

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

In the Matter of)
DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al.) Docket Nos. 50-413
(Catawba Nuclear Station,) 50-414
Units 1 and 2))

TESTIMONY OF LARRY R. DAVISON CONCERNING MR. LANGLEY'S
ALLEGATION OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF NRC INSPECTIONS

1 Q. STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

2 A. My name is Larry R. Davison, and my business address is Catawba
3 Nuclear Station, P. O. Box 223, Clover, South Carolina 29710.

4

5 Q. STATE YOUR PRESENT JOB POSITION WITH DUKE POWER
6 COMPANY AND DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF YOUR JOB.

7 A. I am Project Quality Assurance Manager responsible for Quality
8 Assurance during construction of the Catawba Nuclear Station. A
9 detailed description of the nature of my job, as well as my
10 professional experience and qualifications, is set forth in my
11 previously filed testimony.

12

13 Q. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH MR. LANGLEY'S ALLEGATION THAT THE
14 COMPANY WAS AWARE OF WHEN THE NRC WAS COMING FOR SITE
15 INSPECTIONS?

16 A. Yes, I am familiar with Mr. Langley's allegation that inspectors
17 received prior notification of forthcoming inspections by the NRC or
18 the Authorized Nuclear Inspectors. To me, Mr. Langley's testimony
19 is unclear. He says that he knew when NRC was coming, and that

1 he got notes in his "pigeonhole" or message box that said a hold
2 point was going to be looked at, but he didn't know who was going
3 to look at it; he thought it might be the NRC.

4

5 Q. DESCRIBE YOUR ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP WITH NRC
6 INSPECTORS WHO VISITED THE CATAWBA SITE.

7 A. Most NRC inspections were unannounced. That is, no one at Duke
8 knew when they were coming until they arrived at the site. Upon
9 arrival, the NRC inspectors would generally hold an entrance
10 conference with site management to let them know they were there
11 and let them know what area of interest they would be looking into.

12

13 Once the NRC inspectors indicated the general areas they were
14 going to be looking at, the NRC inspector would be directed to the
15 people who handled that area. The areas to be inspected were not
16 secret and word of these areas was communicated by management so
17 that the appropriate people would know they would be seeing the
18 NRC inspectors. For example, if the NRC wanted to look at pipe
19 welding, they would be escorted to the field where they would
20 select what specific welds they wanted to see. If we knew the NRC
21 inspector was going to look into pipe welding it was not uncommon
22 to make craft, technical support, and QC supervisors aware that
23 the NRC would be looking into those areas. This was done so that
24 the appropriate people could be available to answer questions or
25 provide information to the NRC.

1 If the NRC wanted to inspect specific one time events, such as a
2 specific concrete pour or the setting of the reactor vessel, they
3 would ask us to notify them just prior to the event. In these
4 cases Duke did know in advance what the NRC might be inspecting,
5 but this knowledge did not have any effect on the work activity.
6 These inspections by the NRC were rare compared to the
7 unannounced visits.

8
9 Q. HAVE YOU INVESTIGATED THIS ALLEGATION?

10 A. Yes, I have reviewed his testimony and researched the allegation to
11 determine if it is valid. I have discussed the allegation of
12 prenotification with QC welding inspectors, and the first level
13 supervisor during Mr. Langley's employment. I have personal
14 knowledge of the practice of disseminating information to
15 inspectors.

16
17 I have also talked with other site personnel and these discussions
18 did not substantiate his allegations.

19
20 The inspectors usually learn of the presence of an NRC inspector
21 on site by word-of-mouth. Before the assignment of a resident
22 inspector in 1979, visits by the NRC were "news." When the NRC
23 inspector identifies to site personnel his area of interest, it has
24 been our practice to notify supervision in that area that they
25 will be visited by the NRC inspector.

1 Q. WHAT ARE YOUR CONCLUSIONS AS A RESULT OF THIS
2 INVESTIGATION?

3 A. I find no evidence that prior notification of NRC inspections of
4 items is or has been a practice at Catawba.

5

6 From discussions with inspectors and the welding inspector
7 supervision, prenotification to welding inspectors of specific
8 items to be inspected by the NRC did not occur unless the NRC
9 had an announced inspection. Even then the work and inspections
10 were not modified because of any notification.

11

12 Q. HAVE YOU FORMED AN OPINION OF WHAT MR. LANGLEY MAY BE
13 REFERRING TO IN THIS ALLEGATION?

14 A. Yes. Mr. Langley may have been referring to the Authorized
15 Nuclear Inspector (ANI), a resident inspector required by the
16 ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code. They have the authority to
17 establish hold points on the work travelers (process control) to
18 indicate specific steps they may want to inspect. In such cases
19 the specific step is clearly indicated to the inspector and
20 craftsmen. ANI's also have the right to inspect work in progress
21 randomly, and they do so. The ANI might have indicated to an
22 inspector a specific step they wanted to witness by placing a
23 note in the inspector's box.

24

1 It appears that Mr. Langley is confused on what the notes were for
2 and he did not understand them. Mr. Langley probably did know
3 by word-of-mouth when the NRC was on site and looking at welding
4 and he probably incorrectly assumed the notes he saw were about
5 these inspections.