DUKE POWER COMPANY
P.O. BOX 33189
CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
(704) 373-4531

84 MAR 2 A8:59

March 23, 1984

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Catawba Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached Significant Deficiency Report No. SD 413-414/84-03.

Very truly yours,

Hal B. Tucker

Hal B. Tucker

LTP/php

Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector
Catawba Nuclear Station

Palmetto Alliance
2135½ Devine Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29205

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.
Attorney-at-Law
P. O. Box 12097
Charleston, South Carolina 29412

JPO/HBT/LTP
March 23, 1984

Duke Power Company
Catawba Nuclear Station

Report Number: SD 413-414/84-03

Report Date: March 23, 1984

Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2

Identification of Deficiency:

A potential problem may exist with the overspeed governor and fuel transfer pump drive hubs. On a non-nuclear commercial diesel, the flexible coupling drive hubs were found to be loose on the shafts.

Initial Report:

On February 24, 1984, Mr A Ignatonis of the NRC, Region II, Atlanta, Georgia office was notified of these deficiencies by Mr W O Henry, Mr B R Justice, and Mr J D Heffner of Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina, 28242.

Supplier and/or Component:

Transamerica Delaval Inc. of Oakland, California supplied the four diesel generators, designated 1A, 1B, 2A & 2B, utilized at the Catawba Nuclear Station.

Lovejoy Inc. of Downers Grove, Illinois manufactured the hub couplings.

Description of Deficiency:

A potential problem may exist with the overspeed governor and fuel transfer pump flexible drive coupling hubs. The hubs were found loose on the shafts on a non-nuclear diesel application.

On a nuclear application, an alarm occurs if the overspeed governor stops turning and the diesel will continue to operate. However, if the fuel transfer pump stops turning, the diesel will shut down unless there is an auxiliary fuel transfer pump driven by another power source (i.e., electric motor).

The Catawba diesels have not been inspected for loose hubs due to ongoing Unit 1 preoperational testing. Following the completion of preoperation testing, the diesels will be inspected for loose hubs.

Analysis of Safety Implication:

Based on the assumption that the hubs could work loose, and the fact that the fuel oil booster pump must be manually operated to supply fuel to the diesel, a loose hub for the fuel pump could compromise diesels operability.

Corrective Action:

The corrective action to eliminate this potential problem will be to inspect the drive for looseness of the hubs on the shafts. If the hubs are tight, no further action is required except to reinstall the pin and set screw, using "Locktite 609" per the manufacturer's recommendation. If the hubs are loose on the shaft, the mating surfaces will be inspected, cleaned, and the hubs will be reinstalled using "Locktite 609" per the manufacturer's recommendations. The key, screw and pin will be reinstalled using "Locktite 609."

The corrective action for Unit 1 is expected to be completed prior to fuel load, and the corrective action for Unit 2 will be completed by September 3, 1984.