

JUL 20 1984

NRC Form 368  
(9-83)U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104  
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Monticello	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 3	1 OF 0 1 2

TITLE (4)
Inadvertent Start of No. 12 Diesel Generator

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
0 6	2 1	8 4	8 4	0 2 3	0 0	0 7	2 0	8 4		0 5 0 0 0 0	
										0 5 0 0 0 0	

OPERATING MODE (9)	POWER LEVEL (10)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(e)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)						
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)						
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.72(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)						
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)									

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAME	AREA CODE		
Lawrence E. Pudlick, Engineer II	6 1 1 2	2 1 9 1 5 1 - 1 5 1 1 5 1 1	

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Inaccurate instructions for isolating A side RHRSW pump motor's DC control power resulted in the de-energization of the offsite source undervoltage relay causing the fast start of No. 12 Emergency Standby Diesel Generator. Isolation was immediately removed and the diesel fast start relay reset. No. 12 Emergency Standby Diesel Generator was shutdown. No. 11 Emergency Standby Diesel Generator was out of service at the time for routine relay maintenance.

Isolation instruction was put on hold until changes were made to prevent a similar event. A warning instruction has been placed on the DC control breaker to prevent its inadvertent opening and start of the emergency standby diesel generators. Also, modifications are to be made to the Emergency Standby Diesel generator start logic that will reduce the number of initiation signals to the diesels, including the removal of the offsite source undervoltage signal.

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PDR ADOCK 05000263  
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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Monticello	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 3	8 4	— 0 2 3	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On June 21, 1984 at 0140 CST, while the plant was in cold shutdown for refueling and maintenance, work was initiated that required isolation of the A side RHRSW pump motors (BI). Inaccurate isolation instruction resulted in the DC control power (EJ) to Emergency Safeguard Bus No. 15 switchgear (EB) to be de-energized causing the de-energization of the offsite source undervoltage relay (27) and the subsequent fast start of No. 12 Emergency Standby Diesel Generator (EK). Operator action immediately restored DC control power to Bus. No. 15 switchgear and shutdown No. 12 Emergency Standby Diesel Generator. No. 11 Emergency Standby Diesel Generator and Emergency Safeguard Bus No. 16 were out of service for routine maintenance at the time of the event.

The Emergency Standby Diesel Generator fast start logic performed as designed.

Investigation revealed that the isolation instructions mistakenly required the opening of the DC control power circuit breaker (72) to Bus No. 15 switchgear rather than the removal of the NR DC control fuse (FU) for the RHRSW pump motor air circuit breakers.

To prevent a similar event, a warning label has been attached to the DC control power circuit breaker to Emergency Safeguard Bus No. 15 switchgear cautioning the opening of the circuit breaker and subsequent actions. Also, modifications are to be made to the Emergency Standby Diesel generator start logic that will reduce the number of initiation signals to the diesels, including the removal of the offsite source undervoltage signal.

During the event, Tech. Spec. required systems were operable.

No safety consequences resulted from the event.

Previous reportable event of a similar nature is M-RO-84-001.



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U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT  
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22

Inadvertent Start of No. 12 Diesel Generator

The License Event Report for this occurrence is attached.

This event was reported via the Emergency Notification System per 10 CFR  
Part 72 on June 21, 1984.

*for* *M. M. Vick*  
David Musolf  
Manager - Nuclear Support Services

DMM/MTV/dab

c: Regional Administrator-III, NRC  
NRR Project Manager, NRC  
Resident Inspector, NRC  
MPCA  
Attn: J W Ferman

Attachment

*IE22*  
*11*