

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 5					PAGE (3) 1 OF 03		
TITLE (4) Actuation of Control Building Emergency Air Filtration Train																	
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)							
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)				
0	1	3	1	8	4	8	4	0	0	4	Brunswick Unit 2				0 5 0 0 0 3 2 4		
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																	
OPERATING MODE (9)		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)			
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(e)			
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)			
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)							
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																	
NAME M. J. Pastva, Jr., Regulatory Technician										TELEPHONE NUMBER 9 1 1 9 4 5 7 - 1 9 5 2 1 1							
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																	
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS							
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 31, 1984, at 1500, Train B of the Control Building's Emergency Air Filtration (CBEAF) System started due to a fire alarm in the Unit 2 instrument back panels area. This was possibly caused by painting in the area. At the time, Unit 1 was shut down and Unit 2 was at 94 percent power. The train was secured and returned to standby.

On March 1, 1984, at 1405, with Unit 1 at 100 percent and Unit 2 at 95 percent power, CBEAF Train A started due to a spurious Unit 2 Computer Room fire alarm. The train was secured and returned to standby. On March 2, 1984, at 1850, with Unit 1 at 100 percent and Unit 2 at 95 percent power, CBEAF Train B started due to a fire alarm in the kitchen. This was probably due to cooking fumes in the Control Room kitchen. The train was secured and returned to standby. On March 9, 1984, at 1751, with Unit 1 in startup at 5 percent and Unit 2 at 96 percent power, CBEAF Train B started due to a spurious Control Room fire alarm. The train was secured and returned to standby. On March 14, 1984, at 2300, with Unit 1 at 99 percent power and Unit 2 shut down, CBEAF Train B started due to a spurious Control Room fire alarm. The train was secured and returned to standby.

In each case, the CBEAF trains (A and B) were operable. In addition, there was no component or system failures, nor were there any personnel errors associated with these events. Plant Engineering is evaluating corrective actions to minimize spurious actuations of the CBEAF.

JE22

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 5 8 4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		— 0 0 4	— 0 0 0	2	OF	0	3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On January 31, 1984, at 1500, it is believed that paint fumes from spray painting of the Unit 2 Control Room's instrument back panels caused the actuation of an ionization chamber fire detector located near the back panels area. As a result, Train B of the Control Building's Emergency Air Filtration (CBEAF) System automatically started. At the time of this occurrence, Unit 1 was shut down for maintenance and Unit 2 was operating at 94 percent power. In addition, the redundant CBEAF System Train A was operable. At 1510 the subject fire detector was reset and the CBEAF System Train B was returned to standby readiness.

Following the event, a sample of the Train B charcoal was removed and sent off for laboratory analysis to determine the charcoal efficiency. The charcoal in the Train B was replaced with new charcoal due to not having any sample canisters remaining on the filter. Results of the charcoal analysis, performed by Nuclear Containment Services, Inc., showed the charcoal was 99.77 percent efficient.

On March 1, 1984, at 1405, with Units 1 and 2 at power operation (100 percent and 95 percent power, respectively), the CBEAF System Train A automatically started due to a spurious fire alarm condition detected in the Unit 2 Computer Room. At the time, CBEAF System Train B was operable. The Train A was secured and returned to standby readiness.

On March 2, 1984, at 1850, with Units 1 and 2 at power operation (100 percent and 95 percent power, respectively), possible cooking fumes from the Control Room kitchen actuated the kitchen fire alarm and the CBEAF Train B automatically started. At the time, CBEAF System Train A was operable. The fire alarm detector was reset and the Train B was secured and returned to standby readiness.

On March 9, 1984, at 1751, with Unit 1 in reactor startup at 5 percent power and Unit 2 operating at 96 percent power, a spurious fire alarm condition detected in the Control Room area caused the CBEAF System Train B to automatically start. At the time, CBEAF System Train A was operable. The Train B was secured and returned to standby readiness.

On March 14, 1984, at 2300, with Unit 1 operating at 99 percent power and Unit 2 shut down for refueling, a spurious fire alarm condition detected in the Control Room area caused the CBEAF System Train B to automatically start. At the time, CBEAF System Train A was operable. The Train B was secured and returned to standby readiness.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 5 8 4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		—	0 0 4	—	0 0 0	3	OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

In each event there were no identified component/system failures, or personnel errors associated with the incurred spurious and detector initiated actuation of the CBEAF System trains. Actuation of a CBEAF System train places the involved unit in its design mode of operation.

As a result of these events, plant Engineering will develop and implement appropriate corrective actions based on evaluation of the following: The sensitivity levels of the Control Building's fire detectors versus their design basis intent and the feasibility of installing time delay relays in the fire detector logic input to the CBEAF System.



Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, NC 28461-0429
March 28, 1984

FILE: B09-13510C
SERIAL: BSEP/84-0678

NRC Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-325
LICENSE NO. DPR-71
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-84-4

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. In a letter to Mr. J. P. O'Reilly's office dated March 2, 1984, Serial: BSEP/84-0529, it was conveyed that this event would be reported by March 30, 1984. This report is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours,

C. R. Dietz, General Manager
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

RMP/clh/LETH1

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung
NRC Document Control Desk
Mr. James P. O'Reilly

IE22
1/1