


James A. FitzPatrick
Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 41
Lycoming, New York 13083
315 342-3840



Radford J. Converse
Resident Manager

March 11, 1982
JAFF-92-0209

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: DOCKET NO. 50-333
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: 92-010-00 - Roving Fire Watch
Patrols Missed

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Questions concerning this report may be addressed to
Mr. W. Verne Childs at (315) 349-6071.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'R. Converse'.

RADFORD J. CONVERSE

RJC:WVC:lar

Enclosure

cc: USNRC, Region I
USNRC Resident Inspector
INPO Records Center

170001
9203180032 920311
PDR ADDCK 05000333
S PDR

Cont No
9203180032
IE22
11

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3					PAGE (3) 1 OF 6							
TITLE (4) Roving Fire Watch Patrols Missed for Six Hours Due to Personnel Error																						
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)												
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME				DOCKET NUMBER (8)									
0	2	1	0	9	2	9	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	1	1	9	2	0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																			
N			20.000a)				20.000a)				20.73a)(2)(iv)				73.71b)							
POWER LEVEL (10)			0 0 0				00.000a)(1)(i)				00.73a)(2)(iv)				73.71a)							
			00.000a)(1)(ii)				00.000a)(2)				00.73a)(2)(iv)				OTHER (Specify in Appendix before and in Text, NRC Form 305A)							
			00.000a)(1)(iii)				X 00.73a)(2)(i)				00.73a)(2)(iv)(A)											
			00.000a)(1)(iv)				00.73a)(2)(ii)				00.73a)(2)(iv)(B)											
			00.000a)(1)(v)				00.73a)(2)(iii)				00.73a)(2)(v)											
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																						
NAME W. VERNE CHILDS, SENIOR LICENSING ENGINEER										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 3 1 5 3 4 9 - 6 0 7 1												
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																						
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC													
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)												
YES (If yes, specify EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										MONTH DAY YEAR												
X NO																						

ABSTRACT (Less than 1000 words, i.e., approximately fifteen single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

ElIS Codes are in []

The plant was shutdown and in the cold condition for maintenance and refuel. On 2/11/92 it was discovered that hourly roving fire watch patrols required by Technical Specification 3.12.F.2 for a 6-hour period starting at 2300 on 2/10/92 had not been met. During a routine fire watch patrol, the usual access route to a portion of the reactor building [NG] was denied by Radiation Protection personnel due to a temporary high radiation area. The fire watch supervisor was informed. However, the supervisor erroneously assumed complete responsibility and did not inform the shift supervisor or take action to gain access by any of several available routes to allow the completion of the required fire watch patrol. The fire watch patrol was performed immediately after the Fire Protection Supervisor discovered the problem. A replacement fire watch supervisor has been hired and trained. LER-92-001 and LER-92-006 are similar events.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRATION: 8/31/95

FACILITY NAME (1) JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)				
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		9 2	-- 0 1 0	-- 0 0	0 2	OF	0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's.) (17)

EIIIS Codes are in[]

Description

The plant was shutdown and in the cold condition for maintenance and refuel. On February 11, 1992 at approximately 0530 hours the shift supervisor was informed that fire watch requirements of Technical Specification 3.12.F.2 had not been met for a six (6) hour period.

A fire barrier penetration seal baseline inspection, which began in November 1991, has revealed a number of deficiencies which require posting of continuous or roving fire watches (see LER-91-024). Fire barrier penetration seal deficiencies in the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) [BN] enclosure (room) located in the west crescent area of the reactor building [NG] is one of the areas to which a fire watch patrol is assigned on an hourly roving patrol basis.

During the evening of February 10, 1992 personnel were in the process of moving equipment necessary for refueling activities from the ground floor (elevation 272 ft.) of the reactor building to the refueling floor (elevation 369 ft.) of the reactor building. The equipment being moved had fixed radioactive contamination on (or within) the equipment in sufficient quantity that the area was designated as a "high radiation area". When the fire watch approached the area on his way to the west crescent area (elevation 272 ft.) to complete the 2300 to 2400 hours patrol, Radiation Protection personnel denied the fire watch access to the high radiation area.

The fire watch informed the fire watch supervisor that the hourly roving patrol of the west crescent area could not be completed because of the access restrictions on elevation 272 ft. of the reactor building. The supervisor made a log entry noting that the hourly patrol of the west crescent was not being completed due to temporary high radiation area. These conditions continued until approximately 0500 hours when the night shift personnel involved in moving materials to the refuel floor completed their shift. While the fire watch post instructions required the shift supervisor to be notified, he was not notified by either the fire watch or the fire watch supervisor during the 6-hour period from 2300 hours on February 10, 1992 to 0500 hours on February 11, 1992.

At approximately 0500 hours on February 11, 1992 the plant Fire Protection Supervisor arrived at the plant and discovered the failure of the fire watches to patrol the west crescent area on an hourly basis. The shift supervisor was immediately informed and the fire watches were instructed to complete the hourly patrol of the west crescent area. The patrol between 0500 and 0600 hours, as well as later patrols, were completed as required.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OME NO. 3150-0104

EX-RES. 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 6 0 0 0 3 3 3	LER NUMBER (3)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		9 2	0 1 0	0 0	0 3	OF	0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 206A's (1))

The Fire Protection Supervisor discussed the event with the fire watch supervisor and senior plant management. The fire watch supervisor tendered his resignation which was immediately accepted.

Cause

The event was caused by a personnel error (poor judgement) by the fire watch supervisor. When the fire watch informed the fire watch supervisor that access was denied, the shift supervisor should have been informed in accordance with written instructions.

The fire watch supervisor inappropriately assumed complete responsibility and (apparently) made no effort to assure the fire watch patrol could be completed by gaining access to the west crescent area by another route or by requesting assistance from the shift supervisor. Access was available, without any complicating factors such as the temporary high radiation area, by simply crossing the reactor building on a different elevation. It is apparent that the fire watch supervisor should have understood that access was available. Two (2) other fire watch supervisors that received the same training (at the same time) clearly understood that access was available by other routes.

Analysis

The west crescent area of the reactor building contains the RCIC enclosure and portions of the Safety Division 1 Residual Heat Removal/Low Pressure Coolant Injection (RHR/LPCI) [BO] and core spray [BM] systems. None of these systems was required to be operable because the reactor was shutdown, reactor coolant temperature was approximately 100°F, and reactor water level had been increased to the refueling level. In addition, reactor core decay heat was at a low level because the reactor had been shutdown for approximately 75 days. As a result, the event was of minimal significance.

The event requires a report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an operation prohibited by plant Technical Specifications; that is, the fire watch requirements of Technical Specification 3.12.F.2 were not met for the six (6) hour period from 2300 hours on February 10, 1992 to 0500 hours on February 11, 1992.

Corrective Action

1. The hourly fire watch patrol of the west crescent area was immediately reestablished. The patrol between 0500 and 0600 hours on February 11, 1992 (and later patrols) were completed as required.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMS NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/96

FACILITY NAME (1) JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3	LER NUMBER (3)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISED NUMBER		
		92	010	00	04	OF 04

TEXT: If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's (17)

2. The resignation of the fire watch supervisor was accepted and a replacement was hired. The replacement fire watch supervisor began regular duties (after completion of training) on March 11, 1992.
3. Each fire watch and fire watch supervisor was made aware of the fire watch and fire watch supervisor performance deficiencies and what should have been done when difficulties in completing the fire watch patrols first occurred. This action reinforces the employee's understanding of plant management expectations concerning the fire watch and fire watch supervisor duties. Completed during shift meetings on February 19, and 20, 1992.

Additional Information

Failed Components: None

Previous Similar Events: LER-92-001 and LER-92-006 reported additional instances when fire watchstanding requirements were not met.