

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Washington Nuclear Project - Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 1					PAGE (3) OF 0 3							
TITLE (4) Activation of Pre-Action and Deluge Systems																						
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)												
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)									
0	4	1	9	8	4	8	4	0	2	6	0	1	0	5	1	8	8	4	0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																			
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)							
0 0 1			20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.38(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)							
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(c)(2)				X 50.73(a)(2)(vii) (c)&(d)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)							
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)											
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)											
			20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)											
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																						
NAME L.D. Kassakatis, Plant Compliance Engineer										TELEPHONE NUMBER 5 0 9 3 7 7 1 2 5 0 1												
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										Ext. 2201												
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC												
B	KIP			N																		
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)				MONTH DAY YEAR								
X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										NO				0 9 0 1 8 4								

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

The first activation of the Pre-Action and Deluge Systems occurred on 3-21-84 and was reported as a Licensee Event Report because water was found in the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) Train B. The water entered the SGTS via the Deluge System, momentarily lifted the deluge valve off its seat and allowed water to leak and run out the nozzles onto the floor adjacent to the SGTS Charcoal Bed. On 4-19-84 and 4-27-84 water was found in the B Train of the SGTS again. The A Train of the SGTS was inspected to insure no water was present and a B Train Test Canister pulled.

After each of the events B Train of the SGTS was considered inoperable until the Test Canister Analysis was complete indicating no charcoal damage.

A design change is in progress to prevent future occurrences.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Washington Nuclear Project - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 4	--	0 2 6	--	0 0	0 2	OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

The activation of Pre-Action and Deluge portions of the Fire Protection System have been causing pressure surges in the Fire Protection System. The surges have been of sufficient magnitude to unseat the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) Deluge Valves. The SGTS deluge valves automatically reseal because their trip mechanisms have not been activated, however, the water found in the SGTS indicates that the pressure surge is unseating the SGTS deluge valves for a short duration.

1st Event 3-21-84

- (a) Power Level - Zero
- (b) Plant Mode - 4
- (c) Prior to Initial Power Operation

An ionization detector in the cable spreading room was activated by craft using a grinder. The detector activated Pre-Action System 65 (cable spreading room) by tripping the respective deluge valve. The resulting pressure drop caused the fire pumps FP-P-2A and FP-P-2B (2000 gpm electrics) to start. The ensuing pressure surge caused Pre-Action System 84 (HPCS Diesel room) to flood its piping (no water issued from nozzles). The Standby Gas Treatment Deluge Valve for Train A prefilter momentarily lifted, wetting the prefilter medium. Standby Gas Treatment Train B second charcoal bed deluge valve lifted momentarily and failed to reset properly, water leaked by the seat and ran out the nozzles onto the floor adjacent to the charcoal bed. No water came in contact with the charcoal in the unit.

Operations isolated the deluge valve for Train B second charcoal bed and it was then reset. The prefilter was dried and the water was cleaned up in the Train B charcoal bed area. The trains were tested using the iodine method and found satisfactory, then placed in service. Pre-Action Systems 65 and 84 were drained and returned to service. Fire pump start pressure (mercoird pressure switches) were checked. A Plant Modification Request was written to investigate the feasibility of installing pressure surge reducing valves (Clayton type) to mitigate the surge during pump starts. The event posed no potential safety problem.

2nd Event 4-19-84

- (a) Power Level 1%
- (b) Plant Mode - 2
- (c) During Initial Power Operations

Water was found in the area of the second charcoal filter of SGTS Train B. Activation of the Cable Chase Pre-Action System the previous week had initiated the same sequence of events described in the 1st Event. The SGTS was again cleaned up and a test canister pulled and analyzed to insure no damage to the charcoal.

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Washington Nuclear Project - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 4	—	0 2 6	—	0 0 0	3	OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

3rd Event 4-27-84

- (a) Power Level 1%
- (b) Plant Mode - 2
- (c) During Initial Power Operations

An inspection was made immediately after activation of the Fire Protection System and water was again found in the charcoal filter area. The sequence described in the 1st Event was repeated again. The SGTS was again cleaned up and a test canister pulled and analyzed to insure no damage to the charcoal.

The 1st Event resulted in the initiation of a Plant Modification Request which has subsequently been processed and the surge reducing valves are being procured and will be installed as soon as possible. The Fire Protection System pumps are being run continuously to prevent additional surges.

Washington Public Power Supply System

P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397
May 18, 1984

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 84-026-01

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 84-026-01 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of Technical Specification Section 6.9.1.7 and discusses the item of noncompliance, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence. This report is the first revision of LER 84-026.

Very truly yours,

J. D. Martin for
J. D. Martin (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

JDM:mm

Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 84-026-01

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, Administrator
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