

DUKE POWER COMPANY

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84 MAY 16 A 9:00

May 11, 1984

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Catawba Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached Significant Deficiency Report
No. SD 413-414/84-09.

Very truly yours,

H.B. Tucker / BT

Hal B. Tucker

LTP/php

Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector
Catawba Nuclear Station

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REPORT NUMBER: SD 413-414/84-09

REPORT DATE: May 11, 1984

FACILITY: Catawba Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2

IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCY:

Incorrect tubing clamps were used in the erection of several tubing supports. This deficiency was identified on Nonconforming Item 18265.

INITIAL REPORT:

On April 12, 1984, Al Ignatonis, NRC Region II, Atlanta, Georgia was notified of the deficiency by W O Henry, R C Gamberg, S D Alexander, and T L Utterback of Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina.

COMPONENT AND/OR SUPPLIER:

Fabricated by Duke Power Company, Catawba Nuclear Station.

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY:

As reported in Nonconforming Item 18265, several tubing supports were erected using 3D tubing clamps rather than the 2D clamps required by the design. This situation occurred because the incorrect clamps were released from the warehouse and the craftsman and inspector failed to identify the incorrect clamps due to confusion as to when the clamps should be inspected. Some inspection personnel felt the verification was done during the torque inspection of the clamp while others thought the verification was done during the mechanical inspection of the support.

ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS:

Failure of the tubing pressure boundary would prevent proper system operation. Assuming the obligatory single failure and existence of this non-conformance at a time when containment isolation is necessary, it would not be possible to fully meet our commitments to isolate containment.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

All individuals involved with the erection and inspection of tubing supports have been made aware of this situation. To prevent reoccurrence, inspection personnel have been instructed that verification of tubing

clamps shall be performed at the mechanical inspection of the support rather than at torque inspection.

Construction Technical Support has performed an in-plant inspection of all tubing supports. Process control has been generated to have all incorrect clamps replaced. QA will reinspect all tubing supports to assure the proper clamps have been installed. This rework/reinspection shall be complete by May 21, 1984.