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February 24, 1992
LIC-92-0545

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: Special Report on Inoperability of Fire Protection Equipment

The Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), holder of Operating License DPR-40, submits this report pursuant to the requirements of Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Unit No. 1 Technical Specification (TS) 2.19, "Fire Protection Systems".

FCS Technical Specification Section 2.19(7) requires that all penetration fire barriers protecting safety-related areas shall be functional (intact). With a penetration fire barrier non-functional, within one hour, either a continuous fire watch is to be established on at least one side of the affected penetration, or the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the penetration is to be verified and an hourly fire watch patrol established. The non-functional penetration must be restored to functional status within seven days or, failing that, a report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to TS 5.9.3 is to be prepared and submitted within an additional 30 days.

On January 16, 1992, roll-up fire door 1007-1, between Corridor and the Radwaste Building, was breached to install a personnel access door in the roll-up door. This fire door was returned to service on February 7, 1992. Appropriate compensatory measures, as required by TS 2.19(7), were in place for the duration of the impairment.

On January 30, 1992, two previously unidentified conduit penetrations were identified in the east wall of Room 81, which separates Room 81 from the Turbine Building. These conduit penetrations are sealed with grout and are considered to be correctly installed, however, no installation documentation was readily available to verify this. The penetrations were conservatively declared inoperable and appropriate compensatory measures, as required by TS 2.19(7), were instituted. The required compensatory measures will remain in place until installation documentation is found or an inspection is performed to verify adequate installation. This impairment will be restored by the end of the 1992 Refueling Outage.

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On February 5, 1992, penetration 19-E-30, between Room 19 and the Turbine Building, was breached to support installation of Modification MR-FC-90-026, "Raw Water Discharge Valve Replacement". The penetration remains breached at this time. Appropriate compensatory measures, as required by TS 2.19(7), were instituted at the time of the impairment and will remain in place until the fire barrier penetration is restored. This impairment will be restored by the end of the 1992 Refueling Outage.


On February 5, 1992, penetration 57E-W-8, between Rooms 57E and 57W, was declared inoperable because several gaps in the Ceraboard facing on both sides of the penetration were not caulked. This penetration was returned to service on February 13, 1992. Appropriate compensatory measures, as required by TS 2.19(7), were in place for the duration of the impairment.

On February 7, 1992, the Personnel Air Lock between the Auxiliary Building and Containment was opened to facilitate access to Containment during the current refueling outage. This air lock will be opened and closed several times in the course of the outage and has been conservatively declared an administratively declared impaired fire barrier for the duration of the outage. Appropriate compensatory measures, as required by TS 2.19(7), were in place at the time of impairment and will remain in place for the duration of the impairment. This impairment will be restored by the end of the 1992 Refueling Outage.

On February 8, 1992, penetration 81-E-22 was breached to run a power lead from the Turbine Building to Room 81 to support work on a modification and other outage work. Appropriate compensatory measures, as required by TS 2.19(7), were instituted prior to impairing the penetration and will remain in place for the duration of the impairment. This impairment will be restored by the end of the 1992 Refueling Outage.

If you should have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,



W. G. Gates
Division Manager
Nuclear Operations

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