

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON, Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 1 OF 0 2										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2				
TITLE (4) ACTUATION OF ESF VENTILATION SYSTEMS																								
EVENT DATE (5)				LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)				OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)												
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
0	3	0	9	8	4	84	-	0	0	7	-	0	0	0	4	0	9	8	4	0 5 0 0 0 0				
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)																						
5		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)										
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 0 0				20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)										
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 306A)										
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)														
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(B)														
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(x)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)														
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																								
NAME JACQUELINE HINDS, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER										TELEPHONE NUMBER 8 0 5 5 9 5 - 7 3 5 1														
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																								
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS					
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)														EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR						
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)														<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO										

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 9, 1984, while in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), the 120V vital instrument A.C. bus 1-3 was de-energized when an operator inadvertently reset the "Inverter Input" breaker which appeared to be tripped. This action de-energized the bus which resulted in the automatic operation of two Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems. The ESF systems actuated were the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System and the Control Room Ventilation System. To prevent recurrence of this event, additional labeling has been added to the inverter panels to clarify each breaker's function.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	— 0 0 7	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

At 1916 PST, on March 9, 1984, while in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), the 120V vital instrument A.C. bus 1-3 (EF) was inadvertently de-energized causing the Auxiliary Building and Control Room Ventilation systems (VF, VI) to transfer from normal operation to an emergency mode.

The event occurred while a licensed operator was performing a routine walkdown of the D.C. switchgear room and noticed the "Inverter Input" breaker (BKR) on the instrument inverter 1-3 panel appeared to be tripped. The operator attempted to reset the breaker, which was actually closed, and in the process de-energized the 120V vital instrument A.C. bus 1-3. The operator immediately recognized the error and placed the instrument bus on the 120V A.C. backup source. He then notified the Control Room of the situation. The inverter (INVT) was returned to service within five minutes.

Loss of the 120V vital instrument A.C. bus 1-3 resulted in the automatic operation of two Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems. The Auxiliary Building Ventilation System transferred from normal operation to the "Safeguards Only" mode and the Control Room Ventilation System switched to the pressurization mode. Subsequently, the Control Room staff completed notification of the significant event per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii) within four hours.

The de-energized bus was caused by the failure of the operator to recognize that the breaker was closed. The operator mistakenly interpreted the inverter input breaker as the switch which supplies AC power to the inverter. This function is accomplished by the "AC Input" breaker which had a past history of tripping during power transients. If the operator had reset the "AC Input" breaker, the inverter would have continued to receive power from the DC source. However, the function of the "Inverter Input" breaker is to provide both the rectified A.C. and the D.C. inputs to the inverter. Thus, when the "Inverter Input" breaker was opened, the inverter and associated bus were de-energized.

Non-specific labeling of the inverter breakers contributed to the operator's error. To prevent recurrence of this event, a simplified inverter diagram showing the location, function and labeling of each breaker has been mounted on all the 120V instrument inverter panels in both Units 1 and 2.

The 120V instrument A.C. system consists of four vital A.C. busses and two supplemental vital A.C. busses with their associated inverters. Each inverter is independently connected to its respective instrument distribution panel so that the loss of an inverter cannot affect more than one distribution panel. The loads on the distribution panel are arranged such that loss of any one distribution panel will not reduce the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, this event can in no way affect the public's health and safety in any operational mode.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E

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J. O. SCHUYLER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

April 9, 1984

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-139

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555


Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 84-007-00
Actuation of Engineered Safety Feature Systems

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning the actuation of two ESF ventilation systems.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin
Service List

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