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McGuire Nuclear Generation Department
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DUKE POWER

February 27, 1992


U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369
Licensee Event Report 369/92-01

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a) (1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 369/92-01 concerning failure to remove a steam generator tube from service. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i). This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public. A supplemental report will be submitted on 4/8/92.

Very truly yours,


T.C. McMeekin

TLP/bcb

Attachment

xc: Mr. S.D. Ebnetter
Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30323

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339

Mr. Tim Reed
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Washington, D.C. 20545

Mr. P.K. Van Doorn
NRC Resident Inspector
McGuire Nuclear Station

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PDR ADOCK 05000369
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME(1)

McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER(2)

05000 369

PAGE(3)

1 OF 1

TITLE(4) A Technical Specification Violation Occurred Because Of Failure To Remove A Steam Generator Tube From Service, As Necessary, During The Unit 1 End Of Cycle 7 Refueling Outage.

EVENT DATE(5)

LER NUMBER(6)

REPORT DATE(7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED(8)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
1	28	92	92	01	0	2	27	92	McGuire, Unit 1	05000 369
										05000

OPERATING

1

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following)(11)

MODE(9)		20.402(b)		20.405(e)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
POWER	97%	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
LEVEL(10)		20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		Abstract below
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)		and in Text)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER(12)

NAME

Terry L. Pedersen, Supervisor, McGuire Safety Review Group

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

704

875-4487

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT(13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRCDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRCDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED(14)

EXPECTED

MONTH

DAY

YEAR

SUBMISSION

4

8

92

DATE(15)

X

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

NO

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines)(16)

On January 16, 1992, at 1912, Operations Control Room personnel, commenced an orderly shutdown of Unit 1, as a result of primary to secondary leakage, which had increased to approximately 235 gallons per day, on Steam Generator (SG) 1D. Prior to the shutdown, Unit 1 was operating in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 97 percent power. Unit 1 was taken off line at 0649, January 17, 1992, and entered Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) on January 18, 1992, at 0552. The leakage was attributed to SG tube 47-46, leaking 30 drops per minute at secondary side head pressure, and SG tube 36-30, leaking 2 drops per minute at 180 psig above head pressure. Subsequent investigation of the event determined that SG tube 47-46 had an indication in excess of the Technical Specification limit of 40 percent. Tube 36-30 leakage was attributed to an inadequate kinetic weld bond. Re-evaluation of Motorized Rotating Pancake Coil (MRPC) Eddy Current Test (ECT) data collected during the 1991 End Of Cycle (EOC) 7 refueling outage, revealed that the indication on tube 47-46 existed at that time and was greater than the 40 percent through wall limit. Duke Power personnel and industry experts conducted an extensive historical ECT data review, acquired additional MRPC data, and developed new plugging criteria. Tubes 47-46 and 36-30 were plugged, along with other suspect tubes located in SGs 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D. A supplemental report will be submitted when the investigation has been completed.