

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

50-285/76-5 Supplement 2

CONTROL BLOCK:

[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE  
NAME

LICENSE NUMBER

LICENSE  
TYPE

EVENT  
TYPE

01 N E F C S 1

0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0

4 1 1 1 1

0 3

CATEGORY

REPORT  
TYPE

REPORT  
SOURCE

DOCKET NUMBER

EVENT DATE

REPORT DATE

01 CONT 57 58 59 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

## EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 During the performance of the monthly calibration procedure for March, 1977, a  
03 Recirculation Actuation System Pressure Switch was found to have drifted from the  
04 tolerances described by the calibration procedure.  
05  
06

07 I A E I N S T R U A B O 7 0 Y

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 The Model D25-M1855 Barksdale pressure switch was found to have drifted out of  
09 specification. This setpoint drift did not result in a violation of any limiting  
10 condition for operation.

11 E 1 0 0 Normal Power Op. B Surveillance Testing  
12 Z Z NA NA NA

## PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

13 0 0 0 Z NA

## PERSONNEL INJURIES

14 0 0 0 NA

## OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 NA

## LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

16 Z NA

## PUBLICITY

17 NA

## ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 See Attachments 1, 2 and 3

19

NAME: G. Peterson/J. Connolley

PHONE: 402-426-4011

ATTACHMENT NO. 1

Safety Analysis

As was previously stated in LER 50-285/76-5 and its supplement 1, the Recirculation Actuation System (RAS) pressure switches are being checked on a monthly basis in an effort to minimize setpoint drift. This supplement is written to report the out of specification setpoint drift of pressure switch D/LC-383-2 Right which was found on March 14, 1977.

In the event the units safety injection system was required to operate, 283,000 gallons of borated water and a minimum of 28,000 gallons of borated water would be used for pump suction during the time required to switch to the recirculation actuation mode of operation.

The RAS switch setpoints are calibrated monthly, to minimize setpoint drift. This action, along with maintaining a higher level in the safety injection and refueling water tank, insures that at no time was the inventory of minimum borated water requirement violated.

LER 50-285/76-5  
Supplement 2  
Page Three

ATTACHMENT NO. 2

Corrective Action

The Barksdale pressure switch setpoint was found to have drifted in excess of the calibration procedure. The pressure switch will continue to be calibrated on a monthly basis until new switches arrive on site and can be installed under Design Change Request 75A-36.

ATTACHMENT NO. 3

Failure Data

The setpoint drift of subject switches was noted and reported as listed below:

Abnormal Occurrence 50-285/75-5  
Operations Incident 76-31  
Operations Incident 76-47  
Operations Incident 76-54  
Operations Incident 76-75  
Operations Incident 20  
Operations Incident 51  
Operations Incident 303  
Licensee Event Report 50-285/76-5 and Supplement 1



## Omaha Public Power District

1623 HARNEY ■ OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68102 ■ TELEPHONE 536-4000 AREA CODE 402

March 28, 1977  
FC-204-77

Mr. E. Morris Howard  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region IV  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive  
Suite 1000  
Arlington, TX 76012



TE FILE COPY

Dear Mr. Howard:

Reference: Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1  
Docket No. 50-285

In accordance with the Fort Calhoun Station's Technical Specifications, the Omaha Public Power District, as holder of facility operating license DPR-40, submits three copies of the following Supplement No. 2 to licensee event report 50-285/76-5 to satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.16.

Sincerely,

W. C. Jones  
Section Manager  
Operations

WCJ/WDD:rge

Enclosures

cc: Director, Office of Management  
Information and Program Control  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555 (3)

Director, Office of Inspection and  
Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555 (30)

Mr. L. C. Shalla  
SARC Chairman  
PRC Chairman  
Fort Calhoun File (2)

770950102