

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)  
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear StationDOCKET NUMBER (2)  
0 5 0 0 0 3 9 5 1 OF 0 2TITLE (4)  
Engineering Safety Feature Actuation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 4	1 7	8 4	8 4	0 2 3	0 0	0 5	1 7	8 4		0 5 0 0 0
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)										
OPERATING MODE (9)		5	20.402(b)		20.406(e)		80.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 0 0	20.406(a)(1)(i)		80.36(a)(1)		80.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)		80.36(a)(2)		80.73(a)(2)(vi)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)		80.73(a)(2)(i)		80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)			
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)		80.73(a)(2)(ii)		80.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)			
			20.406(a)(1)(v)		80.73(a)(2)(iii)		80.73(a)(2)(x)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME  
A. R. Koon, Jr., Associate Manager, Regulatory Compliance

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE  
8 0 3 3 4 5 - 5 2 0 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS
A	E J			N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1025 hours on April 17, 1984, with the Plant in Mode 5, an inadvertent undervoltage signal occurred on Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Bus 1DA. The signal actuated the ESF Load Sequencer (ESFLS) and attempted to start "A" Diesel Generator which was tagged out of service for maintenance. The ESFLS stripped all non-essential loads and opened the normal incoming breaker to Bus 1DA. The inoperable diesel interrupted further operation of the ESFLS at this point. The de-energized bus prevented operation of any safety feature equipment. Operations personnel restored the normal incoming power to Bus 1DA at 1050 hours after identifying the cause of the event.

8405220460 840517  
PDR ADOCK 05000395  
S PDR

TE22

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
	0 5 0 0 0					OF

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At 1025 hours on April 17, 1984, with the Plant in Mode 5, an inadvertent undervoltage signal occurred on Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Bus 1DA. The signal actuated the ESF Load Sequencer (ESFLS) and attempted to start "A" Diesel Generator which was tagged out of service for maintenance. The ESFLS stripped all non-essential loads and opened the normal incoming breaker to Bus 1DA. The inoperable diesel interrupted further operation of the ESFLS at this point. The de-energized bus prevented operation of any safety feature equipment. Operations personnel restored the normal incoming power to BUS 1DA at 1050 hours after identifying the cause of the event.

The inadvertent ESF actuation on April 17, 1984, is attributed to personnel error. Electrical Maintenance personnel had previously disabled the undervoltage detection circuitry to replace time delay relays for which the qualified life (ten years) for use in LE equipment had expired. Station drawings and Electrical Maintenance Procedure (EMP) 300.012, "Relay Replacement," were being used as guides in the relay replacement. The electricians initially lifted the incoming wires from the undervoltage detection circuitry to the ESFLS cabinet prior to de-energizing the field components to prevent actuation of the ESFLS on an undervoltage condition. However, the personnel failed to return the circuit to service in the reverse order upon completion of the relay replacement and inadvertently actuated the ESFLS when the equipment sensed an undervoltage condition.

Electrical Maintenance personnel normally disconnect and land wiring only on de-energized circuits. It is believed that this safety conscious work habit caused the personnel error on April 17.

There were no adverse consequences resulting from this event. The Plant was in Mode 5 and ESF Bus 1DB was considered to be the operable electrical bus per the requirements of Technical Specification 3.8.3.2, "Onsite Power Distribution."

Management is reviewing recent events, involving maintenance personnel, where the cause was personnel error. This review, which is expected to be complete by July 1, 1984, will provide short and long term corrective actions to reduce future occurrences.

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

O. W. DIXON, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

May 17, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50/395  
Operating License No. NPF-12  
LER 84-023

Dear Sir:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #84-023 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

CJM:OWD/lcd  
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer  
T. C. Nichols, Jr./O. W. Dixon, Jr.  
E. H. Crews, Jr.  
E. C. Roberts  
W. A. Williams, Jr.  
D. A. Nauman  
J. P. O'Reilly  
Group Managers  
O. S. Bradham  
C. A. Price  
D. A. Lavigne

J. F. Heilman  
C. L. Ligon (NSRC)  
K. E. Nodland  
R. A. Stough  
G. Percival  
C. W. Hehl  
J. B. Knotts, Jr.  
INPO Records Center  
ANI Library  
NPCF  
File

IE22  
1/1