

DUKE POWER COMPANY

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34 MAY 10 4 39 PM '84

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Catawba Nuclear Station  
Units 1 and 2  
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached Significant Deficiency Report  
No. SD 413-414/84-07.

Very truly yours,

*Hal B. Tucker*

Hal B. Tucker

LTP/php

Attachment

cc: Director  
Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

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Duke Power Company  
Catawba Nuclear Station

REPORT NUMBER: SD 413-414/84-07

REPORT DATE: May 4, 1984

FACILITY: Catawba Nuclear Station  
Units 1 and 2

IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCY:

End Blocks for ITT Grinnell Figure 307 mechanical snubber extension pieces, modified by Duke Power Company's Construction Department, were found to be incorrectly drilled and tapped. This discrepancy was identified by Nonconforming Item 18167.

INITIAL REPORT:

On April 5, 1984, Virgil Brownlee, NRC Region II, Atlanta, Georgia was notified of the deficiency by J L Ritchie, W O Henry, and T L Utterback of Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina.

COMPONENT AND/OR SUPPLIER:

Fabricated by Duke Power Company, Catawba Nuclear Station.

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY:

On August 10, 1983, the Construction Department at Catawba Nuclear Station began drilling and tapping end blocks for extension pieces of ITT Grinnell Figure 307 mechanical snubbers. During a support/restraint inspection, excessive play between the rod end threads and the end block threads was identified by the QA inspector as a discrepancy. This problem was identified March 14, 1984 on Nonconforming Item Report 18167. Subsequent investigation by Construction Technical Support revealed that 315 supports with extension pieces had been fabricated since August 10, 1983. Of the 315, 104 were found to have extension pieces with oversized holes. The threads were checked with "go-no go" gauges for the specified class fit.

ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS:

Had this situation not been detected, it is possible that some of these mechanical snubbers could have failed during a design basis event. This possibly could have led to an overstressed condition of the restrained component.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The Construction Procedure (CP-353) used to perform the modification of extension pieces has been revised to include a check of all threads with "go-no go" gauges as a part of the fabrication process.

All extension pieces modified since August 10, 1983 have been checked with "go-no go" gauges. Those found to have unacceptable threads will be replaced by May 11, 1984.