

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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 (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	P	A	P	B	S	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5				
7	8	LICENSEE CODE										14	LICENSE NUMBER										25	LICENSE TYPE					30	57 CAT 58				

CON'T

7 8 REPORT SOURCE L € 0 5 0 - 0 2 7 7 7 1 2 2 9 8 3 8 0 4 0 3 8 4 9
60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | On December 29, 1983, with Unit 2 at 56% power, ST 6.4 identified
03 | that the outboard MSIV, AO-2-2-86B, fast closure time was 5.5
04 | seconds. This exceeds the maximum limit of 5 seconds specified in the
05 | Tech. Spec. Table 3.7.1. This event has insignificant consequences
06 | because the inboard MSIV, AO-2-2-80B, closed in 3.43 seconds and
07 | the average isolation time for all steam lines was 4.26 seconds. Also
08 | both inboard and outboard MSIV's on the 'B' steam line passed an LLRT.

SYSTEM CODE C D 11		CAUSE CODE E 12		CAUSE SUBCODE B 13		COMPONENT CODE V A L V O P 14				COMP. SUBCODE C 15		VALVE SUBCODE Z 16					
7 8		9 10		11 12		13 14 15 16 17 18				19 20							
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR 8 3 21 22		23		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 2 5 24 25 26		27		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 28 29		REPORT TYPE L 30 31		REVISION NO. 0 32			
ACTION TAKEN E 18		FUTURE ACTION B 19		EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21		HOURS 0 0 0 0 22 37 40		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 41		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y 24 42		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25 43		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER H 3 4 3 26 44 47	
33 34		35 36		37 38 39 40		41 42		43 44		45 46		47 48		49 50			

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The 5.5 second closure time has been attributed to insufficient flow
1 1 through the fast closure needle valve on the oil dashpot. The valve
1 2 was immediately re-adjusted and retested satisfactorily. Excessive
1 3 closure time could not be reproduced. Failure to report the event
1 4 within 30 days is due to personnel error. The person was counseled.

FACILITY STATUS				% POWER				OTHER STATUS				METHOD OF DISCOVERY				DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION			
1	5	E	28	0	5	6	29	NA				B	31	Surveillance Testing					
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24		
ACTIVITY CONTENT				AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY				LOCATION OF RELEASE											
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	N/A				N/A									
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24		
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES				DESCRIPTION															
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	N/A											
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24		
PERSONNEL INJURIES				DESCRIPTION															
1	8	0	0	0	40	N/A													
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24		
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY				DESCRIPTION															
1	9	Z	42	N/A															
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24		
PUBLICITY				DESCRIPTION															
2	0	N	44	N/A															
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24		

NAME OF PREPARER.

M. J. Cooney

PHONE: (215) 841-5020

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

2301 MARKET STREET

P.O. BOX 8699

PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19101

(215) 841-4000

April 4, 1984

Docket No. 50-277

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: License Event Report

Gentlemen:

The following LER identifies that the closure time of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), AO-2-2-86B, on the "B" main steam line exceeded Technical Specification limits.

Reference:	Docket No. 50-277
Report Number:	2-83-25/3L
Event Date:	December 29, 1983
Report Date:	April 2, 1984
Facility:	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD #1, Box 208, Delta, PA 17314

Pursuant to the 10 CFR 50.73 requirements that became effective January 1, 1984, NRC notification of this event would not now be required. However, since this event occurred prior to January 1, 1984, it is being reported under the previous requirements. Failure to provide the NRC with notification of this event within 30 days is the result of an individual personnel error.

Technical Specification Reference:

Technical Specification Table 3.7.1

IE22
1/1

Description of the Event:

On March 1, 1984, while performing a review to verify completion of 1983 License Event Reports (LER's), it was discovered that an LER was not submitted when a Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) fast closure time exceeded the maximum Technical Specification limit in December, 1983.

On December 29, 1983, with Unit 2 at approximately 56 percent power level, surveillance test, ST-6.4, "Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure Timing," was performed. This test consists of individually testing the fast closure timing of each of the eight MSIV's. While testing the outboard MSIV, AO-2-2-86B, on the "B" Main Steam Line, it was noted that the fast closure time of this valve was 5.5 seconds. This time exceeds the maximum limit of 5.0 seconds as specified in Technical Specification Table 3.7.1.

Consequences of the Event:

The inboard MSIV, AO-2-2-80B, on the "B" Main Steam Line, was tested with an acceptable fast closure time of 3.43 seconds. This indicates that the total time for isolation of the "B" Main Steam Line was within the Technical Specification limit. Isolation of the inboard and outboard MSIV's on the "B" Main Steam Line was verified on February 18, 1984, when both the AO-2-2-80B and AO-2-2-86B valves passed a local leak rate test. Likewise, all other MSIV's tested satisfactorily and completion of the surveillance testing on all eight MSIV's indicated that the average total isolation time for all four main steam lines was 4.26 seconds.

Since the FSAR transient analysis (Section 14.6.3.3.1.c) assumes a maximum time of 10 seconds for isolation of the MSIV's, which is considerably greater than the maximum Technical Specification limit of 5.0 seconds, the 0.5 second excess isolation time of MSIV, AO-2-2-86B, is believed to have insignificant consequences.

Cause of the Event:

The 5.5 second isolation time of MSIV, AO-2-2-86B, was attributed to insufficient flow through the fast closure needle valve on the oil dashpot as a result of a slight restriction in the valve and was easily corrected by adjustment of the needle valve to obtain the proper oil flow. During the next refueling outage on Unit 2, the oil dashpot and air cylinder of the valve operating mechanism on both MSIV's, AO-2-2-80B and AO-2-2-86B, on the "B" main steam line are scheduled to be cleaned and overhauled. The failure to report this event within 30 days was caused by a clerical error.


The reporting requirements were considered and unofficially documented in the minutes of the morning meeting between the senior staff on December 30, 1983, where an initial review of the event was conducted. The event was never officially processed as a reportable event. The error was discovered when the completed LER's were being reviewed against the minutes of the morning meetings, and it was noticed that an LER was never submitted.

Corrective Actions

When the 5.5 seconds closure time of MSIV, AO-2-2-86B, was found, the closure time of the valve was corrected by opening the fast closure needle valve on the oil dashpot to obtain sufficient oil flow. The valve was retested with an acceptable fast closure time of 4.66 seconds. Excessive isolation time after making the valve adjustment could not be reproduced. A later surveillance test, ST-6.4.1-1, "Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure Timing and Closure Timing Adjustment," produced satisfactory results on January 30, 1984.

Failure to provide the NRC with notification of this event within 30 days was the result of an individual personnel error. That individual has been counseled on the importance of making frequent LER reviews and has been reminded of the mechanisms that are available to track the status of these reports.

Very truly yours,



W. T. Ullrich
Superintendent
Nuclear Generation Division

cc: Mr. A. R. Blough, Site Inspector
Dr. Thomas E. Murley, USNRC