

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2 1 OF 0 2TITLE (4)
INADVERTENT SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATIONEVENT DATE (5)
MONTH DAY YEAR
0 2 2 2 8 4 8 4
LER NUMBER (6)
YEAR SEQ. NUMBER REV. NUMBER
0 0 4 0 0
REPORT DATE (7)
MONTH DAY YEAR
0 3 2 2 8 4
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER (9)
Unit 0 5 0 0 0
Unit 0 5 0 0 0OPERATING MODE (9)
5
POWER LEVEL (10)
0 0 0
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)
20.402(b) 20.405(c) X 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER
AREA CODE
J. G. HAYNES, STATION MANAGER 7 1 4 4 9 2 - 7 7 0 0COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NRCDS
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NRCDSSUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
MONTH DAY YEAR

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 2/22/84, with Unit 3 in Mode 5 with a steam bubble in the pressurizer, a Plant Protection System surveillance was being performed. At 1940, when the "relay hold" pushbutton was pushed, the Safety Injection System, the Containment Cooling System, the Containment Isolation System, and the Control Room Isolation System were inadvertently actuated. All operable components actuated properly. All high pressure safety injection pumps and one low pressure safety injection pump were out of service. Three charging pumps started and injected approximately 150 gallons of water into the Reactor Coolant System.

The cause of this incident is believed to be dirty contacts on the "relay hold" pushbutton. The "relay hold" pushbutton should have kept the trip path relays energized during testing of the B-C matrix, but dirty contacts could have allowed de-energization of the B-C trip path resulting in the safety injection actuation. The "relay hold" pushbutton was cycled repeatedly with no other misoperation or malfunction. Operation of the pushbutton could have effectively cleaned dirty contacts and prevented subsequent misoperation. This event is considered to be an isolated occurrence and no further corrective action is planned.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER			
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2	8 4	- 0 0 4	- 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On February 22, 1984, with Unit 3 in Mode 5 with a steam bubble in the pressurizer (EIIS Identification Code PZR) and shutdown cooling in service, a Plant Protection System (EIIS Identification Code JC) surveillance was being performed. At 1940, when the "relay hold" pushbutton was pushed, the Safety Injection System (EIIS Identification Code BQ), the Containment Cooling System (EIIS Identification Code BK), Containment Isolation System (EIIS Identification Code JM), and the Control Room Isolation System (EIIS Identification Code VI) were inadvertently actuated. All operable components actuated properly. All high pressure safety injection pumps (EIIS Identification Code P) and one low pressure safety injection pump (EIIS Identification Code P) had previously been removed from service as allowed by Technical Specifications for Mode 5 operation. The remaining low pressure safety injection pump was lined up for shutdown cooling.

Operators performed the Emergency Operating Instruction for an inadvertent safety injection actuation. The charging pumps (EIIS Identification Code P) were stopped within one and one-half minutes after the safety injection actuation. Approximately 150 gallons of water were injected into the Reactor Coolant System (EIIS Identification Code AB) by the charging pumps. Since the Reactor Coolant System was at shutdown boron conditions, the small volume of borated water injected by the charging pumps did not significantly increase Reactor Coolant System boron concentration. Consequently, no adjustment of boron concentration was required following the event.

Investigation, including verification of proper power supply voltage and proper operation of all relays in the affected trip path, revealed no defective or failed components. The cause of this event is believed to be dirty contacts on the "relay hold" pushbutton. The "relay hold" pushbutton should have powered hold coils on the trip path relays to prevent an actuation during testing. Dirty contacts could have allowed de-energization of the trip path relays which would have resulted in inadvertent actuation. The "relay hold" pushbutton was cycled repeatedly without any misoperation or malfunction. Operation of the pushbutton could have effectively cleaned dirty contacts and prevented subsequent misoperation. This event is considered to be an isolated occurrence and no further corrective action is planned.

The safety analysis shows that the shutdown cooling relief valve (EIIS Identification Code RV) has adequate relieving capacity to protect the Reactor Coolant System from overpressurization on an inadvertent safety injection actuation with two high pressure safety injection pumps and all charging pumps injecting water into a solid Reactor Coolant System. Therefore, there are no credible circumstances under which this event would have resulted in the plant being outside its design limits.

Southern California Edison Company



SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

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SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

J. G. HAYNES
STATION MANAGER

March 22, 1984

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-362
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 84-004
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving the actuation of the Safety Injection Actuation System. The health and safety of plant personnel or the public were not affected by this event.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

Enclosure: LER No. 84-004

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, NRC Region V)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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