

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3											DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2			
TITLE (4) SPURIOUS REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM TRIP																		
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)								
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES						DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 3	0 5	8 4	8 4	0 0 7	0 0	0 3	2 9	8 4							0 5 0 0 0			
			0 5 0 0 0															
OPERATING MODE (9) 3			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)															
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0			20.402(b)			20.405(c)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)						
			20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)						
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)						
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)									
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)									
			20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)									
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																		
NAME J. G. HAYNES, STATION MANAGER											TELEPHONE NUMBER							
											AREA CODE		7 1 4 4 9 2 1 - 7 7 0 0					
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																		
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC									
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)											<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 3/5/84, at 1800, with Unit 3 in Mode 3, a Reactor Protection System trip occurred. All eight reactor trip breakers opened, fully inserting all Control Element Assemblies not already inserted. No trip bistables actuated during this event. Channel Functional Testing and other investigations of suspected portions of the Reactor Protection System could not determine a cause for the trip. The health and safety of plant personnel or the public were not affected by this event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER		
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2	8 4	- 0 0 7	- 0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On March 5, 1984, at 1800, with Unit 3 in Mode 3, a Reactor Protection System (RPS) (EIIS System Code JC) trip occurred. Prior to the trip, Control Element Assemblies (CEA's) (EIIS Component Code ROD) in Shutdown Group A were fully withdrawn and those in Shutdown Group B were being withdrawn, and all other CEA's were in the fully inserted position. Following the trip, all eight Reactor Trip Breakers (EIIS Component Code 52) opened and Shutdown Groups A and B CEA's were fully inserted.

At the time of the trip, an Instrument and Control (I&C) Technician was removing reactor coolant flow signal simulating devices in Plant Protection System (PPS) (EIIS System Code JC) Channel C, in accordance with Procedure S023-II-1.6. These signal simulating devices were installed to prevent unnecessary Reactor Coolant Low Flow trips while performing Reactor Coolant Pump (EIIS Component Code P) balancing. The I&C Technician had just completed removing similar devices from Channel B, and no trips occurred. Before removing the flow signal simulating devices from Channel C, the associated trip bistables were placed in bypass. The trip occurred while the Channel C flow signal simulating devices were being removed.

Indications received during the trip showed that an RPS trip had occurred and then cleared in the AC matrix; however, there were no indications of a Channel A trip, and there were no trips on Channel C which were not already in bypass. Therefore, a trip should not have occurred. In an attempt to determine the cause of the trip, the I&C Technician was instructed to reinstall and then remove the flow signal simulating devices on Channel C; however, the trip was not repeated. Subsequently, a Channel Functional Test was satisfactorily performed on PPS Channel C. Additional testing was also performed on the AC matrix power supplies and Reactor Coolant Low Flow trip bistables in all channels. No abnormal conditions were found. After exhausting all feasible investigations, and since the nature of the event was conservative in direction and could not plausibly attribute to any future nonconservative action, no restrictions were placed on plant operations as a result of this trip.

There are no credible alternate circumstances under which this event would have resulted in the plant being outside its design limits.

Southern California Edison Company

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SCE

J. G. HAYNES
STATION MANAGER

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March 29, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-362
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 84-007
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73.a.2(iv), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving the actuation of the Reactor Protection System. The health and safety of plant personnel or the public were not affected by this event.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

J. G. Haynes

Enclosure: LER No. 84-007

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, NRC Region V)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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