Wisconsin Electric POWER COMPANY
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U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

March 9, 1973

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT
UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT PURGE SUPPLY VALVE
SWITCH MALFUNCTION

In accordance with Section 15.6.6.A.3.d of the Technical Specifications for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27), this report is submitted with respect to a switch malfunction and an investigation which disclosed that under certain specific conditions a single equipment failure could conceivably result in the containment purge inlet valves failing to close on initiation of a containment isolation signal.

On February 8, 1973, following maintenance of the Unit 2 containment purge valves, a functional test was performed on the purge valves to confirm their operability. In the Point Beach arrangement, these purge valves are air operated and controlled by a single switch. Since placing the manual switch to the open position would cause both valves to open simultaneously, instrument air was secured to one valve while cycling the second valve. This procedure provides that one valve remains shut at all times during the test to maintain containment integrity.

Upon testing the outboard of the two containment purge inlet valves (number 3244), the valve opened when placing the manual switch to the open position, but did not close when the switch was returned to the closed position. An investigation of the switch revealed that a small screw which secures the contact closing cam to the manual portion of the switch had become loose and backed off. This permitted the cam to stay in the "contacts closed" position and prevented further manual operation of the switch from opening the contacts and closing the valve. It is our opinion that the failure of this switch is an isolated case and is not generic in nature.

During the review of the electrical drawings following the switch malfunction, it was noted that if the switch failed in the manner described above a containment isolation signal would not be capable of closing the open valve or valves if both were open at that time.

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To correct this condition whereby the malfunction of a single switch, under the given conditions, could conceivably result in the loss of the capability of the two purge supply valves to perform their containment isolation function the control systems for each individual valve will be modified to include a switch which will operate that valve only. A malfunction of a single switch can thus result in one valve failing to close, containment integrity being maintained by the redundant valve.

A similar modification will be made to the valve control circuits of the Unit 2 purge axhaust valves and the Unit 1 purge supply and purge exhaust valves.

Very truly yours,

Sol Burstein

Senior Vice President

Sol Burstein

cc: Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region III