

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protection system instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE with the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Table 3.3.1-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.1-1.

ACTION:

- a. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system, place the inoperable channel(s) and/or that trip system in the tripped condition* within 1 hour. ~~The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.~~
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for both trip systems, place at least one trip system** in the tripped condition within one hour and take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1.

DELETE →

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.1.1 Each reactor protection system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.1.1-1.

4.3.1.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.

4.3.1.3 The REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip functional unit shown in Table 3.3.1-2 shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one channel per trip system such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip system.

*An inoperable channel need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur. In these cases, the inoperable channel shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1 for that Trip Function shall be taken.

**The trip system need not be placed in the tripped condition if this would cause the Trip Function to occur. When a trip system can be placed in the tripped condition without causing the Trip Function to occur, place the trip system with the most inoperable channels in the tripped condition; if both systems have the same number of inoperable channels, place either trip system in the tripped condition.

INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.2 The isolation actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.2-2 and with ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Table 3.3.2-3.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.2-1.

ACTION:

- DELETE →
- a. With an isolation actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.2-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
 - b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system, place the inoperable channel(s) and/or that trip system in the tripped condition* within one hour. ~~The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.~~
 - c. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for both trip systems, place at least one trip system** in the tripped condition within one hour and take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1.

*An inoperable channel need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur. In these cases, the inoperable channel shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1 for that Trip Function shall be taken.

**The trip system need not be placed in the tripped condition if this would cause the Trip Function to occur. When a trip system can be placed in the tripped condition without causing the Trip Function to occur, place the trip system with the most inoperable channels in the tripped condition; if both systems have the same number of inoperable channels, place either trip system in the tripped condition.

TABLE 3.3.3-1 (Continued)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION
ACTION

- ACTION 30 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement:
a. With one channel inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour or declare the associated system inoperable.
b. With more than one channel inoperable, declare the associated system inoperable.
- ACTION 31 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, declare the associated ADS trip system or ECCS inoperable.
- ACTION 32 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour.
- ACTION 33 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 8 hours or declare the associated ADS valve or ECCS inoperable.
- ACTION 34 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement:
a. For one trip system, place that trip system in the tripped condition within one hour or declare the HPCS system inoperable.
b. For both trip systems, declare the HPCS system inoperable.
- ACTION 35 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour, or align the HPCS system to take suction from the suppression pool, or declare the HPCS system inoperable.
- ACTION 36 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour or declare the HPCS system inoperable.
- ACTION 37 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, declare the associated emergency diesel generator inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2, as appropriate.
- ACTION 38 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour. operation may then continue until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
- ACTION 39 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour. Restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or declare the associated system inoperable.

* The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

ACTION

- ACTION 1 - Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.
- ACTION 2 - Verify all insertable control rods to be inserted in the core and lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position within one hour.
- ACTION 3 - Suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS and insert all insertable control rods within one hour.
- ACTION 4 - Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours.
- ACTION 5 - Be in STARTUP with the main steam line isolation valves closed within 6 hours or in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.
- ACTION 6 - Initiate a reduction in THERMAL POWER within 15 minutes and reduce turbine first stage pressure to less than the automatic bypass setpoint within 2 hours.
- ACTION 7 - Verify all insertable control rods to be inserted within one hour.
- ACTION 8 - Lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position within one hour.
- ACTION 9 - Suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, and insert all insertable control rods and lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position within one hour.

DELETE

~~Except replacement of LPRM strings provided SRM instrumentation is OPERABLE per Specification 3.9.2.~~

TABLE 3.3.7.5-1

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENT	REQUIRED NUMBER OF CHANNELS	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS	ACTION
1. Reactor Vessel Pressure	2	1	1,2,3	PO
2. Reactor Vessel Water Level	2	1	1,2,3	BO
a. Fuel Zone	2	1	1,2,3	BO
b. Wide Range	2	1	1,2,3	BO
3. Suppression Pool Water Level	2	1	1,2,3	BO
4. Suppression Pool Water Temperature	16, 2/sector	8, 1/sector	1,2,3	BO
5. Primary Containment Pressure	2	1	1,2,3	BO
6. Primary Containment Air Temperature	2	1	1,2,3	BO
7. Drywell Pressure	2	1	1,2,3	PO
8. Drywell Air Temperature	2	1	1,2,3	BO
9. Primary Containment and Drywell Hydrogen Concentration Analyzer and Monitor	2	1	1,2,3	BO
10. Safety/Relief Valve Position Indicators**	2/valve	1/valve	1,2,3	BO
11. Primary Containment/Drywell Area Gross Gamma Radiation Monitors	2*	1*	1,2,3	BO
12. Offgas Ventilation Exhaust Monitor [#]	1	1	1,2,3	BO
13. Turbine Building/Heater Bay Ventilation Exhaust Monitor [#]	1	1	1,2,3	BO
14. Unit 1 Vent Monitor [#]	1	1	1,2,3	BO
15. Unit 2 Vent Monitor [#]	1	1	1,2,3	BO
16. Neutron Flux				
a. Average Power Range	2	1	1,2,3	BO
b. Intermediate Range	2	1	1,2,3	BO
c. Source Range	2	1	1,2,3	BO
17. Primary Containment Isolation Valve Position ***	2/valve	1/valve	1,2,3	BO

* Each for primary containment and drywell.

** One channel consists of a pressure switch on the SRV discharge pipe, the other channel consists of a temperature sensor on the SRV discharge pipe.

*** One channel consists of the open limit switch, and the other channel consists of the closed limit switch for each automatic containment isolation valve in Table 3.6.4-1,a.

[#] High and intermediate range D19 system noble gas monitors.

TABLE 4.3.7.5-1
ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS
1. Reactor Vessel Pressure	M	R	1, 2, 3
2. Reactor Vessel Water Level	M	R	1, 2, 3
a. Fuel Zone	M	R	1, 2, 3
b. Wide Range	M	R	1, 2, 3
3. Suppression Pool Water Level	H	R	1, 2, 3
4. Suppression Pool Water Temperature	M	R	1, 2, 3
5. Primary Containment Pressure	M	R	1, 2, 3
6. Primary Containment Air Temperature	M	R	1, 2, 3
7. Drywell Pressure	M	R	1, 2, 3
8. Drywell Air Temperature	M	R	1, 2, 3
9. Primary Containment and Drywell Hydrogen Concentration Analyzer and Monitor	NA	Q*	1, 2, 3
10. Safety/Relief Valve Position Indicators	M	R	1, 2, 3
11. Primary Containment/Drywell Area Gross Gamma Radiation Monitors	M	R**	1, 2, 3
12. Offgas Ventilation Exhaust Monitor [#]	M	R	1, 2, 3
13. Turbine Building/Heater Bay Ventilation Exhaust Monitor [#]	M	R	1, 2, 3
14. Unit 1 Vent Monitor [#]	M	R	1, 2, 3
15. Unit 2 Vent Monitor [#]	M	R	1, 2, 3
16. Neutron Flux	M	R	1, 2, 3
a. Average Power Range	M	R	1, 2, 3
b. Intermediate Range	M	R	1, 2, 3
c. Source Range	M	R	1, 2, 3
17. Primary Containment Isolation Valve Position	M	R	1, 2, 3

*Using sample gas containing:

- One volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.
- Four volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.

**The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall consist of an electronic calibration of the channel, not including the detector, for range decades above 10 R/hr and a one point calibration check of the detector below 10 R/hr with an installed or portable gamma source.

[#]High and intermediate range D19 system noble gas monitors.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.4 CHEMISTRY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.4 The chemistry of the reactor coolant system shall be maintained within the limits specified in Table 3.4.4-1.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1:

1. With the conductivity, chloride concentration or pH exceeding the limit specified in Table 3.4.4-1 for less than 72 hours during one continuous time interval and, for conductivity and chloride concentration, for less than 336 hours per year, but with the conductivity less than 10 $\mu\text{mho/cm}$ at 25°C and with the chloride concentration less than 0.5 ppm, this need not be reported to the Commission.
2. With the conductivity, chloride concentration or pH exceeding the limit specified in Table 3.4.4-1 for more than 72 hours during one continuous time interval or with the conductivity and chloride concentration exceeding the limit specified in Table 3.4.4-1 for more than 336 hours per year, be in at least STARTUP within the next 6 hours.
3. With the conductivity exceeding 10 $\mu\text{mho/cm}$ at 25°C or chloride concentration exceeding 0.5 ppm, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and 3, with the conductivity, chloride concentration or pH exceeding the limit specified in Table 3.4.4-1 for more than 48 hours during one continuous time interval, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

c. At all other times:

1. With the:
 - a) Conductivity or pH exceeding the limit specified in Table 3.4.4-1, restore the conductivity and pH to within the limit within 72 hours, or
 - b) Chloride concentration exceeding the limit specified in Table 3.4.4-1, restore the chloride concentration to within the limit within 24 hours, or

perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system. Determine that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system remains acceptable for continued operation prior to proceeding to OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3.

2. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

2 or

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

FEEDWATER LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.9 Two independent feedwater leakage control (FWLC) system subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.


ACTION:

With one FWLC system subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours ^{and} in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.9 Each FWLC system subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by observing proper operation of the associated ECCS water leg pump.
- b. At least once per 18 months by cycling each valve in the flow path not testable during POWER OPERATION through at least one complete cycle of full travel.



CONTAINMENT AVERAGE TEMPERATURE VS RELATIVE HUMIDITY

Figure 3.6.5.2-1

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.6.1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and *.

ACTION:

Without SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, restore SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. In Operational Condition *, suspend handling of irradiated fuel in the primary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.6.1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated by:

- a. Verifying at least once per 24 hours that the vacuum within the secondary containment is greater than or equal to ~~0.40~~ inches of vacuum water gauge. 0.66
- b. Verifying at least once per 31 days that:
 1. The primary containment equipment hatch is closed and sealed and the shield blocks are installed adjacent to the shield building.
 2. The door in each access to the secondary containment is closed, except for routine entry and exit.
 3. All penetrations terminating in the annulus not capable of being closed by OPERABLE automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in position.

*When irradiated fuel is being handled in the primary containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION (Continued)

restore the diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

- c. With one offsite circuit of the above required A.C. sources and diesel generator Div 1 or Div 2 of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. If a diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE diesel generators separately for each diesel generator by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 within 8 hours* for each diesel generator which has not been successfully tested within the past 24 hours. Restore at least one of the inoperable A.C. sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. Restore at least two offsite circuits and diesel generators Div 1 and Div 2 to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from time of initial loss or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- d. With diesel generator Div 3 of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the offsite A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. If the diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE diesel generators separately by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 within 24 hours*. Restore diesel generator Div 3 to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or declare the hPCS system and the C ESW pump inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specifications 3.5.1 and 3.7.1.1.
- e. With diesel generator Div 1 or Div 2 of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, in addition to ACTION ~~b or c~~, as applicable, verify within 2 hours that all required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator as a source of emergency power are also OPERABLE; otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

*This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable diesel generator is restored to OPERABILITY. The provisions of Specification 3.0.2 are not applicable.

** when either the Div 1 or Div 2 diesel is restored to OPERABILITY.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

INCLINED FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.12 The inclined fuel transfer system (IFTS) may be in operation provided that:

- a. The access door and floor plugs of all rooms through which the transfer system penetrates are closed and locked.
- b. All access interlocks and palm switches are OPERABLE.
- c. The Versa blocking valve located in the Fuel Handling Building IFTS hydraulic power unit is OPERABLE.
- d. At least one IFTS carriage position indicator is OPERABLE at each carriage position ~~of the twelve proximity sensors~~ and at least one liquid level sensor is OPERABLE at each liquid level monitoring position.
- e. All keylock switches which provide IFTS access control-transfer system lockout are OPERABLE.
- f. The warning light outside of the access door is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: When the IFTS blank flange is removed.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more access interlocks, warning lights, and/or palm switches inoperable, operation of the IFTS may continue provided that entry into the area is prohibited by establishing a continuous watch and conspicuously posting as a high radiation area.
- b. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend IFTS operation with the IFTS at either terminal point. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.12.1 Within 4 hours prior to the startup of the IFTS, verify that no personnel are in areas immediately adjacent to the IFTS tube and that the access door and floor plugs to rooms through which the IFTS tube penetrates are closed and locked.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.9.12.2 Within 4 hours prior to the operation of IFTS and at least once per 12 hours thereafter, when the IFTS is in operation verify that:

- a. At least one IFTS carriage position indicator is OPERABLE at each carriage position of the twelve proximity sensors and at least one liquid level sensor is OPERABLE at each liquid level monitoring position.
- b. The warning light outside of the access door is OPERABLE.

4.9.12.3 Within 4 hours prior to the operation of IFTS and at least once per 7 days thereafter, when the IFTS is in operation verify that:

- a. All access interlocks for the IFTS Valve Room are OPERABLE.
- b. The Versa blocking valve in the Fuel Handling Building IFTS hydraulic power unit is OPERABLE.
- c. All keylock switches which provide IFTS access control-transfer system lockout are OPERABLE.

4.9.12.4 Within 4 hours prior to installation of the floor plugs, after they have been removed, verify that the access interlocks and palm switches for the shield building annulus room and/or mid-support room, as applicable, are OPERABLE.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall be notified in writing pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4

PLANT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. Functional Tests

During the first refueling shutdown and at least once per 18 months thereafter during shutdown, a representative sample of snubbers shall be tested using one of the following sample plans for each type of snubber. The sample plan shall be selected prior to the test period and cannot be changed during the test period. ~~The NRC Regional Administrator shall be notified in writing of the sample plan selected prior to the test period or the sample plan used in the prior test period shall be implemented:~~

- 1) At least 10% of the total of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested either in-place or in a bench test. For each snubber of a type that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.7.4.f., an additional 5% of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or until all snubbers of that type have been functionally tested; or
- 2) A representative sample of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested in accordance with Figure 4.7.4-1. "C" is the total number of snubbers of a type found not meeting the acceptance requirements of Specification 4.7.4.f. The cumulative number of snubbers of a type tested is denoted by "N". At the end of each day's testing, the new values of "N" and "C" (previous day's total plus current day's increments) shall be plotted on Figure 4.7.4-1. If at any time the point plotted falls on or above the "Reject" line all snubbers of that type shall be functionally tested. If at any time the point plotted falls on or below the "Accept" line, testing of snubbers of that type may be terminated. When the point plotted lies in the "Continue Testing" region, additional snubbers of that type shall be tested until the point falls in the "Accept" region or the "Reject" region, or all the snubbers of that type have been tested. Testing equipment failure during functional testing may invalidate that day's testing and allow that day's testing to resume anew at a later time, providing all snubbers tested with the failed equipment during the day of equipment failure are retested; or
- 3) An initial representative sample of 55 snubbers of each type shall be functionally tested. For each snubber type which does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria, another sample of at least one-half the size of the initial sample shall be tested until the total number tested is equal to the initial sample size multiplied by the factor, $1 + C/2$, where "C" is the number of snubbers found which do not meet the functional test acceptance criteria. The results from this sample plan shall be plotted using an "Accept" line which follows the equation $N = 55(1 + C/2)$. Each snubber point should be plotted as soon as the snubber is tested. If the point plotted falls on or below the "Accept" line, testing of that type of snubber may be terminated. If the point plotted falls above the "Accept" line, testing must continue until the point falls on or below the "Accept" line or all the snubbers of that type have been tested.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

ACTIVITIES (Continued)

- f. The Plant Security Plan and Emergency Plan, and implementing instructions, shall be reviewed at least once per 12 months. Recommended changes to the implementing instructions shall be approved by the Director, Nuclear Support Department, or Director, Perry Plant Technical Department, as appropriate. Recommended changes to the Plans shall be reviewed pursuant to the requirements of Specification 6.5.1.6 and approved by the General Manager, Perry Plant Operations Department, and either the Director, Nuclear Support Department, or the Director, Perry Plant Technical Department, as appropriate. NRC approval shall be obtained as appropriate.

6.6 REPORTABLE EVENT ACTION

6.6.1 The following actions shall be taken for REPORTABLE EVENTS:

- a. The Commission shall be notified and a report submitted pursuant to the requirements of Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50, and
- b. Each REPORTABLE EVENT shall be reviewed by the PORC and the results of the review submitted to the NSRC and the Vice President - Nuclear.

6.7 SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATION

6.7.1 The following actions shall be taken in the event a Safety Limit is violated:

- a. The NRC Operations Center shall be notified by telephone as soon as possible and in all cases within 1 hour. The Vice President - Nuclear and the NSRC shall be notified within 24 hours.
- b. A Safety Limit Violation Report shall be prepared. The report shall be reviewed by the PORC. This report shall describe (1) applicable circumstances preceding the violation, (2) effects of the violation upon unit components, systems, or structures, and (3) corrective action taken to prevent recurrence. *Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4*
- c. The Safety Limit Violation Report shall be submitted to the ~~Commission~~ the NSRC, and the Vice President - Nuclear within 30 days of the violation.
- d. Critical operation of the unit shall not be resumed until authorized by the Commission.

6.8 PROCEDURES/INSTRUCTIONS AND PROGRAMS

6.8.1 Written procedures/instructions shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities referenced below:

- a. The applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

6.8 PROCEDURES/INSTRUCTIONS AND PROGRAMS (Continued)

b. In-Plant Radiation Monitoring

A program which will ensure the capability to accurately determine the airborne iodine concentration in vital areas under accident conditions. This program shall include the following:

1. Training of personnel,
2. Procedures for monitoring, and
3. Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

c. Post-accident Sampling

A program which will ensure the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant, radioactive iodines and particulates in plant gaseous effluents, and containment atmosphere samples under accident conditions. The program shall include the following:

1. Training of personnel,
2. Procedures for sampling and analysis, and
3. Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

6.9 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

ROUTINE REPORTS

6.9.1 In addition to the applicable reporting requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, the following reports shall be submitted to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC unless otherwise noted.

STARTUP REPORT

Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to
10 CFR 50.4

6.9.1.1 A summary report of plant startup and power escalation testing shall be submitted following (1) receipt of an Operating License, (2) amendment to the license involving a planned increase in power level, (3) installation of fuel that has a different design or has been manufactured by a different fuel supplier, and (4) modifications that may have significantly altered the nuclear, thermal, or hydraulic performance of the unit.

6.9.1.2 The startup report shall address each of the tests identified in the Final Safety Analysis Report Subsection 14.2.12.2 and shall include a description of the measured values of the operating conditions or characteristics obtained during the test program and a comparison of these values with design predictions and specifications. Any corrective actions that were required to obtain satisfactory operation shall also be described. Any additional specific details required in license conditions based on other commitments shall be included in this report.

6.9.1.3 Startup reports shall be submitted within (1) 90 days following completion of the startup test program, (2) 90 days following resumption or commencement of commercial power operation, or (3) 9 months following initial criticality, whichever is earliest. If the startup report does not cover all three events, i.e., initial criticality, completion of startup test program, and resumption or commencement of commercial operation supplementary reports shall be submitted at least every 3 months until all three events have been completed.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

SEMIANNUAL RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT (Continued)

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall include any changes made during the reporting period to the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) and to the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM), pursuant to Specifications 6.13 and 6.14, respectively, as well as any major change to Liquid, Gaseous, or Solid Radwaste Treatment Systems pursuant to Specification 6.15. It shall also include a listing of new locations for dose calculations and/or environmental monitoring identified by the Land Use Census pursuant to Specification 3.12.2.

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall also include the following: an explanation as to why the inoperability of liquid or gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation was not corrected within the time specified in Specification 3.3.7.9 or 3.3.7.10, respectively; and description of the events leading to liquid holdup tanks exceeding the limits of Specification 3.11.1.4.

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORTS

*to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4*

with a copy

6.9.1.8 Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience shall be submitted on a monthly basis to the Director, Office of Resource Management, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, *with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office* no later than the 15th of each month following the calendar month covered by the report.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

6.9.1.9 Core operating limits shall be established and documented in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT before each reload cycle or any remaining part of a reload cycle for the following:

- (1) The Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR) for Technical Specification 3.2.1.
- (2) The Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) for Technical Specification 3.2.2.
- (3) The Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR) for Technical Specification 3.2.3.

The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by NRC in NEDE-24011-P-A, General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel. (The approved revision at the time reload analyses are performed shall be identified in the COLR.)

The core operating limits shall be determined so that all applicable limits (e.g., fuel thermal-mechanical limits, core thermal-hydraulic limits, ECCS limits, nuclear limits such as SHUTDOWN MARGIN, and transient and accident analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.

The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, *Submitted* including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements thereto, shall be ~~provided~~ *provided* upon issuance for each reload cycle, ~~to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Document Control Desk with copies to the Regional Administrator and Resident Inspector)~~ *pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4.*

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

SPECIAL REPORTS

Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4

6.9.2 Special reports shall be submitted to the ~~Regional Administrator of the Regional Office~~ within the time period specified for each report.

6.9.3 Safety-relief valve failures will be reported to the ~~Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC via the Licensee Event Report system~~ within 30 days.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4 and 10 CFR 50.73

6.9.4 Violations of the requirements of the fire protection program described in the Final Safety Analysis Report which would have adversely affected the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire shall be reported to the ~~Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC via the Licensee Event Report system~~ within 30 days.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4 and 10 CFR 50.73

6.10 RECORD RETENTION

6.10.1 In addition to the applicable record retention requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, the following records shall be retained for at least the minimum period indicated.

6.10.2 The following records shall be retained for at least 5 years:

- a. Records and logs of unit operation covering the interval at each power level.
- b. Records and logs of principal maintenance activities, inspections, repair, and replacement of principal items of equipment related to nuclear safety.