



THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

P.O. BOX 5000 - CLEVELAND, OHIO 44101 - TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 - ILLUMINATING BLDG. - 55 PUBLIC SQUARE

Serving The Best Location in the Nation

MURRAY R. EDELMAN
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR

March 16, 1984

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

RE: Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441
Lack of Power Monitor Downstream
of Fuses in the HPCS Safety-
Related Control Circuits [RDC 98(84)]

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter is the final report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) on the deficiency concerning the lack of a power monitor downstream of fuses in the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) safety-related control circuits. Mr. P. R. Pelke of your office was notified on February 16, 1984, by Mr. B. D. Walrath of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) that this problem was being evaluated. This discrepancy was identified during a safety system functional capability review being performed for CEI by GDS Associates.

This report contains a description of the deficiency, analysis of safety implications and planned corrective action to be implemented.

Description of Deficiency

FSAR Section 1.8 states that bypass and inoperable status indication is provided in the plant control room in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.47. As shown on B-208-065 (E22) sheet A100 Rev. F, there is no power monitor downstream of the fuses for relays K9CX1, 2 and 3. If the fuses are blown or removed, the Balance of Plant (BOP) Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) initiation signals to safety equipment would be lost without any indication to the operator. This safety equipment includes both the Emergency Service Water (ESW) System and the diesel generator for Division 3 power. The balance of plant isolation signal that isolates nonsafety equipment off of the safety bus in the event of a LOCA would also be lost.

8403260247 840316
PDR ADOCK 05000440
S PDR

MAR 19 1984

110 IE27

Analysis of Safety Implications


In the event the identified fuses are blown or removed, HPCS (which provides core cooling in the event of a LOCA) would be unavailable with no indication to the control room operator. If this happens, a limiting condition of operation would occur without operator knowledge. This could result in a violation of our technical specifications if an additional Emergency Core Cooling System was removed from service.

Corrective Action

Gilbert Associates, Incorporated, our Architect/Engineer, is currently evaluating the as-designed condition of the system and will make appropriate design changes to correct the control circuits. The design changes are planned to be completed and issued by May 1, 1984.

Please call if there are any questions.

Sincerely,



Murray R. Edelman
Vice President
Nuclear Group

MRE:pab

cc: Mr. M. L. Gildner
NRC Site Office

Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
c/o Document Management Branch
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center, SEE-IN
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339