

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401  
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

May 9, 1984

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BLRD-50-438/84-32  
BLRD-50-439/84-30

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANTS UNITS 1 AND 2 - ALTERATIONS OF FIRE DOORS AND  
FRAMES - BLRD-50-438/84-32, BLRD-50-439/84-30 - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector Ed Ford  
on April 12, 1984 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 3011. Enclosed  
is our first interim report. We expect to submit our next report by  
December 21, 1984.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at  
FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

*L. M. Mills*

L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
ALTERATIONS OF FIRE DOORS AND FRAMES  
BLRD-50-438/84-32, BLRD-50-439/84-30  
NCR 3011  
10 CFR 50.55(e)  
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

A number of fire-rated doors and frames at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant have been altered after certification. Some alterations were made without prior approval by TVA's Division of Engineering Design (EN DES). Other modifications were made to accomplish NRC-mandated security requirements or to maintain pressurization required for radiation protection or upgrade door leakage performance found deficient in preop tests. Modifications were also made in order to repair material damaged during construction.

Alterations included, but may not be limited to, signs and tags pop-riveted to doors, lock strike covers pop-riveted to door faces, holes drilled in door faces for temporary lock installations, electrical box screwed to doorframe, electrical magnetic switches screwed to door face and frame, holes in door frames for electrical defeat switch, doors drilled for electric lock solenoid and handle anchorage, door bottom seals screwed to door face, weatherstripping screwed to doorframe, door astragals screwed to door face, door closers through-bolted to doors, and interior metal siding pop-riveted to doorframe.

Similar occurrences at TVA's Watts Bar Nuclear Plant have been reported under NCR 4443R (WBRD-50-390/83-69, WBRD-50-391/83-64).

Interim Progress

TVA is performing an evaluation to determine the impact of door modifications on performance as a fire barrier and the affect on plant safety functions. Also, the cause and action to prevent occurrence are being investigated.