

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 3 0 2 1 OF 0 3TITLE (4)
Post-Accident Sampling System Manual Isolation Valves Found Closed

EVENT DATE (5)			LSR NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0	2	2	8	8	4	0	0	0	N/A		0 5 0 0 0
0	2	2	8	8	4	0	0	0	N/A		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																															
1	<table border="1"><tr><td>20.402(b)</td><td>20.408(e)</td><td>50.73(a)(2)(iv)</td><td>73.71(b)</td></tr><tr><td>20.408(a)(1)(i)</td><td>50.38(c)(1)</td><td>50.73(a)(2)(v)</td><td>73.71(e)</td></tr><tr><td>20.408(a)(1)(ii)</td><td>50.38(c)(2)</td><td>50.73(a)(2)(vii)</td><td>X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)</td></tr><tr><td>20.408(a)(1)(iii)</td><td>50.73(a)(2)(i)</td><td>50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)</td><td rowspan="3">Voluntary Report</td></tr><tr><td>20.408(a)(1)(iv)</td><td>50.73(a)(2)(ii)</td><td>50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)</td></tr><tr><td>20.408(a)(1)(v)</td><td>50.73(a)(2)(iii)</td><td>50.73(a)(2)(ix)</td></tr></table>										20.402(b)	20.408(e)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)	20.408(a)(1)(i)	50.38(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(e)	20.408(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	20.408(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	Voluntary Report	20.408(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	20.408(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)
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20.408(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)																													
20.408(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	Voluntary Report																													
20.408(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)																														
20.408(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)																														

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME
K. R. Wilson, Supervisor, Site Nuclear LicensingTELEPHONE NUMBER
AREA CODE
9 0 4 7 9 5 1 - 3 8 0 2

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
NO
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
0 4 3 0 8 4

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 28, 1984 while conducting a post-installation engineering review of the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS), utility personnel discovered that six manual isolation valves were closed, thereby reducing the system's capability to perform as designed. Florida Power Corporation had declared the PASS operable on January 1, 1984. The sampling capacity of the Reactor Coolant System was available through the normal letdown and pressurizer primary sampling flowpaths. The radiological consequences of such sampling are currently being evaluated and will be submitted in a supplement to this report.

Personnel error and inadequacies in the Modification Approval Record (MAR) process are the causes of the event. All six valves were opened. Procedures and the MAR process will also be revised to prevent recurrence. This is a voluntary report.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	- 0 0 4	- 0 0 0	2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

IDENTIFICATION OF EVENT

In compliance with NUREG-0737 and the associated confirmation order, the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) was declared operable on January 1, 1984. On February 28, 1984¹, while utility personnel were conducting a post-installation engineering review, it was discovered that the following manual isolation valves were closed:

RCV-34 (AB, ISV, "A" RCS Cold Leg Sample Isolation Valve)
RCV-35 (AB, ISV, "A" RCS Cold Leg Sample Isolation Valve)
RCV-48 (AB, ISV, "C" RCS Cold Leg Sample Isolation Valve)
RCV-144 (AB, ISV, "C" RCS Cold Leg Sample Isolation Valve)
CAV-472 (IP, ISV, RB Sump Return Line Isolation Valve)
CAV-502 (IP, ISV, Sample Return Line Isolation Valve)

For the PASS to be configured as designed, these valves are required to be open. Consequently, the PASS was not able to perform all its functions in the manner designed. However, all NUREG-0737 required samples could be taken within the required time frames.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The sampling capacity of the Reactor Coolant System² (RCS) was available through the normal letdown and pressurizer primary sampling flowpaths. The radiological consequences of sampling the RCS and not returning reactor coolant to the reactor building sump through the direct path are currently being evaluated. The results of this evaluation will be submitted in a supplement to this report.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

Both personnel error and inadequacies in the Modification Approval Record (MAR) process contributed to this event. In the development of the PASS MAR, personnel failed to adequately address two procedures (OP-301, Filling and Venting the RC System; and OP-403, Chemical Addition System) that required revisions as a result of the addition of the PASS to the plant. OP-301 required RCV-34, -35, -48 and -144 to be closed. Thus in July, 1983, in accordance with procedure OP-301, these valves were closed prior to filling the RCS following refueling. CAV-472 and -502 should have been incorporated into OP-403 but were not. CAV-472 and -502 were left shut during testing following the installation of PASS. All of the valves should have been reopened prior to system utilization in the "emergency mode."

The MAR process apparently failed to provide an adequate mechanism to identify all procedures affected by this plant modification.

1. 76% Rated Thermal Power, Mode 1
2. AB

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	- 0 0 4	- 0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTION


1. All six manual isolation valves (RCV-34,-35,-48,-144 and CAV-472,-502) were opened.
2. OP-301 will be revised to leave RCV-34,-39,-48 and -144 open.
3. OP-403 will be revised to include CAV-472 and 502, and to leave these valves open.
4. A more effective method of system turnover in the MAR process will be devised to ensure that all necessary system documentation (procedures, valve check lists, etc.) are in place prior to responsibility for the system being transferred to operations and maintenance. This is part of a long-term program initiated by FPC to upgrade the MAR process and is a subject of general discussion between NRC/ONRR and the OL licensees.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

None

REPORTABILITY

Voluntary Report



**Florida
Power**
CORPORATION

March 30, 1984
3F0384-24

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3
Docket No. 50-302
Operating License No. DPR-72
Licensee Event Report No. 84-004-00

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report No. 84-004-00 which is submitted voluntarily by Florida Power Corporation.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

G. R. Westafer
Manager, Nuclear Operations
Licensing and Fuel Management

AEF/feb

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator, Region II
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30303

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