

Jersey Central Power & Light Company



MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 201-539-6111

MEMBER OF THE

General



Public Utilities Corporation

April 14, 1975



Mr. A. Giambusso
Director, Division of Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station
Docket No. 50-219
Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/75-10

The purpose of this letter is to forward to you the attached abnormal occurrence report in compliance with paragraph 6.6.2.a of the Technical Specifications.

Enclosed are forty copies of this submittal.

Very truly yours,

Donald A. Ross, Manager
Generating Stations-Nuclear

cs

Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region 1

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General



Public Utilities Corporation

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/75-10

Report Date

April 14, 1975

Occurrence Date

April 4, 1975

Identification of Occurrence

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.A.1, excessive leakage rate through the reactor building to torus vacuum breaker valves V-26-16 and V-26-18. This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraphs 1.15.B, 1.15.D, and 1.15.E.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was shut down for the 1975 refueling.

Description of Occurrence

After performing the local leak rate tests as required by Technical Specification 4.5.E on April 4, 1975, it was found that both reactor building to torus vacuum breaker block valves (V-26-16 and V-26-18) had leak rates exceeding the limits specified in Technical Specification 4.5.F.C and in 10CFR50, Appendix J, as follows:

<u>Valve</u>	<u>Ltm (35)</u>	<u>Ltm (20)</u>
V-26-16	196.7 scfh	164.4 scfh
V-26-18	78.8 scfh	65.86 scfh

In reviewing this event, an apparent conflict in reporting requirements between Appendix J to 10CFR50 and the Technical Specifications was observed. Section V.B.3 of Appendix J would require that this event be reported in an accompanying

summary report to the next primary containment leak rate test report. According to 10CFR50, therefore, this event need not be reported for two to three years from the date of occurrence. Since the valves may be considered inoperable as defined in the Technical Specifications, the leakage is being reported in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.

The plant is currently being maintained in a condition that does not require primary containment.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Component failure is the cause of this occurrence.

Analysis of Occurrence

Each of these redundant valves is one of a set of two primary containment isolation valves. The second valve of each set is a check valve. Neither of the check valves was found to be leaking and, therefore, would have performed their intended isolation function during operation and under accident conditions.

The failure of the valves to meet the leakage requirements would not impair their ability to perform their function as vacuum breakers. The safety significance of this failure was, therefore, loss of redundancy in primary containment isolation valves.

Corrective Action

Valves V-26-16 and V-26-18 will be adjusted and/or repaired and retested to reassure their ability to satisfy the leakage requirements specified in Technical Specification 4.5.F.C and in 10CFR50, Appendix J. It is anticipated that these valves will be replaced during the current refueling outage. If this is not done, the valves will be replaced during the first outage of sufficient length to allow completion of the replacement.