

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2		
TITLE (4) CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE LIMIT EXCEEDED																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEG. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 3	0 5	8 4	8 4	0 1 3	0 0 0 4	0 2	8 4						0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9) 1		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)		
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				X 50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				X 50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME J. G. HAYNES, STATION MANAGER										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7 1 4 4 9 2 - 7 7 0 0						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 3/5/84, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, containment pressure increased to a positive 0.8 pounds per square inch gage (psig). Operators commenced venting the containment at 2213 through the minipurge exhaust system in accordance with Procedure S023-1-4.2, "Containment Purge and Recirculation Filtration System." The containment was vented for two hours. Containment pressure was reduced to less than a negative 0.3 psig at 2334, contrary to Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.4. Containment pressure was restored to within the limits of LCO 3.6.1.4 at 0155.

The incident resulted from a misinterpretation of the venting procedure. The procedure limited venting of the containment to maximum of two hours. The operators interpreted the procedure as requiring two hours of venting and did not recognize that the containment pressure was approaching Technical Specification limits during the venting. The responsible operators have been counseled and have received additional instruction concerning the use of procedures and the Technical Specifications.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER			
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2	0   5   0   0   0   3   6   1	8   4	-   0   1   3	-   0   0	0   2	OF	0   2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On March 5, 1984, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, containment pressure increased to a positive 0.8 pounds per square inch gage (psig). Operators commenced venting the containment (EIIS System Code NH) at 2213 through the minipurge exhaust system (EIIS System Code VA) in accordance with Procedure S023-1-4.2, "Containment Purge and Recirculation Filtration System," to reduce containment pressure. The containment was vented until 0013 on March 6, 1984.


At 0130, during performance of the shiftly surveillance, operators noted that containment pressure was at a negative 0.5 psig, contrary to Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.4 which requires containment pressure to be maintained between a positive 1.5 psig and a negative 0.3 psig. Operators took immediate action to restore containment pressure to within the limits of LCO 3.6.1.4. At 0155 containment pressure was restored to a negative 0.3 psig.

Investigation into this incident revealed that containment pressure had fallen to a negative 0.4 psig, less than the minimum limit of LCO 3.6.1.4, at 2334 on March 5, 1984. It was thus determined that the one hour allowed by the action statement of LCO 3.6.1.4 to restore containment pressure within limits had been exceeded.

This event resulted from a misinterpretation of the venting procedure. The procedure limited venting of the containment to a maximum of two hours. The operators interpreted the procedure to require two hours of venting and did not recognize that containment pressure was approaching Technical Specification limits during containment venting. The responsible operators have been counseled and have received additional instruction on the use of procedures and the Technical Specifications. Additionally, S023-1-4.2 has been revised to caution operators to periodically verify containment pressure within limits when venting the containment.

The safety analysis shows that the maximum feasible containment internal vacuum resulting from misoperation of the containment minipurge system is considerably less than the internal vacuum resulting from the Design Basis Accident for containment external pressure design. Therefore, there are no reasonable or credible alternatives under which this event would have resulted in exceeding the containment design basis.

*Southern California Edison Company*



SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92072

J. G. HAYNES  
STATION MANAGER

April 2, 1984

TELEPHONE  
(714) 492-7700

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-361  
30-Day Report  
Licensee Event Report No. 84-013  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) and 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.1.4. The health and safety of plant personnel or the public were not affected by this event.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

Enclosure: LER 84-013

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)  
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, NRC Region V)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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