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March 15, 1984


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Catawba Nuclear Station  
Units 1 and 2  
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached a final report of corrective action taken in response to Significant Deficiency Report SD 413-414/83-14, which was transmitted to you on November 2, 1983.

Very truly yours,



Hal B. Tucker

LTP/php

Attachment

cc: Director  
Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector  
Catawba Nuclear Station

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DUKE POWER COMPANY  
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

REPORT NUMBER: SD 413-414/83-14

REPORT DATE: March 15, 1984

FACILITY: Catawba Units 1 and 2

IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCY: Potential Deficiency of Seal at Conduit Connection to Safety-Related Equipment Located in Harsh Environments.

INITIAL REPORT: Duke Power Report #SD-413-414/83-14 submitted to Mr. James P. O'Reilly, U.S. NRC, on November 2, 1983 by Mr. Hal B. Tucker, Duke Power Company, 422 S. Church Street, Charlotte, NC 28242.

DESCRIPTION: Consistent with the corrective action plans described in the November 2, 1983 submittal, safety-related equipment located in the Reactor Building, Dog Houses, and UHI Accumulator Rooms and required to function under the postulated accident conditions have been reviewed to determine sealing requirements and the cable entrance seal installation method used. Results of this review are as follows:

- 1) Equipment properly sealed or not requiring cable entrance sealing; Rotork and Limitorque motor-operated valve operators, Electrical hydrogen recombiners, Motors, Penetrations, Barton transmitters, RDF and MINCO RTD's, TEC acoustic monitors; and General Atomic radiation monitors.
- 2) ASCO and Valcor solenoid valves may have been acceptably sealed per an option of the installation specification utilizing epoxy sealing material inside the device cable entrance. However, since the sealing requirement was not specifically directed, these components must be inspected and the epoxy seal added as necessary.
- 3) Namco limit switches, Solon differential pressure switches, Magnatrol level switches, Veritrak flow transmitters, Barton level switches, Barton pressure switches, and Aeromatic Allied solenoid valves were installed per an option of the installation specification which may be susceptible to moisture intrusion

Of concern is the equipment identified in categories 2 and 3 above.

ANALYSIS: Refer to November 2, 1983 submittal.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Prior to Unit 1 fuel load, Duke Power plans to add Scotchcast 9 epoxy sealing material inside the device cable entrances of 1) all the Unit 1 devices in category 2 above and, 2) devices in category 3 which are located in the Unit 1 Reactor Building. Scotchcast 9 is fully qualified for use in the postulated Reactor Building accident environment. Dow Corning RTV 3145, which is fully-qualified for postulated accident environments outside the Reactor Building will be applied to the conduit fittings of Unit 1 devices in category 3 which are located in the Dog Houses and UHI Accumulator Room.

Duke Power is continuing to evaluate alternative sealing methods, such as connectors, fully-qualified for use in harsh environments. The conduit/cable entrances to all Unit 2 devices identified in categories 2 and 3 above will be sealed by a fully-qualified method prior to Unit 2 fuel load.