

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2		
TITLE (4) Isolated Fire Protection Spray Header																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 2	2 1	8 4	8 4	0 1 8	0 0	0 3	2 0	8 4	Sequoyah, Unit 2				0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8			
OPERATING MODE (9) 5			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)													
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0			20.402(b)				20.406(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)	
			20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.36(e)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)	
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(e)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
			20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)					
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME Glenn B. Kirk, Compliance Section Engineer										TELEPHONE NUMBER						
										AREA CODE 6 1 5 8 7 0 - 6 1 4 6						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 02/23/84 at 1200(C), fire protection deluge valve 0-FCV-26-211 was found isolated with no continuous fire watch in place. Investigation revealed that the deluge valve had been isolated at approximately 0353(C) on 02/21/84 in order to drain the sprinkler header which had been charged by a spurious signal. The unit operator failed to initiate a continuous fire watch as required by LCO 3.7.11.2 and later failed to have the isolation valve reopened after the sprinkler header had drained. A continuous fire watch was initiated on discovery of the condition, and the isolation valve (0-HCV-26-1125) was reopened at 1249(C) on 02/23/84.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7 8 4 - 0 1 8 - 0 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
					0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On 02/23/84 at 1200(C) with unit 1 in mode 5 (176 degrees F, 280 psig) and unit 2 in mode 1 (578 degrees F, 2235 psig), fire protection deluge valve 0-FCV-26-211 was discovered isolated with no continuous fire watch in place. Investigation revealed that on 02/21/84 a spurious signal had opened the deluge valve and charged the sprinkler header to the spreading room (elevation 706, control building) and the Operations office area (elevation 732, control building). An assistant unit operator (AUO) was dispatched to close the valve and drain the sprinkler header. In order to drain the header, the AUO isolated the deluge valve by closing valve 0-HCV-26-1125. The AUO notified the unit operator (UO) that the deluge valve had been isolated and the header was draining. The UO failed to initiate a continuous fire watch as required by LCO 3.7.11.2 and failed to have the isolation valve reopened when the sprinkler header had drained. The sprinkler header was inoperable from approximately 0353(C) on 02/21/84 when the deluge valve was isolated until 02/23/84 at 1249(C) when the isolation valve was reopened. A fire watch was established at 1200(C) on 02/23/84 when the condition was discovered.

This event was discussed with shift groups, and emphasis was placed on the requirements for establishing fire watches for inoperable portions of fire protection systems.

There was no effect on public health or safety.

There have been no previous occurrences.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Post Office Box 2000
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

March 20, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555


Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT
SQRO-50-327/84018

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning a fire protection deluge valve found isolated. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a.2.ii.b.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



C. C. Mason
Power Plant Superintendent

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

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NRC Inspector, NUC PR, Sequoyah

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