

Jersey Central Power & Light Company



MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 201-539-6111

General



Public Utilities Corporation

June 27, 1975



Mr. A. Giambusso
Director, Division of Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station
Docket No. 50-219
Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/75-17

The purpose of this letter is to forward to you the attached abnormal occurrence report in compliance with paragraph 6.6.2.a of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Donald A. Ross, Manager
Generating Stations-Nuclear

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Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region 1

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MEMBER OF THE

General



Public Utilities Corporation

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/75-17

Report Date

June 27, 1975

Occurrence Date

June 19, 1975

Identification of Occurrence

Failure of Core Spray System Parallel Isolation Valve (V-20-15) to demonstrate operability/during surveillance testing. This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15.D.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was at steady state power with the following major parameters:

Power:	Core, 1600 MWt
	Electric, 530 MWe
Flow:	Recirculation, 13.0×10^4 gpm
	Feedwater, 5.91×10^6 lb/hr
Stack Gas:	9300 μ ci/sec

Description of Occurrence

On Thursday, June 19, 1975, at approximately 1100, during the performance of surveillance testing on the four (4) Low Reactor Pressure Core Spray Valve Permissive Pressure Switches (RE 17A, B, C, and D), Core Spray System Parallel Isolation Valve (V-20-15) failed to demonstrate operability. The testing of each low pressure switch may be summarized as follows:



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- (1) The sensor is isolated from the reactor, pressure is bled off, and the opening of the associated parallel isolation valves is noted.
- (2) Using a test pump, a pressure in excess of 285 psig is impressed on the sensor, and the closing of the associated parallel isolation valves is noted.
- (3) Pressure is bled off from the sensor, and the opening of the associated parallel isolation valves is noted.

Valve (V-20-15) failed to close completely when step (2) was being performed on pressure switch (RE 17B). It is noted that V-20-15 had previously functioned normally during the testing of pressure switch (RE 17A).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Investigation revealed that the tab on the "B" phase of the valve motor breaker stab was broken resulting in intermittent contact with the associated bus bar. Consequently, the loss of one phase caused the valve motor to trip.

Analysis of Occurrence

Each core spray system is provided with two (2) parallel isolation valves which open when a low-low reactor water level or high drywell pressure condition exists in addition to a low reactor pressure condition (<285 psig). The safety significance of this event is considered to be the loss of parallel isolation valve redundancy in one core spray system. It is noted that V-20-15 did open during the surveillance testing, as would have been required during a loss of coolant accident.

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action involved replacing the V-20-15 motor breaker stab and inspecting the motor breakers for the other parallel isolation valves. The Plant Operations Review Committee concluded that the breaker stab replacement is sufficient repair action when considering this type of failure.

Failure Data

General Electric
1C7700 Line Control Center
Size I Breaker
Type - FVNR
Stab Base Assembly Part No. 117E6219G1