

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1

PAGE (3)

1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

INADVERTENT ESF ACTUATIONS - MARCH 9

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)		
0 3	0 9	8 4	8 4	0 1 6	0 0	0 3	3 0	8 4		0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0		
										0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0		

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)			
		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)			
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)			
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
AREA CODE	
J. G. HAYNES, STATION MANAGER	7 1 4 4 9 2 - 7 7 0 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	X				

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 9, 1984, at 1933 PST, a technician inadvertently actuated the Safety Injection Actuation System (SIAS), the Containment Cooling Actuation System (CCAS) and the Containment Spray Actuation System (CSAS) during a retest of the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) matrix section of the Plant Protection System. All systems functioned properly. The SIAS, CCAS and CSAS were all secured within 12 minutes. Approximately 6000 gallons of spray water were released by containment spray. During the recovery, the reactor was manually tripped. Inspection has determined that no component or system damage resulted from the containment spray.

The cause was due to a technician making an error while performing a 31-day surveillance on the Plant Protection System. Appropriate procedural changes were made to require independent verification of certain restoration steps.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On March 9, 1984, at 1933 PST, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100% power, a technician was performing a routine retest of the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) (EIIS System Code JE) matrix section of the Plant Protection System (PPS) (EIIS System Code JC), using Procedure S023-II-1.1, "Surveillance Requirement, Reactor Plant Protection System, Channel Functional Test." After performing tests whereby the Number 1 trip path logic was actuated, he inadvertently omitted steps involving depressing the reset buttons for the Safety Injection Actuation System (SIAS) (EIIS System Code BQ), the Containment Cooling Actuation System (CCAS) (EIIS System Code BK), and the Containment Spray Actuation System (CSAS) (EIIS System Code BE). He then actuated the Number 2 trip path logic.

When the Number 2 trip path logic was activated, with the failure to reset the Number 1 trip path logic, the selective 2 of 4 trip path logic was satisfied and SIAS, CCAS and CSAS actuated. All systems functioned properly.

After verifying no concurrent emergency had occurred, operators began securing Containment Spray within two minutes at 1935. At 1938, operators began securing Safety Injection. At 1946, operators began securing Containment Cooling. Reactor power decreased as a result of the delivery of borated water from the boric acid make-up tanks (EIIS Component Code TK) through the charging pumps (EIIS Component Code P) and, at 1949, the reactor was manually tripped from 27% power.


All components functioned properly during this event. Approximately 6000 gallons of spray water was discharged from the Containment Spray system during the two minutes of operation. The containment has been inspected and no damage has been observed.

Review of this matter has determined that alternate ESF or PPS matrix actuations would not have resulted in a more severe event.

A review of station policy on the requirements of verbatim compliance, dual verification and signature responsibilities will be provided to all technicians. Additionally, enhancements to the training program will be performed to ensure that current requirements in this area are sufficient and are covered on a periodic basis.

Procedure S023-II-1.1 was revised to require independent verification on steps that require resetting or restoring a channel or system to normal service. Other appropriate station procedures will be reviewed and revised as necessary to incorporate this policy.

Southern California Edison Company



SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

J. G. HAYNES
STATION MANAGER

TELEPHONE
(714) 492-7700

March 30, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-361
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 84-016
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving the actuation of the Safety Injection Actuation System, Containment Spray Actuation System, Containment Cooling Actuation System and a manual reactor trip. The health and safety of plant personnel and the public were not affected by this event.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

JG Haynes

Enclosure: LER No. 84-016

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, NRC Region V)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPC)

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