



Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Nuclear Project  
P. O. Box 10429  
Southport, N.C. 28461-0429

February 28, 1992

FILE: B09-13510C

10CFR50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-324  
LICENSE NO. DPR-62  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2-92-001

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is submitted in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours,

J. W. Spencer, General Manager  
Brunswick Nuclear Project

RSK/

Enclosure

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebner  
Mr. N. B. Le  
BSEP NRC Resident Office

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Brunswick Steam Electric Plant  
Unit 2DOCKET NUMBER (2)  
05000324

PAGE (3)

1

TITLE (4) UNIT 2 SCRAM DURING MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE TESTING

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NO.	REV. NO.		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
02	02	92	92	-	001	-	03	01	92		

OPERATING

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

MODE (9)

1

20.402(b)

20.405(c)

X

50.73(a)(2)(iv)

73.71(b)

POWER

20.405(a)(1)(i)

50.73(c)(1)

50.73(a)(2)(v)

73.71(c)

LEVEL (10)

79%

20.405(a)(1)(ii)

50.73(c)(2)

50.73(a)(2)(vi)

OTHER (Specify in Abstract and Text)

20.405(a)(1)(iii)

50.73(a)(2)(f)

50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)

20.405(a)(1)(iv)

50.73(a)(2)(g)

50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)

20.405(a)(1)(v)

50.73(a)(2)(h)

50.73(a)(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Rhonda S. Knight, Regulatory Compliance Specialist

TELEPHONE NUMBER

(919) 457-2174

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

X	YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X				4	15	92

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space type-written lines) (16)

On January 29, 1992, Unit 2 was operating at approximately 100% steady state power. An annunciator for low electrohydraulic (EHC) fluid pressure was received. EHC pressure swings occurred. Reactor power was reduced to about 85% power to close #4 turbine control valve (TCV) which reduced the EHC pressure swings. On February 2, 1992, reactor power was reduced about to 79% and TCV testing began. During #2 TCV testing, the Control Operator (CO) did not have time to reset the scram logic for the 'B1' trip (received as expected) before the 'A1' switch tripped and a full scram signal was received causing a reactor scram. Following the reactor scram, RCIC automatically initiated and injected. HPCI initiated but level recovered prior to allowing injection. The cause of this event is perceived to be air or nitrogen trapped in the Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure (TCVFC) line creating a pressure perturbation on the TCVFC Pressure Switch No. 1 (2-EHC-PSL-1756) causing it to trip. The seal failure of the accumulator associated with this line allowed nitrogen to enter the EHC fluid and it was later found that the gas side of the accumulator was near solid with EHC fluid. The accumulator seal failure is attributed to excessive cycling which began after installation of the partial arc conversion modification during the last Unit 2 refueling outage. General Electric and Carolina Power & Light are investigating the cause and developing a plan for corrective action. Until implementation of the corrective action, reactor power has been reduced to decrease the EHC system oscillations. The EHC accumulators were rebuilt. During the scram recovery the CO was unable to reset the 'A' Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) turbine due to a failed reset relay coil in the RFP reset logic. The 'A' RFP also had a bound pump shaft assembly due to failure of wear ring cap screws. The safety significance of this event was minimal. Safety systems functioned as designed. Another similar event was reported in LER 1-90-017 (SCRAM during TCV/TSV testing due to procedural and switch problems).