

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

FACILITY NAME (1) Salem Generating Station - Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 2										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3									
TITLE (4) Inconsistency Between Technical Specifications and Safety Analysis																													
EVENT DATE (5)						LER NUMBER (6)						REPORT DATE (7)						OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH		DAY		YEAR		YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER		MONTH		DAY		YEAR		FACILITY NAMES Salem Unit 2						DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 1					
0 6		0 6		8 48		4		0 1 5		0 0		0 7		0 6		8 4								0 5 0 0 0					
OPERATING MODE (9) N						THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)																							
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 10 10						20.402(a)						20.406(a)						60.73(a)(2)(iv)						73.71(a)					
						20.406(a)(1)(i)						60.36(a)(1)						60.73(a)(2)(v)						73.71(a)					
						20.406(a)(1)(ii)						60.36(a)(2)						60.73(a)(2)(vi)						OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 3.6A)					
						20.406(a)(1)(iii)						60.73(a)(2)(i)						60.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)											
						20.406(a)(1)(iv)						60.73(a)(2)(ii)						60.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)											
20.406(a)(1)(v)						60.73(a)(2)(iii)						60.73(a)(2)(ix)																	
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																													
NAME J. L. Rupp																				TELEPHONE NUMBER 6 0 9 3 3 9 - 4 3 0 9									
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																													
CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NRC				CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NRC									
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)									
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										NO																			

**ABSTRACT** / Limit to 1400 words i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines (16)

On June 11, 1984, PSE&G received notification from Westinghouse of a potential unreviewed safety question, concerning the consistency between the safety analysis and Technical Specification 3.4.1.2. The issue in question concerns the number of operating Reactor Coolant Pumps when in Mode 3. The Technical Specification requires two operable pumps, although only one is required to be operating. However, the safety analysis in the FSAR assumes that either two or all of the pumps are actually operating. This inconsistency which is generic in nature, apparently originated from Standard Technical Specification 3.1.1.1 requirements. Westinghouse has reviewed the applicable accidents under the reduced flow conditions of one reactor coolant pump. Calculations reveal that the DNB design basis for only one accident (bank rod withdrawal from subcritical) may not be met when only one pump is in operation; although, since the accident analysis includes conservatism, which when removed show that the DNBR is above the limit value, no significant safety hazard exists. PSE&G has taken procedural and administrative controls to ensure that while in Mode 3, with the rod control system energized, there will be at least two Reactor Coolant Pumps operating. A License Change Request will be submitted to ensure consistency between the Technical Specification and the FSAR.

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**PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:**

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

**IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:**

Inconsistency Between Technical Specifications and Safety Analysis

Discovery Date: 06/06/84

Report Date: 07/06/84

This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 84-089

**CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:**

Not Applicable

**DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:**

On June 11, 1984, Salem Generating Station received notification from Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Water Reactor Divisions, (letter No. PSE-84-731, dated June 6, 1984) of a potential unreviewed safety question concerning the consistency between the safety analysis and the Technical Specifications. The issue in question concerns the number of operating Reactor Coolant Pumps (AB) when in Mode 3. Technical Specification 3.4.1.2 states that in Mode 3, there must be two loops operable (which means that the reactor coolant pump must be operable), but only one loop must be actually operating. However, the safety analysis in the FSAR assumes that either two or all of the reactor coolant pumps are actually operating, not just one. In the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), analyses performed at Hot Zero Power are assumed to bound Mode 3 operation. The accidents which are limiting at Hot Zero Power are 1) steamline break, 2) rod ejection and 3) bank rod withdrawal from subcritical.

**APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:**

The inconsistency between the safety analysis and the Technical Specification, which is generic in nature, apparently originated from Standard Technical Specification 3.1.1.1 requirements.

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
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**ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:**

Westinghouse has reviewed the three accidents under the reduced flow conditions of one reactor coolant pump. For the rod ejection and steamline break events, Westinghouse has determined that the inconsistency between the safety analysis and the Technical Specification will not impact the conclusions presented in the FSAR. However, for the bank rod withdrawal from subcritical accident, Westinghouse has performed calculations which show that the DNB design basis for this Condition II event may not be met when only one pump is in operation. Thus, the margin for safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications is reduced and this may be an unreviewed safety question according to 10CFR 50.59. It should be noted, that on a best estimate basis, the DNB design basis can be met. The FSAR licensing basis analysis includes conservatism (such as high reactivity insertions rates) which when removed, show that the DNBR is above the limit value. Thus, no significant safety hazard exists.

**CORRECTIVE ACTION:**

Integrated Operating Procedures applicable to Mode 3 operation are being revised to ensure that when the Rod Control System [AA] is energized, there will be at least two operating Reactor Coolant Pumps. In addition, an interpretation guide for Technical Specification 3.4.1.2 will be written and added to Operations Directive 12 (Tech Spec Interpretations). A License Change Request will be submitted to ensure that Technical Specification 3.4.1.2 is consistent with the FSAR.

  
General Manager-  
Salem Operations

JLR:tms

SORC Mtg 84-083B



**PSEG**

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

July 6, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION  
LICENSE NO. DPR-70  
DOCKET NO. 50-272  
UNIT NO. 1  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 84-015-00

This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR 50.73(a)(ii)(B). This report is required within thirty (30) days of discovery.

Sincerely yours,

J. M. Zupko, Jr.  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

JR:k11

CC: Distribution

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