

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.11 At least one reactor coolant system vent path consisting of one vent valve and one block valve capable of being powered from emergency buses shall be OPERABLE and closed at each of the following locations:

- a. Pressurizer Steam Space
- b. Reactor Coolant Loop A High Point
- c. Reactor Coolant Loop B High Point

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4

ACTION:

- a. With one of the three reactor coolant system vent paths inoperable, maintain the inoperable vent path closed with power removed from the valve actuator of the vent valve and block valve in the inoperable vent path.
- b. With two or more of the three reactor coolant system vent paths inoperable; maintain the inoperable vent paths closed with power removed from the valve actuators of all the vent valves and block valves in the inoperable vent paths, and restore at least two of three of the vent paths to OPERABLE with 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. The provisions of 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.11. Each reactor coolant system vent path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per Refueling Cycle by:

1. Verifying all manual isolation valves in each vent path are locked in the open position.
2. Cycling each vent valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel from the Control Room.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

CONTAINMENT PURGE AND EXHAUST ISOLATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.9 The containment purge and exhaust isolation system shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY MODE 6.

ACTION:

With the containment purge and exhaust isolation system inoperable, close each of the purge and exhaust penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.9 The containment purge and exhaust isolation system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 100 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS by verifying that containment purge and exhaust isolation occurs on manual initiation and on a high radiation test signal from the containment gaseous activity radiation monitoring instrumentation channels.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

STORAGE POOL

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.11 All missile shields and at least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks.

APPLICABILITY Whenever irradiated fuel assemblies are in the storage pool.

ACTION:

- a. With all missile shields not installed over the storage pool:
 - 1) Immediately install all missile shields upon notification of a Tornado Watch, and
 - 2) Install all missile shields not required to be removed for in-progress handling of fuel assemblies.
- b. With the minimum water level requirement not satisfied, suspend all movement of fuel and crane operations with loads in the fuel storage area and restore the water level to within its limit within 4 hours.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.11.1 All missile shields shall be determined to be installed over the storage pool when irradiated fuel assemblies are in the fuel storage pool:

- a) Immediately upon notification of a Tornado Watch, and
- b) Upon completion of handling fuel assemblies.

4.9.11.2 The water level in the storage pool shall be determined to be at least its minimum required depth at least once per 7 days when irradiated fuel assemblies are in the fuel storage pool.

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

Docket No: 50-302

Facility: Crystal River Unit 3

Licensee: Florida Power Corporation

Date of Application: May 31, 1984

Request:

Florida Power Corporation requests issuance of an amendment to the Crystal River Unit 3 Technical Specifications allowing exemption from the requirements of Specification 3.0.4 for Specifications 3.4.11, 3.9.9, and 3.9.11.

Significant Hazards Consideration Determination:

- (x) Amendment involves no significant hazards considerations.
() Amendment involves significant hazards considerations.

Basis for Determination:

Specification 3.4.11 as proposed by Generic Letter 83-37, November 1, 1983, allows continued Power Operation and Start-up provided the inoperable vent path is deactivated. Because there are no additional safety concerns during Hot Standby or Hot Shutdown associated with vent operability, 3.0.4 exemption for this Specification is within the intent of guidance provided by the NRC.

The revision of Specification 3.9.9 is clearly within the acceptance criteria of the Standard Review Plan and the Standard Technical Specifications for Babcock and Wilcox PWR's (NUREG-0103, Revision 4).

Exemption from Specification 3.0.4 for Specification 3.9.11 does not significantly reduce the safety margin as specified in the Standard Review Plan. Analysis required by the SRP with respect to the Spent Fuel Pools do not consider the state of the reactor, therefore the safety margins are unaffected.

Requested Implementation Date:

Florida Power Corporation does not request an implementation date.