	Successful start
05-24-90	15:19	Successful start
05-24-90	15:30	Successful start
05-24-90	19:16	Successful start
05-26-90	20:28	Successful start
06-01-90	11:45	Successful start

Clearly this diesel generator continued to experience an excessive rate of trips and failures most of which were the same kind of failure that led to the station blackout at mid-loop that occurred on 3-20-90. Clearly this diesel was not reliable as the COA response letter and the LER tried to convey. As further proof of the unreliability Georgia Power had to initiate a design change to remove some of the unreliable components from the control logic after experiencing all the additional failures.

Considering the evidence:

The words are false in counting the starts. They overstate the reliability of the diesel. They were used by NRC to make decisions "Significant to the Regulatory Process" (To allow Restart) Concern was raised about the accuracy of the start data before submittal of LER.

SONOPCO personnell recognized that the previous (COA) statements were false before submittal of the LER. Factual data was presented disputing the data after submittal and stating that information provided to NRC was incorrect.

Substantial delays occurred in starting to correct the LER. Additional delays were introduced after beginning correction (QA audit).

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Revisions were delayed until after critical meetings with NRC (6-08-90 IIT presentation to Commissioners). Additional unplanned delays were introduced (complete revision) after QA audit substantiated inaccuracy claim. Multiplicity of revision letters (also false) to explain the mistake.

Submittal to AEOD by LER revision to correct multiple non-LER errors.

Performance of the Diesel itself proves the unreliability and the falseness of the statements given to the NRC.

Above actions did not proceed without repeated and continuing expression of concern from the plant employee who exposed the Material False statement .

one can only conclude that Georgia Power did indeed make Material False Statements in written correspondence to the NRC due to as a minimum careless disregard and willfully conspired to delay and cover up the disclosure of those false statements.

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