

Richard A. Uderitz
Vice President
Nuclear

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609 935-6010

October 26, 1983

Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator
Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

NRC INSPECTION 50-311/83-18
SALEM GENERATING STATION
UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-311

Public Service Electric and Gas Company has reviewed the Notice of Violation as described in Appendix A of your letter dated September 26, 1983. Our response to the notice is provided below.

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Item A

In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the violation is set forth below:

Technical Specification limiting condition for operation 3.4.10.3 requires that, with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) less than 312°F and the vessel head in place, two Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS) relief valves shall be operable or the RCS shall be depressurized with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 3.14 square inches. With both POPS valves inoperable, the RCS is to be depressurized and vented within 8 hours.

Contrary to the above:

Between 6:00 a.m. on April 24, 1983, and 2:00 p.m. on April 25, 1983 with the RCS less than 312°F and the vessel head in place at Unit 2, both POPS valves were inoperable, and the RCS was not depressurized with a designated RCS vent of greater than or equal to 3.14 square inches.

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Reply to Item A

The loss of the RCS vent path was due to a failure between the Shift Supervisor and Maintenance Supervisor to follow the established plant procedure of approving all work orders only in writing, and only at the time the work is actually to be accomplished.

Another contributing factor was that no formalized procedural guidance existed to indicate how the RCS vent path should be established and controlled.

a. Corrective steps which have been taken and results achieved

Upon discovery of the loss of vent path, immediate steps were initiated to establish an alternate vent path. The path was established at 1358 hours, April 25, 1983.

The Shift Supervisor was counseled in regard to his actions in the matter. A night order book entry was made to assure all Operations Supervisors are aware that work orders should not be approved until the plant is in a condition to allow the work to proceed safely.

Operations Department Directive OD-70, Installation/Removal of PORV Blocking Devices, and OP-II-2.3.6 and OP-II-2.3.7, Establishing and Terminating Reactor Coolant System Vent Path to the Pressurizer Relief Tank, were developed, and issued on June 29, 1983. They provide a formalized method to establish, terminate and control the RCS vent path when it is required by Technical Specifications.

All Maintenance Supervisors were also reinstructed on the importance of keeping the operating shift informed of maintenance as it affects plant status.

b. Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations

The Maintenance Department will send all its supervisors to the Supervisory Skills Training Program, which includes a two week course on PWR fundamentals.

Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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c. Date when full compliance will be achieved

We are presently in full compliance with Specification
3.4.10.3.

Sincerely,



CC: Mr. Donald C. Fischer
Licensing Project Manager

Mr. Leif Norrholm
Senior Resident Inspector