

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION


NIAGARA  MOHAWK

300 ERIE BOULEVARD, WEST
SYRACUSE, N. Y. 13202

50-2

January 6, 1975

Mr. Karl R. Goller
Assistant Director of Operating Reactors
Directorate of Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D.C. 20545



Dear Mr. Goller:

In accordance with the Technical Specifications for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit #1, the enclosed Abnormal Occurrence Report (74-17) is being submitted. This is in the accepted format as detailed in Regulatory Guide 1.16, Rev. 1.

Very truly yours,



R.R. Schneider
Vice President - Electric Operations

TJD/mm

Enc.

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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA  MOHAWK

DATE: January 6, 1975

SUBJECT: Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-220 /74-17

The enclosed Abnormal Occurrence Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specifications Section 6.

TO: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

FROM: Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Nine Mile Point - James A. FitzPatrick Site

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station

P.O. Box #32
Lycoming, New York 13093

Docket 50-220

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA  MOHAWK

SUBJECT: Abnormal Occurrence 10 Day Letter

REFERENCE: License DPR 17.

Report No.: 50- 220 /74- 17

Report Date: 12/30/74

Occurrence Date: 12/27/74

Facility: NMP #1

Identification of Occurrence:

One inoperable SRM (14)

Conditions Prior to
Occurrence:

<u> </u>	Steady State Power	<u> </u>	Routine Shutdown
<u> </u>	Hot Standby	<u> </u>	
<u> X </u>	Cold Shutdown	<u> </u>	Lead Changes
<u> </u>	Refueling Shutdown	<u> </u>	
<u> </u>	Routine Startup	<u> </u>	Other

Description of the Occurrence:

During shutdown surveillance testing, it was found that SRM (14) was inoperable. Technical Specifications Sec. 3.1.1b (4) requires 3 operable Instrument Channels for startup. This LCO was satisfied as the other 3 SRM's were operable.

Apparent Cause of the Occurrence:

_____ Design
_____ Manufacture
_____ Installation/Const.
_____ Operator

_____ Procedure
_____ Unusual Service
_____ Condition
_____ X Component Failure
_____ Other (Specify)

Detector failure

Analysis of Occurrence:

The source range monitor (SRM) system performs no automatic safety function. It does provide the operator with a visual indication of neutron level which is needed for knowledgeable and efficient reactor startup at low neutron levels and it also provides rod withdrawal blocks to the Rod Control System. The results of reactivity accidents are functions of the initial neutron flux. One operable SRM channel would be adequate to monitor the approach to critical using homogeneous patterns of scattered control rods. A minimum of three operable SRM's is required as an added conservatism.

Therefore, it can be concluded that one SRM being inoperable would not have prevented the performance of the intended function of the SRM system. Further, no hazard would have been presented to the plant safety or health and welfare of the general public from this event.

Corrective Action:

Detector was replaced with spare and system response to neutrons was verified.

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA MOHAWK

DATE: December 30, 1974

SUBJECT: Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-220 /74-17

The enclosed preliminary AOR is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specifications Section 6.

TO: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19405

FROM: Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Nine Mile Point - James A. FitzPatrick Site

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station

P.O. Box #32
Lycoming, New York 13093

Docket 50-220

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA  MOHAWK

SUBJECT: Abnormal Occurrence 24 hour Notification

Confirming Mr. C. Stuart phone conversation
with Mr. T. Shadlosky AEC RO:1 office on
12/27/74.

REFERENCE: License DPR 17.

Report No.: 50- 220 /74-17

Report Date: 12/30/74

Occurrence Date: 12/27/74

Facility: NMP # 1

Identification of Occurrence:

One inoperable SRM (14)

Conditions Prior to
Occurrence:

<u> </u>	Steady State Power	<u> </u>	Routine Shutdown
<u> </u>	Hot Standby	<u> </u>	
<u> X </u>	Cold Shutdown	<u> </u>	Load Changes
<u> </u>	Refueling Shutdown	<u> </u>	
<u> </u>	Routine Startup	<u> </u>	Other

Description of the Occurrence:

During shutdown surveillance testing, it was found that SRM (14) was inoperable. Technical Specifications Sec. 3.1.1b (4) requires 3 operable Instrument channels for startup. This LCO was satisfied as the other 3 SRM's were operable.

Apparent Cause of the Occurrence:

_____ Design
_____ Manufacture
_____ Installation/Const.
_____ Operator

_____ Procedure
_____ Unusual Service
_____ Condition
X _____ Component Failure
_____ Other (Specify)

Detector failure

Analysis of Occurrence:

The source range monitor (SRM) system performs no automatic safety function. It does provide the operator with a visual indication of neutron level which is needed for knowledgeable and efficient reactor startup at low neutron levels and it also provides rod withdrawal blocks to the Rod Control System. The results of reactivity accidents are function of the initial neutron flux. One operable SRM channel would be adequate to monitor the approach to critical using homogeneous patterns of scattered control rods. A minimum of three operable SRM's is required as an added conservatism.

Therefore, it can be concluded that one SRM being inoperable would not have prevented the performance of the intended function of the SRM system. Further, no hazard would have been presented to the plant safety or health and welfare of the general public from this event.

Corrective Action:

Detector replaced

Failure Data:

Later