

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

50-285/76-8

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 6

PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION

LICENSEE NAME: 01 N E F C S I 14
 LICENSE NUMBER: 00-000000-00 25
 LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 30
 EVENT TYPE: 0 3 31 32

REPORT TYPE: 01 CONT 57 58
 REPORT SOURCE: L 59 60
 DOCKET NUMBER: 050-0285 61 68
 EVENT DATE: 032976 69 74
 REPORT DATE: 042176 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 During normal operation at 60 percent power, a loss of power occurred to the 161 KV/
 03 4160 volt house service transformers T1A-3 and T1A-4 at 2237 hours on March 29, 1976.
 04 An automatic fast transfer to the unit auxiliary power transformers T1A-1 and T1A-2
 05 maintained unit operation. Both the diesel generators and the off-site 345 KV supply
 06 are redundant to the 161 KV supply. Power was restored to T1A-3 and (continued)

SYSTEM CODE: E A 10
 CAUSE CODE: C 11
 COMPONENT CODE: Z Z Z Z Z Z 12 17
 PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER: Z 43
 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z 9 9 9 44 47
 VIOLATION: N 48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 A loss of the 161 KV supply to the Fort Calhoun unit substation (due to off-site 161
 09 KV fault) resulted in a loss of power to house service transformers T1A-3 and T1A-4.
 10 No fault condition occurred on any on-site equipment.

FACILITY STATUS: E 9
 % POWER: 060 10 12 13
 OTHER STATUS: NA 44
 METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A 45
 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: NA 46
 FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z 9
 CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z 10
 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA 44
 LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA 45

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

13 000 11 12 13
 TYPE: Z
 DESCRIPTION: NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

14 000 11 12
 DESCRIPTION: NA

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 NA

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

16 Z 10
 TYPE: Z
 DESCRIPTION: NA

PUBLICITY

17 NA

8403260374 760417
 PDR ADDOCK 05000285
 S PDR

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 Event Description: (continued) T1A-4 at 0443 hours on March 30, 1976 (LER 50-285/
 19 76-8). See also Attachments 1 and 2.

NAME: R. L. Andrews

PHONE: 402-536-4000 Ext. 8728

Attachment No. 1

Safety Analysis

The normal source of auxiliary power with the unit at power for the 4160 volt safeguards buses (1A3 and 1A4) is from the house service power transformers being fed from the 161 KV incoming line. Standby power is immediately available via the unit auxiliary transformers with on-site emergency power available from either one of two diesel generators.

The loss of the 161 KV supply to the house service transformers from 2237 hours on March 29, 1976, to 0443 hours on March 30, 1976, was a result of an off-site fault condition on the 161 KV supplies to the site substation. Unit operation continued as allowed and prescribed by Technical Specification 2.7(2)b, hence a limiting condition for operation of the unit was not violated.

If fast transfer to the standby source (unit auxiliary transformers) had failed, a trip of the unit would have resulted in the temporary loss of the standby source. However, upon loss of the normal and standby power sources, the 4160 volt buses (1A3 and 1A4) would have been energized from the diesel generators. The standby source could have been restored by opening motor operated disconnect switch DS-T1 in the bus between the generator and the main transformer, allowing the main and unit auxiliary power transformers to be returned to service.

Therefore, it can be concluded that plant safety was not jeopardized; that no limiting condition for operation was violated; and that no threat to the public health and safety resulted from this event.

Attachment No. 2

Corrective Action

Pursuant to the specific requirements of Technical Specification 2.7(2)b (upon loss of house service transformers T1A-3 and T1A-4) the following was accomplished:

- a. Both diesel generators were started to verify their operability.
- b. The NRC-OIE (Mr. J. Ward) was notified by telephone at 0025 hours on March 30, 1976. Followup telephone conversation was conducted with Mr. R. Smith (NRC-OIE) at 0830 hours on March 30, 1976.
- c. This Licensee Event Report was submitted.

Outages of the 161 KV supply to the unit are unusual and infrequent. In this instance 161 KV circuit 1588 from Blair substation 1226 to Fort Calhoun substation 1251 was tripped at substation 1226 by protective relays. A severe storm was in progress at the time; high winds, sleet and snow, which caused a momentary phase to phase fault on circuit 1588. In order to clear this fault the supply breakers for circuit 1588 were automatically tripped at substation 1226 resulting in a loss of off-site 161 KV power to substation 1251. The line (circuit 1588) was inspected to verify that no damage had occurred and following verification the line was successfully re-energized.

Omaha Public Power District

1623 HARNEY ■ OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68102 ■ TELEPHONE 536-4000 AREA CODE 402



April 21, 1976
FC-138-76

Mr. E. Morris Howard
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76012



Dear Mr. Howard:

Reference: Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-285

In accordance with the Fort Calhoun Station's Technical Specifications, the Omaha Public Power District, as holder of facility operating license DPR-40, submits three copies of the following licensee event report 50-285/76-8 to satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.16.

Sincerely,

W. C. Jones
Section Manager
Operations

WCJ/WDD:rgē

Enclosure

cc: Director, Office of Management
Information and Program Control
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555 (3)

Director, Office of Inspection and
Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555 (30)

Mr. L. C. Shalla
SARC Chairman
PRC Chairman
Fort Calhoun File (2)

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